Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings, Volume III

CFM Files

Verbatim Record

August 9, 1946, 10 a.m.

C.P.(Plen) 8

Chairman: M. Georges Bidault (France)

The Chairman: The meeting is open.

Continuation of the Discussion of the Rules of Procedure and of the Attached Draft Resolution

The Chairman: I call upon M. Manuilsky, Delegate of Ukraine.

M. Manuilsky (Ukraine) (Interpretation).

Before entering into the substance of my statement, allow me to submit a few observations of a more general character.

We are here to deal with an extremely serious matter, we wish to lay the foundations of a solid and lasting peace, and each of us has arrived here fully aware of the weighty responsibility devolving upon him.

For the success of this Conference, it is necessary to admit that each Delegation is entitled to state its views and to explain the position of its country both at meetings of Commissions and at plenary meetings of the Conference.

The Ukrainian Delegation regards the method of discussion chosen by the first Delegate of the United Kingdom as extremely dangerous for those who wish to make use of this right and for those who may not agree with an argument put forward by that Delegate.

This is not our idea of a free discussion, for it constitutes an unjustifiable claim to exercise a dictatorship.

These attempts, it is true, are doomed to failure, but they will have the effect of making the Conference’s work much more difficult.

The Ukrainian Delegation has not taken part in the establishment of the draft treaties prepared by the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers. It also, therefore, might submit a series of amendments bearing upon questions of both substance and procedure. If the Ukrainian Delegation has not done so, this is because its main desire is to facilitate the work of the Conference and thus to ensure its success.

The Ukrainian Delegation has fully realized the great difficulties with which the Council of Foreign Ministers has had to cope in the course of the preparatory work. It knows what efforts have had to be made to reconcile varying opinions and to find a basis of agreement.

We consider that the value of the peace conditions which we are now discussing, the success of the Conference and the lasting character of the peace itself will depend upon the measure of unanimity reached in the decisions which will have to be taken on the questions submitted.

The important problems we have to solve cannot be settled by the automatic comparison of majority and minority.

If this system were adopted, we should end by establishing a most precarious state of affairs after long years of war and final victory. The history of diplomacy is there to show that the best way to settle international relations after a war is that of mutual agreement based on an understanding of the interests of each of the parties, which should be reflected in the decisions to be adopted by all members of this Conference.

The Ukrainian Delegation, to its regret, feels bound to point out that, from the outset of the Conference and under cover of a discussion of questions of procedure, one of the most important decisions of the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers has been brought up again.

Our point of view is as follows: The Council of Foreign Ministers agreed that the decisions of this Conference on the more important questions should be subject to a two-thirds majority. We consider this text as absolutely justified; notwithstanding this, there has been submitted to the Plenary Conference a decision of the Commission on Procedure completely changing the meanng of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. By adopting this decision, we should establish a procedure which is clearly at variance with the decision of the Council of the four Powers and also with the procedure adopted by the Conference of San Francisco, which, I recall, was attended by fifty-one Allied nations.

Article 18, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations reads:

“Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security…”

I ask you, Gentlemen, whether the decisions we take here, those firm foundations of the peace we are striving to ensure, are more important in your mind than recommendations concerning the settlement of disputes considered by the General Assembly. Why has it been felt necessary to upset the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers? Why has the desire arisen to sidetrack the decision adopted by the San Francisco Conference in the best interests of peace and international security.

It is indeed strange that the Paris Conference should have preferred to adopt, in one case by a majority of 11 votes and in another by 14 votes, a decision which formally contradicts the decision previously taken by 51 assembled countries. It is still more strange that after the adoption of this text, the chairman of the Commission on Procedure, M. Spaak, should have submitted on the day following our main meeting, an additional text stipulating that other questions would be settled in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In these circumstances, world public opinion will be hard put to understand the resolution adopted by the Commission on Procedure. It is perfectly obvious that the decision taken by the majority of this Conference devolves from conceptions based not on principles but on a merely numerical count of votes and this count is itself based on the result to be achieved, namely, to impose on a group of the Conference the will of another group of the same Conference.

The Ukrainian Delegation cannot accept a decision of this sort as compatible with the recommendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers which in its turn was approved by countries which, in the Commission on Procedure, have now voted against it. It is extremely doubtful whether such conduct will help the Conference on its way and whether it is likely to lead to that spirit of mutual trust so essential to the success of our work.

During the debate in the Commission on Procedure, it was stated that Ministers who had voted against the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four Powers had done so in accordance with reservations previously made by them. Yet we can find no trace of these reservations or any such proviso in the text of the decision of the four Powers: on the contrary, so far as concerns more important questions which have not yet been decided, the differences of opinion expressed in the Council of Foreign Ministers are clearly set out in the text submitted to us.

It may be asked why the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom did not have their special points of view and their dissent included in the text of the decisions and in the records. The Ukrainian Delegation deeply regrets to have to place on record that certain countries have gone back on their word; it considers that this constitutes a very bad precedent which unfortunately may perhaps be catching and of which the effects will be felt not only in the future work of this Conference but also later on when efforts are made to revise treaties which we are at present preparing.

The Ukrainian Delegation speaks on behalf of a country which has undergone the worst suffering, supported the greatest sacrifices and it sees an element of danger in the adoption of the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom; it sees a danger for the other countries, for those which have also suffered much from the war, for those who have made the heaviest sacrifices and which may be the most seriously affected by this amendment. The Ukrainian Delegation considers that the adoption of the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom will only result in confusing the work of the Conference, for it may well lead to endless discussion on the worth of recommendations which cannot possibly get a two-thirds majority.

For these reasons the Ukrainian Delegation will vote an Article VI for the original text proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers as our rules of procedure. It will do so because it does not desire that the majority of only two votes should give world public opinion a false idea of the wish of the people represented on this Conference. It does not want false ideas to influence public opinion on the bases of the desired peace.

The Ukrainian Delegation wants to ensure the adoption of fair and equitable solutions for all questions connected with territory, reparations, future economic conditions and all other important matters. It desires that decisions which will finally be taken should be satsfactory for all and more especially for those countries that have suffered most from the war.

Mr. Byrnes (U.S.A.)

Mr. President and members of the Conference: It has been more than a year since our fighting men won the war. They worked together, they fought together, and died together. They were friends and comrades, fighting in the cause of freedom. We, the leaders of the Allied nations, should show ourselves worthy of our sons and daughters who risked their lives and gave their lives that freedom might live. To make peace we must be inspired by peace. We must have first the will to make peace, the will to achieve common understanding. That will to make peace and to reach common understanding does not depend on any rules of procedure. This Conference has been called to give the nations which fought the war the opportunity to express their views and to make recommendations. All of us agree that the final text of the treaties will be drawn by the Council of Foreign Ministers and that to be effective they must be ratified by the States which are members of the Council.

Now, why should we have this interminable struggle to determine the right of the nations which helped to win the war to participate in the making of the peace? Why should we try to deny to the nations which fought with us the right to make recommendations here to the Council of Foreign Ministers, even though those recommendations do not secure a full two-thirds majority vote? If a proposal receives thirteen votes and is opposed by eight States are the views of the eight so important that they should prevent the submission to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the views of thirteen States? I think the Council of Foreign Ministers should consider the views of the nations which helped to win the war, even though they are not the views of a majority of us here. That is why I voted for the resolution presented by Yugoslavia, recognizing the right of a neighbouring State, an Allied State, to present its proposal to the Council of Foreign Ministers even though they failed to get a majority vote. If the Foreign Ministers were convinced that the proposal was right and just and in accord with world opinion, the Foreign Ministers certainly should not hesitate to include it in the treaty to be submitted to the States for ratification, but I think that the nations which sent their sons overseas to fight are entitled to the same right, and I take objection to the charge that those of us who wished to recognize their right are fomenting a third world war.

I shall not discuss the statements as to our position in the Council of Foreign Ministers on voting procedure. The record has been presented. The repetition of an inaccurate statement will never make it accurate. Whence comes this talk of blocs? By what right do those who voted, ballot after ballot with the Soviet Union, call those of us who do not always agree with the Soviet Union a bloc? When the New Zealand proposal to have all recommendations made by a simple majority vote was defeated in the Commission by a bare majority of eleven to nine votes, no one of the nine States rose to complain that the proposal had been rejected by a Soviet bloc. But when the Soviet proposal on voting procedure is defeated by the overwhelming vote of fifteen to six, here in this Conference the charge is made that the defeat was brought about by an Anglo-Saxon bloc. What loose and wicked talk this is! France and Norway voted with the majority. They have striven hard to bring about a common accord. Should they now be arraigned as partisans of disunity? Brazil, China, Ethiopia are also so arraigned. Britain, which for a whole year fought the cause of freedom almost alone, is attacked for daring to stand up for a conviction. The United States, which has steadfastly pursued a policy of friendship with all peace-loving nations and has firmly opposed all forms of political arraignment, is accused of being leader of a bloc.

Gentlemen of the Conference, we have come here to make peace. We want to work with all nations. We are not going to gang up against any nation. We have been willing to make concessions to harmonize our views wth others, but we do not intend to make all the concessions. We have not fought for a free world in order to dictate terms of peace to our Allies—or to let them dictate terms of peace to us. I believe in unity. I believe in general agreement. I do not believe that the peace treaties can be written just as this Conference, by a bare majority vote, would write them, but I do believe that the Council, in the writing of the treaties, should consider every recommendation which a majority of the members of the Conference would like them to consider. I believe that this Conference should strive to achieve common agreement in its recommendations so far as it possibly can. But I would be less than frank if I did not say that those who have insisted most loudly on unanimity here have not shown quite the same desire to achieve unanimity. We can never achieve unanimity, we can never achieve common agreement unless we show respect for the opinion, the feeling and the judgment of our Allies.

In our efforts during the past year to make peace and to make peace secure we have found, time and again, the rule of unanimity insisted upon, not to secure unanimity, not to secure common agreement, but to block action. Time and again we have found the rule unanimity insisted upon to compel the majority to yield to a minority which was unwilling, on its part, to make the concessions necessary to make common understanding possible.

Gentlemen of the Conference, the proposed rule of procedure here in question was adopted by a vote of fifteen to six, almost a three-quarters vote, after full debate in which all members of the Conference had an opportunity to participate. Further debate is not going to help to create an atmosphere in which we can reach common agreement. Quite the contrary, I think it will hamper our efforts to reach common agreement.

I say to you only this: The fighting men of the Allied nations who co-operated in winning the war will never understand our wrangling here about questions of procedure. I appeal to the Conference to get on with its work. The world is crying for peace. The people do not want armies of occupation continued indefinitely in countries which are trying to reconstruct their national life on democratic lines. People want our fighting men returned to their homes and to their families. The people want us to get on with the peace. We should not disappoint them.

President (Interpretation)—I call upon M. Kisselev.

M. Kisselev (Interpretation)—Mr. President and fellow delegates. I speak here in order to explain the point of view of the Beyelorussian Delegation on the question of voting procedure. I submit, gentlemen, that this is the most important question which is before the conference and the Byelorussian Delegation cannot agree to the decision taken in the Committee on Procedure that certain decisions can be taken or recommendations by a majority of less than two thirds and more than one half. As the members have heard, these decisions will also be forwarded to the Council of Foreign Ministers as recommendations of the Conference.

From the procedure adopted here at this conference, it is clear that not all the members here present are sincerely striving for unanimity. Let me give some examples. At the beginning of our conference in the opening speeches, Mr. Attlee said that, as we start this conference, we are turning a new page in history and that the suggestions presented to us by the Council of Foreign Ministers represent a maximum of unanimity which it is possible to achieve and that he hoped we would support them in order that a just and durable peace may be ensured. Those were his words. Alas, the facts speak to the contrary. Mr. MacNeil introduced here an amendment which was completely contrary to these desires, because it stated that if certain decisions were not made by a majority of two-thirds but by less than that, they would also go to the Council of Foreign Ministers as recommendations of this conference. Dr. Evatt also stated he saw no danger to peace if we had a recommendation made by a majority of less than two-thirds and this was said by him, despite the fact that many delegations opposed this view. When the Soviet Delegate defended a majority of two-thirds, he proposed that recommendations made by less than a two-thirds majority also be submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This was not adopted, because of extreme pressure brought to bear by the delegation of the United Kingdom and the United States. In this way, I think it is quite clear that certain delegations have brought discord to this conference and that the reason they have brought it undoubtedly is in order to influence public opinion. These delegations favoured and made speeches undermining the authority of the conference and prejudicing a durable and just peace. These delegations had lost sight of the principles which are the elements and the main reasons why some delegations are in favour of adopting the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I have already said this in the Commission on Procedure. A majority of at least two-thirds is best calculated to bring about an understanding of all the delegations here and reflects best the desires of the peoples of the world, of the kind of peace that they wish to have established. These peoples are sovereign States. They have a perfect right to be heard. Our delegation has already stated that we must listen to the voice of the people. There is nothing more dangerous, Mr. President, to the establishment of a just peace than the wish of some of the delegations here to impose their will on others. This conference of ours, Gentlemen, will make decisions which will decide the fate of peoples throughout the world for many many decades. These decisions must contain a minimum of errors, because unfortunately, we know by experience, history teaches us that errors made in peace conferences are corrected by wars. That, gentlemen, is not our goal. We are not here to sow the seeds of the next war. We are here to fix a just and durable peace. That is possible only if we are as unanimous in this work of establishing peace as we were in the cruel war which has just ended. That is why the Byelorussian Delegation supports the views of M. Molotov, first delegate of the Soviet Union, when he says that he wishes to review the decisions made by the Committee on Procedure. This proposal of his is just. It is in accordance with the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In short, it is in favour of the decisions being taken by a majority of at least two-thirds.

The President—I call upon M. Couve de Murville, representative of France.

M. Couve de Murville (France): Nobody, I believe, can fail to realise that the members of the French Delegation did everything in their power to obtain unanimous agreement on the majority rules—as, indeed, on all other problems dealt with by the Commission on Procedure.

We believe it is essential to obtain unanimity in this Conference. The truth is that if we failed to do so it would be very difficult to sign the peace treates. In the same spirit, the French Delegation is convinced that such unanimity can be obtained only on two conditions: first, we must have the genuine agreement of the countries commonly known as the Big Powers, and, second, all countries, whether they are what is called small, average or great, must be considered as moral equals.

All this, to our mind, was perfectly reconcilable in the discussions of the Commission. As to the substance of the matter, it was clear by the end of the day on Tuesday last that agreement had been reached on the two following points. In the first place, special value was attached to the recommendations voted by a two-thirds majority of the Conference. Some delegations even suggested that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be bound by them and should consider them as compulsory. In the second place, it was agreed that recommendations which had obtained, not a two-thirds, but merely a simple majority, should also be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

The point on which agreement had not been reached was in connection with the procedure for transmitting the latter type of recommendation to the Council. This was clearly illustrated by the discussion on a proposal which the French Delegation had submitted in the hope of achieving unanimity. The only difference between this proposal—which was in fact rejected—and the British amendment finally adopted was that recommendations voted by a majority of less than two-thirds would be transmitted to the Council, not automatically, but at the request of any State having voted for their adoption. The Soviet Delegation supported this proposal but, for reasons which I still fail to understand, most of the other delegations did not see fit to do likewise. This the French Delegation deeply regrets, believing as we do that it might have provided the basis for a satisfactory solution reconciling the two rules I have just referred to—that is to say, unanimity of decisions and respect for the rights of all countries.

We are still prepared to support this proposal if the delegations which did not agree to it in the Commission feel that they might now be able to do so. Otherwise we can see no other solution than to endorse the proposals submitted to us by the Commission. As already pointed out on several occasions, these proposals were finally adopted by a very large majority, and—above all—there is only a slight shade of difference between them and the solution which the Soviet Delegation declared its willingness to accept.

Public opinion would certainly find it difficult to understand that the Conference could be divided by such differences.

The French Delegation therefore appeals urgently to the Soviet Delegation to accept the proposals submitted by the Commission on Procedure. We are convinced that they cannot injure the interests of the Soviet Union in any way, any more than they can harm those of any other country, even though the U.S.S.R. Delegation may have had valid reasons for preferring other solutions which were not voted by a two-thirds majority.

In making this appeal, the French Delegation fully realises how important it is to avoid the possibility of a rift at the outset in the unity and cohesion of this Conference. We are met here to prepare peace with five European States. Other conferences will follow, to deal with other treaties. It is to the essential task of world peace that we must devote our efforts, and the world is expecting a great deal of us. It would be deplorable if, on questions the fundamental nature of which has not been proved to us, there should arise differences of opinion which might jeopardise the rest of our work.

Nothing useful can be accomplished, in this Conference or elsewhere, unless we are actuated by the desire to co-operate, to trust each other, and to speak our minds calmly.

The President (Interpretation): The discussion is closed. The Conference has before it a proposal by the Commission on Procedure and simultaneously a proposal by the Soviet Union suggesting the rejection of the Commission’s proposals and the acceptance of the original suggestion made on this matter by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

If I understand aright, the Soviet Delegation wishes to table an amendment which would mean reverting to the original text and substituting it for the text proposed by the Commission on Procedure. Is my understanding correct?

M. Molotov (U.S.S.R.) (Interpretation): It is correct.

The President (Interpretation): Are there any other amendments? I will first put to the vote the Soviet Delegation’s amendment reading as follows:

“In place of Article VI (a) as worded in the proposals of the Commission on Procedure insert the following text:

‘Decisions of the Conference on Questions of Procedure shall be adopted by a majority vote. Decisions on all other questions and recommendations will be adopted by a two-thirds majority’,”

I leave it to the Conference to decide.

(A vote was taken by roll-call. The result of the voting was as follows:

For the amendment:

Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia.

Against the amendment:

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America.

The President (Interpretation): The Soviet Delegation’s amendment is lost by 15 votes to 6.

I shall now put to the vote in a similar manner the draft submitted by the Commission on Procedure. I would remind the Conference that an annex to this draft contains a resolution concerning countries having a common frontier with ex-enemy States. Is the vote demanded?

M. Manuilsky (Ukraine) (Interpretation): I ask for a vote to be taken.

The President (Interpretation): That is a legitimate request.

M. Shmigov (Byelorussia) (Interpretation): On what section of the Commission on Procedure’s draft are you proposing to consult the Conference? Is it the first section?

The President (Interpretation): I intend to consult the Conference on the complete document, i.e. the Rules of Procedure and the Draft Resolution. Does any delegate now wish to have a separate vote taken on the Rules and the Resolution?

M. Mosa Pijade (Yugoslavia) (Interpretation): The Yugoslav Delegation ask for a separate vote to be taken on the Rules and the Draft Resolution and would also like the vote on the Rules of Procedure to be taken section by section.

The President (Interpretation): That is an equally legitimate request. To save time the Conference will doubtless agree to vote by a show of hands.

(Agreed).

I now put Section I: Organs of the Conference.

(This section was adopted).

II.—Chairman, Rapporteurs.

(Adopted).

III.—Invitation to Other States.

President (Interpretation)—I call upon M. Mosa Pijade, representative of Yugoslovia.

M. Mosa Pijade (Yugoslavia)—(Interpretation)—Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, I maintain that this is the point at which I must make a statement. I wish to speak in order to propose the invitation to this Conference of the Republic of Albania.⁵⁷ I should only have made this proposal after the approval of the complete rules of procedure, as it is not a rule of procedure but a basic principle which we wish to submit, but, seeing now what has been done here—on procedure, we have only two paragraphs, (the first was the invitation to the ex-enemy states to make their views heard, and the other was the invitation to other States, not members of the conference, in order to sound their views)—but now at the suggestion of Mr. Byrnes, we have here the insertion of a third paragraph,—the third paragraph which you have in the text before you.⁵⁸

We consider that this third paragraph should have been separate and, if it were withdrawn from this section of the rules, I should have only made my proposals after the adoption of the whole rules. However, since the position is as it is now, I would propose the insertion of a fourth paragraph which is the invitation to Albania.

Albania was the first of all the Balkan countries to fall an easy prey to Italian imperialism. Divided Europe did nothing to defend the independence of this small State. The occupation of Albania was, however, for Fascist Italy, an essential part of the scheme of Italian imperialism aimed at setting foot on Balkan soil in order to gain a strong position for the purpose of closing the Adriatic Sea to Yugoslavia, of establishing a military base for the conquest of the Yugoslav Adriatic coast and for the destruction of Yugoslav and Greek independence. In connection with the German “Drang nach Osten”, this was the first step towards the enslaving of the whole of the Balkans by the Axis Powers. Albania offered armed resistance to the invader, but had to succumb in an uneven struggle. The people of Albania, however, could not resign themselves to live in servitude, and rose in an armed struggle against the Fascist invaders. After Italy’s surrender, they pursued the struggle against the Germans who had seized their country.

For six years the people of Albania waged a grim and heroic struggle against the Fascist invaders for the purpose of defending and regaining their liberty and their independence. While fighting against the Fascist oppressors the Albanian democratic forces had, at the same time, to struggle against the traitors and collaborationists inside the country.

This nation, although small in numbers, has shown itself to be jealous of its national independence and has, by the sacrifices it has made, been the deserving Ally of the democratic nations in the common struggle against the States of the Fascist Axis. Its sacrifices had been heavy. The overwhelming majority of the Albanian people were unanimously behind the leader Enver Hohxa and Albania succeeded in forming an Army of National Liberation which enabled her not merely to free the country of the Fascist yoke by her own forces, but also to send two Albanian divisions to take part in the common struggle on Yugoslav soil.

On November, the 12th, 1944, Sir Maitland Wilson, Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, wrote in a telegram he sent to Enver Hohxa: “I admire the successes scored by the Army of National Liberation in the struggle for the common cause against the common enemy.”

And now, after all its heroic struggles and all the sacrifices it made for the Allied cause, the People’s Republic of Albania is not admitted to take part, the same as the rest of us, in the discussion of the Peace Treaty with Italy, which is her neighbour and which will always remain a menace to her freedom, because we see only too clearly that imperialistic designs are still harboured in Italy.

The Yugoslav Delegation considers that the fact that Albania has not been invited to this Conference as a member State, equal in rights with the other States, cannot be justified. Is Albania an enemy State which should be called to the Conference, merely in order to be heard as enemy States will be, or is she an Allied State deserving the admiration and gratitude of all the democratic countries?

If, however, the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers is irrevocable, the Yugoslav Delegation proposes to the Plenary Session of the Conference to adopt the following resolution:

“The Plenary Session of the Conference decides to invite the People’s Republic of Albania to the Peace Conference in Paris, in order to attend, in a consultative capacity, the Plenary Sessions and the Commissions which will discuss the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy.”⁵⁹

The resolution we propose is quite justified for the reasons I have given you, but it is also justified by the insertion of the third paragraph, Section III of the Rules of Procedure, and I would also refer you to Paragraph 77 of that Treaty with Italy. If the position should be otherwise—that Italy would be called upon to sign with us and then Albania should simply be called in accessorily in order to give its signature to the Treaties which we would have concluded, it seems to me the difference between Albania and other countries at war with Italy are too great here, because Albania, as you see in Paragraph 6 of this Treaty, in the section on Albania, there are six paragraphs concerning Albania alone, whereas, as regards the other countries at war with Italy, there is no mention even of their names. I would ask the Conference to accept the resolution we have proposed as Paragraph 4 of this Section of the Rules of Procedure.

The President: (Interpretation)

I agree with the Yugoslav representative that this is a fundamental question, a question of substance, and in order to settle a question of substance I think the Conference must have rules of procedure. That is my first remark.

In the second place I must admit to feeling somewhat uncertain where paragraph 3 of Section III should be inserted in the Document which already contains a number of decisions for application, which, accordingly presupposes that the rules are already in force. Therefore, if the Conference would adopt the point of view expressed by me, that is to say, confine this Section to the first two paragraphs, the Yugoslav delegate would perhaps agree that the question of substance which he has just raised and which also comprises other questions might be discussed when the whole body of rules has been adopted.

Mr. Byrnes (U.S.A.):

Mr. President: When this proposal was offered it was suggested that it should be added at the appropriate place in the text. It is my opinion that it is not properly a part of the rules. It amplifies the first sentence of paragraph 3. It is a direction to the Secretariat as to when and how the invitations should be sent. My opinion is that its proper place is in the Annex, where there appears the resolution which was tabled by the Yugoslav representative and adopted on page 6, and as the author of the resolution I am entirely satisfied to have it placed in the Annex when the Conference can make such use of it as seems wise.

M. Mosa Pijade (Yugoslavia) (Interpretation)

I accept this proposal of Mr. Byrnes.

The President (Interpretation):

Then paragraph 3 of Section III will be put into the Annex.

Section III as abridged in two paragraphs was adopted.

Section IV: Official and working languages.

The President: Any objections?

Adopted.

Section V: Secretariat.

The President: Any objections?

Adopted.

Section VI: Voting.

I understand that there are objections to this Section and therefore we will take a roll call.

M. Molotov (U.S.S.R.) (Interpretation by Soviet interpreter)

A vote has already been taken.

The President (Interpretation):

Am I to understand that no further objections are raised and that Section VI is approved.

M. Molotov (U.S.S.R.) (Interpretation by Soviet interpreter)

No, on the contrary. We maintain our view.

The President (Interpretation):

I understand that the Soviet Delegation maintains its opposition to this text, but what I want to know as regards Section VI is, if there is no vote what we are to do as regards the objections.

M. Molotov (U.S.S.R.) (Interpretation by Soviet interpreter)

We do not suggest a new vote.

M. Spaak (Belgium) (Interpretation);

In order to avoid confusion, I think we should vote on Section VI.

The President (Interpretation):

That is clearly the right thing to do.

We will then take a vote by roll-call. Those in favour of Section VI will answer “Yes”, those not in favour will answer “No”.

On a roll-call the following Delegations voted “Yes”:

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States of America.

15 votes

and the following Delegations voted “No”:

Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia.

6 votes

The President: Section VI is therefore adopted by 15 votes to 6.

Section VII: Records of meetings.

The President: Any objections?

Adopted.

Section VIII: General Provisions.

The President: Any objections?

Adopted.

Section IX: Amendments and suspensions.

The President: Any objections?

Adopted.

The President: I will now ask the Conference to vote on the whole of the rules of procedure in the usual manner. The annexes will be taken separately.

On a roll-call the following Delegations voted “Yes”:

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States of America.

15 votes

The following Delegations voted “No”:

Byelorussia, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia.

4 votes

The following Delegations abstained from voting:

Czechoslovakia and Poland.

2 votes

The President: The result of the voting is 15 votes for, 4 against and 2 abstentions. Therefore the rules of procedure as set out in C.P./Plen/Doc. 1 are approved. I suggest that the Conference should adjourn before examining the Annexes.

The next meeting will be held this afternoon at 4 o’clock and the new rules of procedure will then be operative.

The meeting stands adjourned.

(The Conference rose at 12.45 p.m.)

57. In despatch 283 of July 23, the American representative in Albania, Joseph E. Jacobs, forwarded an Albanian request that Albania be invited to the Peace Conference. The Albanian Foreign Office had advised him that similar requests had been sent to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, (C.F.M. Files)
58. Mr. Byrnes proposed the addition of a third paragraph to article III of the Draft Rules of Procedure at the 12th Meeting of the Commission on Procedure, August 7; for the United States Delegation Journal account of that meeting, see p. 130. The Draft Rules of Procedure submitted to the Conference by the Commission on Procedure (C.P.(Plen) Doc. 1), are printed in vol. iv, p. 796.
59. The Yugoslav proposal was circulated as C.P.(Plen) 8 A.