501.BD Refugees/5–2046
The British Minister (Makins) to Mr. C. Tyler Wood, Special
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Clayton)
Ref. 173/–/46
Washington, May 20, 1946.
My Dear Ty: Would you refer to the Aide-Mémoire of May 13th about the
proceedings of the Refugee Committee.
- 2.
- After the conversation which we had on this matter on May
12th, I informed the Foreign Office that the initial reaction of
the State Department was (a) that the
proposed tie-up with the United Nations on matters of policy
would merely provide another opportunity for the “Slav group” to
obstruct and block action, and (b) that
the proposal for negotiation of an agreement within the Economic
and Social Council was open to the same objection and that a
direct negotiation among those willing to help would make for
more rapid and effective action. I said you felt that we should
not get co-operation of any kind from Eastern Europe on this
issue, and that it would be more realistic to face this fact at
once.
- 3.
- I have now had a considered reply, of which I enclose a copy
for your confidential information. I have left in the expression
“Slav group” as a matter of convenience, although it is not a
term of art.
- 4.
- I very much hope that in all the circumstances you may find it
possible to send instructions to Warren75 as proposed in the last paragraph of the
enclosure to this letter.
- 5.
- Perhaps when you have had time to digest this document we
could have a talk about it.
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Text of Message From Foreign
Office
While we appreciate the United States point of view, we fear we
cannot agree as regards their point (a).
- 2.
- If the Slav group are so strongly represented as they
apparently expect to be in the new organisation, they will
have far more opportunity [Page 165] to obstruct and block action in that
organisation if it is in the last resort wholly independent
than if it is subject to some kind of ultimate political and
financial United Nations control. Minister of State points
out that, on refugee and displaced persons questions, we
have always hitherto had overwhelming majorities against the
Slav group in the Executive Committee, the Preparatory
Commission and the Assembly of the United Nations, and also
in the Economic and Social Council, except when we and the
United States Government have disagreed; and no doubt we
could always do the same in future. It is clear moreover
that the only way of getting any power behind the work to be
done by the new organisation is by means of assembly
debates, but such debates will have little value if the
United Nations is without any effective ultimate control.
Moreover if such United Nations’ control could be provided
for, and the United States Government would help to make it
effective, so that it was clear that the authority of the
United Nations Assembly was behind the new organisation, the
chances of the work of the latter being a success would be
far better even than in the case of the refugee work
undertaken after the first world war by Dr. Nansen, when he
had much less government backing and much less money, and
was nevertheless able to get successful large-scale
results.
- 3.
- The above arguments in favour of the proposed tie-up with
the United Nations seem to us to apply equally as regard the
negotiation of the agreement establishing the new body. The
Slav group, who are anxious to restrict the scope of the new
organisation, have strong views about the form this
agreement should take and they are more likely to be able to
make these views effective in independent negotiations
between a group of powers such as those represented on the
Refugee Committee than they would be if the Economic and
Social Council sponsored the new agreement and gave its
official blessing in advance to an agreed text which
representatives of all the nations represented at the
Assembly would adopt as a resolution of that body
establishing the new organisation.
- 4.
- We fully understand and indeed have good reasons to
appreciate the State Department’s view that we are unlikely
to get effective cooperation of any kind from the Slav group
on this issue and that it might be “more realistic to face
this fact at once”. But we are not clear what conclusions
they draw from this premise. Are they contemplating the
creation of a new International Refugee Organisation in
which the Slav Powers would not participate at all? If so
how do they contemplate that the reversal of policy implied
should be carried out? Would they suggest that we should
work for a complete break with the Slav Powers on major
issues of principle, and that we [Page 166] should then call a new and separate
conference, without the Slav Powers, to draw up new
proposals and a new constitution? It would be useful to have
the State Department’s views on all these points.
- 5.
- The advantages of a separate organisation without the Slav
Powers are obvious. The main sources of difference on issues
of principle being removed, it would no doubt be much easier
to reach agreement regarding the composition, constitution,
mandate, etc., of the new body. The non-participation of the
Slav Powers in the financial arrangements would
theoretically throw a heavier burden on the participating
powers but as it seems clear that the Slav Powers will in
fact make no effective contribution or only do so to a
limited extent and on conditions which would greatly add to
the difficulty, complexity and duration of the new
organisation’s work, this point is perhaps more one of form
than of substance. From the financial point of view in fact
they might be more of a liability than an asset.
- 6.
- The disadvantages seem to be the difficulty of reversing
our policy on so major an issue as that of the participation
of the Slav Powers in the new organisation, the complete
loss of support which it might involve from the majority of
countries of origin for any activities undertaken by the new
organisation (which might prove particularly inconvenient in
questions of repatriation, screening, etc.), and above all
the open breach in the principle of United Nations
cooperation, for the maintenance of which we have already
made such heavy sacrifices.
- 7.
- If a new organisation without the Slav Powers were to be
created, the objections of United States Government would
have more weight and a strong case might be made for having
no even ultimate-control by the United Nations. On the other
hand lack of United Nations backing would inevitably reduce
the power and authority of the new body, with consequent
loss in efficiency. Moreover, other problems such as that of
providing finance outside the United Nations budget would
still remain.
- 8.
- Meanwhile we have been out-voted in the Refugee Committee
on the major questions of the integration of the new
organisation into the United Nations and of the creation as
an alternative of a commission of the Economic and Social
Council to control it. We have since been trying to ensure
that the type of relationship with (including the degree of
control by) the United Nations, should at least be left as
open as possible. Warren has been strongly resisting this
with the active support of the Slav group. It would be a
great help if he could receive instructions at least to
agree to leave this issue open.
