740.0011 EW(Peace)/8–1046
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Reber)
| Participants: | The Secretary of State |
| Prime Minister de Gasperi (Italy) | |
| Mr. Reber |
The Secretary explained that he had asked the Prime Minister to call to be certain that the latter understood the U.S. position in one respect. The Secretary said that there was owing to the Italian Government from the United States the sum of approximately $125 million [Page 173] in payment for services and supplies furnished. Should this payment however be made at this time the Secretary feared that it would give claimants for reparations such as Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, and the others the possibility of getting it away from Italy. As the Prime Minister was aware the United States had always taken the position that Italy was not in a position to make heavy reparations payments, so that if the others discovered that Italy was receiving this sum they would use every effort to get possession of it themselves. The Secretary then said he wished Mr. de Gasperi to understand that whereas the United States recognized its obligation and would make the payment it would prefer not to do so until after the reparations settlements had been made. The Prime Minister appreciated this situation and thanked the Secretary.
The Prime Minister asked the Secretary what he thought were the chances of an agreement in respect of Trieste. Mr. Byrnes reviewed at considerable length the situation which had led up to the U.S. agreement to the Free Territory of Trieste and explained that, given the apparent Yugoslav determination to gain possession of the area, the creation of the Free Territory directly under the Security Council of the United Nations gave far more assurance that the Territory would not become Yugoslav than would have been the case if it had remained Italian. As soon as Allied troops were withdrawn, ninety days after the Treaty, it had seemed most likely that Yugoslavia would create an incident and be in a position to take it away from Italy since Italian forces would not be strong enough to resist. Now that the United Nations had been made responsible for the security and protection of this Territory far greater assurances could be given since it was out of the question that the 51 United Nations could allow Yugoslavia to violate a territory under their direct protection. Under this arrangement even Soviet Russia was obligated to safeguard the Free Territory and to guarantee its integrity.
De Gasperi was worried about the possibility of keeping order in a state which was unwelcome to both parties and where even today Allied forces could not manage to insure personal security. The Secretary replied that obviously adequate police powers must be given the Governor of this Territory and personal security must be insured both by an International Police Force and by a proper Statute. He said that the United States was committed to seeing that a real basis for security was provided through a sound Statute and would resist any effort to weaken or make ineffectual the Constitution of this Territory.
De Gasperi then explained his concern over the economic future of the area as he said that it was obvious that Italy would no longer be prepared to give financial support or provide in the same way for [Page 174] the development of the area as it had in the past, and he feared that unrest caused by the lack of employment would mean increased Communist influence in the area and the eventual control of the Government by the Communist Party which in turn would lead to a vote by the Assembly for incorporation into Yugoslavia. He asked what could be done if an allegedly popular Assembly voted for this. The Secretary replied that the Governor would have the right of veto and would be required to exercise it in this case as he was obligated to protect the independence of the Territory. Mr. Byrnes said he was somewhat surprised that de Gasperi should accept as a foregone conclusion the fact that the population of the Territory was entirely Communist and would vote for incorporation into Yugoslavia. He said our object had been to protect the Italians in this area and therefore wondered why we should do so if they were all Communist and pro-Yugoslav. De Gasperi answered that in this day of social changes one could not foresee what pressure would be brought to bear on many people to increase Communism and Communist strength among a people who would be disillusioned in any event by the settlement.
In conclusion, de Gasperi said, however, there was one most important element which he wished to stress; namely, that if Pola, a purely Italian city, and the Italian towns along the coast were transferred outright to Yugoslavia, no Government in Italy could sign the Treaty and survive. Even the Socialists, whom he had consulted on this point, had said that they would be unable to do so and that the Communists alone could agree. He therefore urged with considerable vigor that the Free Territory be enlarged. The Secretary replied that only through considerable effort had the United States been able to secure agreement to the establishment of a Free Territory of this size and was therefore committed to support the present proposal. If, on the other hand, the United States saw any way in which the Territory could be increased the Secretary would think this a better solution, but he could not hold out any hope that there was a likelihood of bringing this about.
After repeating with considerable emphasis his argument with respect to Pola, de Gasperi concluded that whereas Italy might in public naturally have to protest the Free Territory his Government could nevertheless accept it provided it was extended to include Pola and the purely Italian areas to the south.
With respect to the Colonies, de Gasperi asked whether it would be possible to eliminate the provision that Italy should renounce its sovereignty pending the settlement of this question within the period of one year as provided in Article 17. The Secretary said he would give this suggestion all possible consideration.