CFM Files

Verbatim Record

C.P.(Plen) 17

President: Mr. Byrnes (U.S.A.)

The President: (Interpretation): The meeting is opened.

Declaration on the Bulgarian Statement (continued):

The President: (Interpretation): As the Conference decided this morning, the English and Russian interpretation of the remarks made by the Greek representative will now be presented.

(The respective interpretations were duly given)

The President: (Interpretation): If no one wishes to speak, the discussion on the statement by the Bulgarian Delegation is now concluded.

The President: The Conference will now hear the statement of the Hungarian Delegation as was decided previously.

I request the Secretary-General to introduce the Hungarian Delegation.

(The Hungarian Delegation was introduced into the Conference by the Secretary-General).

The President: (Interpretation): In the name of the Conference I welcome the Hungarian Delegation. Their views will be put forward by the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and I now request him to speak.

[Mr. Gyöngyösi:] Mr. President, Fellow Delegates—Allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude for the invitation you sent to Hungary to appear at this Conference, thus enabling the Hungarian Government to state its views on the peace treaty which will mark the end of the second world war.

The fact of being allowed to appear and to speak freely fills us with the hope that, this time, the peace negotiations will be different from those we knew over twenty-five years ago. We hope that the settlement resulting from the present talks, will establish a lasting peace, that will assure to the Danubian States a healthy development; this will contribute to a large extent, to ensure the pacification of the whole of Europe, and the rest of the world; it was from Eastern Europe that the sparks burst which twice set the world on fire, provoking the world wars which brought endless sufferings to mankind.

One of the most important guarantees of a lasting settlement is the fact that, contrary to the happenings of 1919, it is being elaborated with the aid and approval of the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

[Page 211]

Representing a vanquished nation, but full of apprehension and fear for the future of mankind, I would like, first, to make two remarks. A peace treaty marks the end of a war. It has necessarily grave consequences for the vanquished. But a peace treaty is at the same time the basis for the future, it is a new beginning, an instrument to eliminate the causes of friction and to ensure the reconstruction of the devastated countries, the reinstatement of distressed populations and the restoration of broken international relations. A peace treaty is thus a sharp division between the past and the future. In our common interest, a peace treaty should take into account the liquidation of past errors and the necessity of establishing a better future. The repressive clauses contained in a peace treaty should, then, be counterbalanced by constructive possibilities which it guarantees.

It is a new, a democratic Hungary that appears to-day before the Conference. The liberating forces of 1848 and the democratic energy of 1918 are united in her. To-day, as on those two occasions, the Hungarian people have taken their fate into their own hands; this time, they will retain it. In a diplomatic note recognising on behalf of the Soviet Government the Hungarian Government, Marshal Voroshilov noted the efforts made by the provisional Hungarian Government as having contributed to “the success of the struggle of the United Nations against Germany.”

But apart from this first result, Hungarian democracy can show other positive results it has achieved in spite of extraordinary initial difficulties. An agrarian reform has completely ended feudal property, stern punishment has been meted out to the war-criminals of former regimes. Finally, first among all liberated countries, Hungary has held free elections by universal suffrage and secret ballot; she was first to institute a press free from all shackles, to re-establish the right to criticise freely and parliamentary institutions.

We know, of course, that the building of democracy cannot be the result of a few months’ hasty work, we know there still, of necessity, persist some faults and failings; but the first results obtained are encouraging. If, to the contrary of what happened in 1918, the Hungarian democracy finds understanding and assistance; if the peace treaty assures to every Hungarian living in the Hungarian State or away from it, the possibility of living a free individual, social and national life, then the Hungarian Democarcy will be able to face the future with confidence and will find it possible to take a useful and constructive part in the work of the democratic peoples.

As we are defending the future of Hungarian democracy, we do not want to forget or deny that in the great struggle just ended, through the fault of the reactionary regime, and social structure, as [Page 212] well as the blindness of its leaders, Hungary has sided against the cause which was that of all peoples and also of the Hungarian people. But the attitude of the Hungarian masses has hampered the actions of the Government; the events of March 1944, the occupation of the country by German troops, the repressions exercised by the German authorities, prove that, faced by the clear attitude of the Hungarian masses, the Hungarian leaders of the old regime could not serve the cause of National-Socialist Germany to the full measure Germany wished and certain States felt obliged to do. Moreover, the Hungarian peasants, the workers in the towns, the intellectuals have organised Resistance, have sabotaged the German War effort and many of them have contributed to the struggle for the liberation of other peoples. Up to the time Hungary was occupied by the Germans, a large number of persecuted people found there a refuge. This refuge was safeguarded there in spite of everything.

There cannot be any doubt that Hungary has fought this war at the side of Germany. It is in this that the responsibility is heavy. But this responsibility is different, both in quality and in quality [quantity?], from that falling on National-Socialism and Fascism, for the simple reason that, in a world conflict, a small nation sees its freedom of action severely limited. Whatever the measure of our responsibility it cannot implicate the whole of the Hungarian population, even if the debatable principle of collective security [responsibility?] is admitted.

Democratic Hungary repudiates aggressive, revisionist policy and true interpreter of the real feelings of the Hungarian nation, intends to live in peace and harmony with its neighbours. This in spite of the fact that after the first world war, one quarter of the Hungarian nation found itself, by virtue of the peace treaty, outside the frontiers of the Hungarian State. These Hungarians had the citizenship of the neighbouring States forced upon them, at a time when all nationalities tended to group themselves into States. The wish to see all Hungarians re-united into the frontiers of one national State should seem legitimate.

Nevertheless, it appears that the realisation of this aim is rendered difficult by geographical and political obstacles, not easily solved. That is why, the constantly acute problem consists—as the frontiers cannot be altered—in modifying the importance of the frontiers and in assuring to the Hungarians, living on the territory of another State, liberties that are the essential conditions of democracy, i.e. the right to live independently, free of want and fear, maintaining their national character.

Unfortunately, I am sorry to be compelled to observe that, very often, on [in] our regions, the condition of those belonging to a national [Page 213] minority, consists in being not only regarded as a national of another State, but being also deprived of the exercise of human rights and, partly, of the guarantee of human dignity.

The settlement which followed the first world war had clauses concerning territories peopled by minorities. These clauses have not always guaranteed the full respect of human rights, but, their application being controlled by the League of Nations, it was at least possible to have a right of appeal.

We are also aware that Hitlerite Germany has known, for its own Imperialist political needs, how to make full use of the guarantees assured to national minorities by the treaties. But the fact that she misused them does not justify the abandonment of a necessary guarantee. This is confirmed by the claims advanced by the international representatives of Jewish organisations, the most authoritative in the matter, as a result of the cruel persecutions they have endured.

It is known to the Hungarian Government that the United Nations Organisation intends to prepare a charter on human rights. This will take time. On the other hand, the United Nations Charter and the declarations of principle contained in the drafts of peace treaties, only mention certain liberties, leaving out the right of choosing one’s domicile, the right of choosing one’s language of instruction, the right of work and the right of enterprise. In a world torn by passions and national intolerance resulting from the war, it is precisely these liberties that it is essential to assure. It would then seem necessary, until the entry into force of the code to be issued by the United Nations Organisation, to come to an agreement whereby the States with a mixed central and Eastern European population, should pledge themselves to respect the exercise of these liberties. May I be allowed to refer in this matter to the memorandum handed to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Events which occurred since the war produced in Hungary a feeling of uneasiness especially with regard to the position of the Hungarians in Roumania where there are more than a million and a half of them and in Czechoslovakia where, according to the Czechs’ own statistics, there are more than six hundred and fifty thousand. The problem therefore concerns hundreds of thousands of individuals and relations between a number of States occupying an important part of Europe the lasting peace of which is involved.

Before I propose a solution of the problems concerning the Roumanian-Hungarian frontiers which we consider to be practicable, we must refer to a certain statement made here by the Head of the Roumanian Delegation. He seems to consider that the decision adopted by the four Foreign Ministers had settled the differences between Roumania and Hungary. For its own part, the Hungarian nation [Page 214] would not consider that this problem had been finally resolved. The Council of the Foreign Ministers abolished the Vienna Award, the work of Fascist Germany, and thereby automatically re-established the Roumanian frontier of 1938. But this in no way resolves the problem facing the two nations. It is true that the Head of the Roumanian Delegation was anxious to give assurances that his country would guarantee equal rights to her new Roumanian citizens. We note this declaration with satisfaction but, unfortunately, I am bound to state that the obviously excellent intentions of the Roumanian Government are frustrated by the chauvinistic spirit animating the authorities and by the anti-Hungarian feelings prevailing in the nationalist organisations. Anxiety is felt for the Hungarians not only in regard to the exercise by them of their political rights but mainly on account of the danger to which their status of equality in the economic plan is exposed with the consequent considerable impoverishment of the Hungarian population in Transylvania which is already apparent. We are glad to grasp the hand extended to us by the Roumanian Government because it is our long-felt desire to live in good understanding with our eastern neighbour. But we must first resolve the difference which undoubtedly exists between us. We suggested such a course spontaneously and on a number of occasions and proposed direct negotiations even before appealing to the Council of Foreign Ministers. We met with a refusal. We are even now prepared to accept any reasonable settlement involving the minimum of sacrifice to the two nations, a settlement which would lead to the establishment between us of conditions favouring a lasting peace and friendship.

We therefore request that the Conference should ask Roumania to send her delegates to confer with us. Let us try to settle these problems together. If these negotiations prove unsuccessful, the Conference could send a Commission with powers to investigate the situation on the spot and to draft a proposed solution for the consideration of the Conference.

Our standpoint is clear from the notes we have sent. We believed that we could understand the intentions of the great victorious powers from the armistice terms as signed by Roumania. Article 19 of these terms provided for the return of Transylvania, or at least of her major part to Roumania. We thought that on the basis of these terms we could make certain modest claims. We requested the return of only 22,000 of the 103,000 square kilometres of the Transylvania which lay within the boundaries of Hungary before the First World War. We did this in the hope that a solution of this kind would better serve the good understanding between the two nations. In practice [Page 215] this would mean that approximately the same number of Hungarians would remain within the boundaries of Roumania as there would be Roumanians on Hungarian territory. The two nations would, therefore, be equally interested in a satisfactory solution of the problem of minorities, with the result that wide territorial autonomies may be granted to them on both sides of the frontier.

In his speech from this rostrum, the Head of the Roumanian Delegation saw fit to claim reparations from Hungary.4 We can discover no moral or legal justification for them. But I cannot dwell on the substance of this problem until the memorandum presented by the Roumanian Government on the subject of these claims is placed at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.

The other important problem which concerns the foreign policy of Hungary is that of its relations with Czechoslovakia. I wish to state that Democratic Hungary, which regards as its primary concern the good understanding and even the friendly co-operation with her neighbouring States looked most hopefully to Czechoslovakia. She saw her as the carrier of the noble ideas of Thomas Masaryk. Yet we were sadly disappointed when we discovered that, through no fault of ours, it became impossible to arrive at this good understanding. I therefore much regret that for this reason I must inform you of the difference which had appeared between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. While recovering from the chaos of war, Democratic Hungary was astonished and then grieved to witness the expulsion, in defiance of the rights of man, of thousands of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, often at a few hours notice and only with a few items of hand-baggage. Six hundred and fifty thousand Hungarians living in Slovakia were deprived of their national status and of the most elementary human rights. Property belonging to citizens of Hungarian nationality was confiscated. No Hungarian may legally engage in any intellectual or manual labour. He may not appeal to a court or join a trade union or enjoy his rights as a citizen. The use of the Hungarian language is forbidden in public offices, often even in church and in any public place in general under threat of punishment. No periodical in the Hungarian language may appear in Czechoslovakia. Hungarian may not be spoken over the telephone, nor are telegrams in Hungarian accepted for transmission. No Hungarian may own a wireless set. There is no instruction carried out in Hungarian. Moreover, private tuition, if carried out in Hungarian, is punishable. The Czech authorities dismissed without compensation those officials employed by the State or in private business who were of Hungarian nationality. They stopped all payments of pensions and superannuation and war [Page 216] wounded, war widows and orphans no longer receive the subsistence allowances to which they were entitled.

Despite all these regrettable measures, the Hungarian Government did everything in its power to improve the relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. With this purpose in view but against its better sentiment the Hungarian Government thought it necessary to conclude, [through] negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, an agreement on the exchange of populations, as recommended by the great Powers. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, the Slovaks and Czechs who reside in Hungary may request to be transferred to Czechoslovakia. For its own part the Czechoslovak Government has the right to compulsory transfer to Hungary, of a number of Hungarians equal to that of the Slovaks and Czechs who had applied for permission to leave Hungary. Under the provisions of this agreement, the Hungarian Government allowed a Czechoslovak Mission accompanied by a military escort, to devote six weeks to propaganda on Hungarian territory intended to induce the Slovaks to apply for a voluntary transfer. Seven hundred Czechoslovak agents were thus employed on Hungarian territory using every means of propaganda, making free use of Hungarian broadcasting facilities not to mention their press, proclamations and posters. In addition they organised public meetings, staged performances in the theatres and exhibited films.

As a result of this unprecedented propaganda, the number of Slovaks in Hungary to request their transfer amounted to one eighth, at the most, of the number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. Thus, even after this transfer, at least half a million Hungarians will still remain in Slovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government intends to push one portion of this considerable Hungarian population into Hungary, and to do away with the other portion by forcibly assimilating it. The Czechoslovak Government pretends to justify all these measures by arguing that the Hungarian minority had betrayed Czechoslovakia at the time of the Munich crisis. As to the attitude adopted by the Hungarian minority during that crisis, I venture to refer to a German secret document which was recently published by the U.S. Department of State. According to this document, on 16th September, Goering sent for the Hungarian Minister in Berlin and made representations to him on account of the indifferent attitude adopted by the Hungarians during the international crisis.

“The Hungarian press was keeping comparatively silent. In the Hungarian minority areas in Czechoslovakia it was completely calm in contrast to the situation in the Sudeten German areas.”5

[Page 217]

For our part, we shall stress and, if necessary, prove that the Hungarian minority played neither a decisive nor even an important part in the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak State in 1938. Indeed it constituted only a small percentage of the entire population. As in the case of the Slovenes, it only demanded a wider autonomy within the State. When an independent Slovakia was established under German protection with the assent of a great majority of the Slovaks, the Hungarians of Slovakia alone refused to collaborate with the Germans and Slovaks and therefore suffered persecution. They openly declared against the establishment of Fascist rule and defended democracy and humane principles in parliament and in the press.

The forcible eviction of the Hungarians from Slovakia is not only morally and politically unjustifiable, it would confront Hungary with an economic, social and political problem which she is unable to solve. It must not be forgotten that the problem involves the eviction and resettlement of a rural population uprooted from their ancestral homes and land.

Gentlemen, however serious and desperate our position may be, the defeated party can never be denied the right of believing that such a demand is contrary to morality and humanity. And if a Hungarian Government could be found willing to accept it under outside pressure, it would be digging its own grave and the grave of Hungarian democracy by so doing. The land and the people who have tilled it for centuries and implanted their civilization therein, are indissolubly linked together. Such a bond could only be forcibly broken by violation of the fundamental laws of human existence. Czechoslovakia wants to keep territory inhabited by Hungarians. In that case let her keep the Hungarians also and give them the full rights of the individual and the citizen. If for any reason Czechoslovakia refuses to do so and insists on the forcible removal of the Hungarian minority, the Hungarian Government would be compelled to maintain the principle that the land is the people’s.

The solution of the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian problem is hampered by the fact that essental differences emerge between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak standpoints on the facts just referred to. That is why the Hungarian Government feels it should ask the Peace Conference to send an international commission of experts to the spot who would enquire into all these questions and make the necessary investigations.

Turning to the economic problems, may I, Gentlemen, draw your attention to the risk that a peace treaty may reduce a country to permanent poverty. Democratic and peaceful development is, after all, hardly compatible with an economic situation which merely enables the population to live on the brink of starvation.

[Page 218]

Preliminary study of the economic clauses of the draft treaty shows that they are even more burdensome than the corresponding clauses in the Armistice, which were already sufficiently severe. They maintain these clauses in principle, but aggravate them in detail, and there are a number of new clauses which augment the difficulties Hungary is already encountering and which threaten to impede the rehabilitation which is necessary for the execution of her international obligations. I am referring only to the articles providing for the liquidation of Hungarian property on United Nations territory and the recognition of any claims Hungary possess and those she may lodge against Germany and her ex-allies.

When it signed the Armistice, the Hungarian Government was still unable to form a true idea of the economic situation of the country. It was only when the common enemy had been driven out and the Government started on the work of reconstruction that it was able to form a better idea of the extent of the destruction.

It then became clear that the productive forces of the country and its national patrimony had been much more seriously damaged than was assumed at the time of the Armistice. The tasks involved in the work of reconstruction were also considerably aggravated. Before the war our national capital was estimated to be 52 milliard pengös or 10 milliard dollars. As a result of the war, 35 to 40% of this capital has been lost. We have lost 35% of the capital invested in our agriculture and more than half our live-stock. One-third of the capital invested in industry has been lost and the other third so seriously impaired that it is useless for production. Finally, one of the most serious reasons for our post-war poverty is that two-thirds of our rolling stock was destroyed or removed by the Germans.

Those are the circumstances in which we have resumed our economic activity. We are anxious to comply with the reparation obligations we assumed under the Armistice and we have made superhuman efforts to rehabilitate our productive forces on a very modest scale. The cost of reconstruction, added to the burden of reparations—only a part of which has been paid because of the hardship prevailing in the country—has called for economic resources which, in view of the total lack of capital, can only be met by inflationary measures almost unprecedented in economic history. This inflation, mainly due to the almost total lack of commodities and the absence of the requisite State revenue, has engulfed the scanty reserves which the population had managed to retain.

Inflation in Hungary has reached such a pitch, that the Hungarian Government has been compelled to try at all costs and with no help from abroad, to stabilise the currency. This has been done, of course, [Page 219] at the cost of great sacrifices borne by the general population. Real wages for instance, only represent 25% of the extremely low pre-war wages level and barely a tenth of the earnings of American workmen. In the year 1946–1947, the per capita national revenue, it is estimated, will only be 350 pre-war pengös, that is 70 dollars, some 25% of which will be absorbed by taxation. The food ration, disregarding the additions for special categories of workers, will only furnish one hundred calories a day, nearly half of which will have to be obtained from UNRRA supplies.

The stabilisation budget represents the maximum effort we can achieve. The items applying to reparations, the maintenance of the Inter-allied Control Commission and the Army of Occupation account for one-third of budget expenditure and absorb 40% of the State Revenue. Even in these circumstances, the sums budgeted for reparations only suffice because the Soviet Union was good enough to allow us to make our reparations payments by instalments and to reckon against the first two annual payments the value of the Hungarian capital invested in an important concern abroad. This generosity, together with the gratitude we owe the liberators of our country, compels us to concentrate our efforts and devote all our energy to meeting our obligations.

The figures I have just quoted, will have shown you that it has been impossible to make provision in our stabilisation budget for the service of our pre-war debts and the payments involved in the restitution of Allied property as provided for in the draft treaty.

We trust that, in its wisdom, the Conference will put us in a position to meet the obligations arising out of our pre-war debts—the existence of which we formally recognise—and our other international obligations, while at the same time avoiding the further economic collapse of our country.

We will take the liberty of putting before the relevant commission, our detailed observations with the necessary supporting evidence on these problems. May I, however, venture to voice here our main idea—to find an equilibrium between the burdens and the payment capacity of a debtor country on the basis of a very modest standard of living for the population and extremely low possibilities of reconstruction of its national economy.

These objectives, modest though they are, can only be achieved with your assistance and your understanding. We therefore, ask for the support of the United Nations for the Hungarian nation, so sorely tried, in order that its efforts to rebuild its country and comply with its international undertakings may be facilitated.

[Page 220]

Gentlemen, I do not propose to try your patience any longer and I shall therefore bring my statement to an end. The Hungarian Republic has asked me to be its mouth-piece and has also placed in me all its hopes for the future. The Hungarian people, which is trying to overcome past hindrances and present difficulties relying on its own resources, hopes for the victory of democratic principles. The immense majority of the nation desired the victory of the United Nations because they saw in it the dawn of an era of justice and the abolition of force both in international and domestic relations.

We know that the United Nations have set themselves the task not only of drawing up the treaties of Peace but, primarily and above all, the establishment of Peace. This task, however, can only be achieved if the spirit imbuing the Charter of the United Nations is also found in the treaties which are designed to bring about lasting peace. We were glad to learn that the conclusion of peace would enable us to join the United Nations Organisation. We shall apply for admission to the Organisation and we can, here and now, assure you that we will give it all the loyal co-operation of whch we are capable. The presence in the new international organisation of the Soviet Union and the United States of America is a guarantee that this association of peoples will be really world-wide.

The Hungarian nation awaits your decision with confidence. It knows it will have to pass through difficult times, but it is resolved to build its future courageously. If it were disappointed, the consequences would be such as I refuse to contemplate. I would not like here to utter any words which might be interpreted as a kind of despairing appeal incompatible with the dignity of an ancient nation which has suffered much and is proud of having on occasion done good service to humanity and civilisation. I am sure that all of you will make a point of weighing carefully what you think should be laid down so as to confer again on the unhappy Hungarian people, Peace, the right of membership in a new world and the possibility of rejoining the Association of free nations.

The President: The Conference has given the closest attention to the statement just delivered by the Hungarian Delegation.

The Members of this Conference will carefully examine the terms of this statement.

I beg the Secretary-General to escort the Hungarian Delegation.

(The Hungarian Delegation leaves).

M. Jan Masaryk (Czechoslovakia)—(Interpretation):

Mr. President—after listening with much attention to the somewhat surprising and unprecedented declaration just made by Hungary, an ex-enemy state, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation would like to have the [Page 221] opportunity of studying this declaration in detail so as to reply upon it tomorrow morning.

Fixing of the Agenda

The President: The Czecho-Slovak Delegate has made a proposal. Any opposition?

(Adopted).

The first item on tomorrow’s agenda will therefore be the debate on the Hungarian statement.

After this debate, the Conference will receive the Finnish Delegation.

After the meeting tomorrow morning the Conference will decide on the setting up of various Commissions required for the work of the Conference. These Commissions may possibly meet in the afternoon.

May I add that the meeting tomorrow morning will be presided by M. Ouang Shih-Chieh, the Chinese Delegate. Does anyone desire to speak? I declare the meeting closed.

(The Meeting rose at 7:15 p.m.)

  1. For text of Tatarescu’s remarks, see the extract from the Verbatim Record of the 15th Plenary Meeting, August 13, p. 191.
  2. For text of the German Foreign Office memorandum from which this excerpt is taken, see Department of State Bulletin, June 9, 1946, p. 984.