Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings, Volume III

CFM Files

Verbatim Record

August 8, 1946, 4 p.m.

C.P.(Plen) 7

Chairman: M. Georges Bidault (France)

The Chairman: The meeting is open.

Discussion of the Rules of Procedure and of the Attached Draft Resolution

The Chairman: The Conference has before it two texts which have just been distributed, namely:

1. Draft Rules of Procedure adopted and now submitted by the Commission on Procedure. [C.P.(Plen)Doc. 1]⁵⁴

2. A draft resolution, following these Rules.

I call upon the delegate of the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Molotov. (U.S.S.R.) (Interpretation)

Mr. President, Fellow Delegates, the Soviet Delegation agrees with the draft Rules of Procedure proposed by the Commission except for one point. The Soviet Delegation disagrees with the decision of the Commission which suggests that the Conference should adopt its recommendations by a simple majority and not by a two-thirds majority as was suggested by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet Delegation cannot agree to any recommendations being adopted at the Conference by a majority of one vote; it cannot agree to 11 Delegations forcing their proposals on the other 10 Delegations. The Soviet Delegation considers such a decision to be erroneous and insists on the reconsideration of this erroneous decision of the Commission.

The method of voting in an international conference is an extremely important problem. The Conference will be expressing its view on many serious problems. It is inadmissible that such problems should be decided by a majority of a single vote. One has to be either very naive or very inexperienced in international questions to advocate such a method of voting in a Peace Conference.

The Soviet Delegation is compelled to remind you of a few elementary matters. As you are aware, in international conferences and gatherings, the guiding principle is supposed to be the effort to achieve unanimity between the various members of the conference. It cannot well be otherwise when the problem consists in ascertaining the common views of a few or of several sovereign States. It is of course not so simple to achieve mutual understanding and to bring into accord the views of the 21 States represented at the Peace Conference. If however, we have assembled at this Peace Conference, we must make an endeavour to achieve unanimity, to understand one another, to make reasonable concessions one to another and we must realize that there is no other possibility of achieving satisfactory results in settling international questions. We have representatives here of great powers and small states. In order to secure mutually acceptable recommendations, we must take account of the individaul opinion of each, great and small. The parties particularly interested in this are the small States who often have to submit to the will of the great powers who maintain troops on their territory so as to influence the negotiations and dictate their will to the small countries. Such a method however is not applicable in the Paris Conference. Consequently, we must find normal ways of achieving unanimity in our Conference and not be carried away by a policy of pressure or by the method of majorising the votes of some of the Delegations as opposed to others.

The ordinary rules of international conferences are well-known. It is usual to try at such conferences to achieve unanimity even though at the cost of considerable effort, to convince one another and arrive at an agreed view which is acceptable to the members of the conference. It is common knowledge that in some international organisations the unanimity rule was applied and is still applied in regard to the adoption of all decisions. We know also that in the Charter of the United Nations, it is said that for the adoption of important decisions, two-thirds of the votes of the Assembly are required and in the Security Council, there must be, in addition, unanimity among the Five Great Powers. At all great power meetings during the war, the world-wide importance of which is well-known, many decisions were adopted and they were all taken unanimously. In the Council of Foreign Ministers which was set up at the Berlin Conference and which has the responsibility of serving the cause of lasting peace, all the proceedings are conducted also on the basis of complete unanimity. People must be very simple if they think that useful results can be achieved in the international sphere by omitting to achieve unanimity between the countries concerned. The Soviet Delegation finds itself compelled to remind you of these elementary matters. It will always be proud to defend the necessity of achieving unanimity in the settlement of inter-natonal problems, and considers it inadmissible to abandon this principle. This is how we understand the interests of the democratic countries, the interests of great states and small states, the interests of the millions of simple people who by their heroism and at the cost of their blood have brought us to victory and who are now patiently waiting to see whether we are prepared to fight for the establishment of permanent peace.

The Council of Foreign Ministers made a suggestion to the Peace Conference regarding the system of voting at plenary meetings of the Conference and of Commissions. In the case of voting at the Plenary Conference, the suggestion read as follows:

“Decisions of the Conference on questions of procedure shall be adopted by a majority vote, decisions on all other questions and recommendations would be adopted by a two-thirds majority.”

It took the Council of Foreign Ministers quite a long time to arrive at this agreement and I quite admit it was the Soviet Delegation which specially urged it. From the text cited, you will see that the Council of Foreign Ministers suggested that the Conference should hold to the principle of a two-thirds majority for the voting of all questions of principle and recommendations at the plenary Conference.

In spite of this the United Kingdom Delegation tabled a new proposal in the Commission on Procedure concerning the method of voting in the Plenary Conference. This proposal which evoked objections from a number of Delegations, was accepted by the Commission.⁵⁵ The following is the text of the decision adopted by the Commission:

“Recommendations of the Plenary Conference will be of two kinds:

(1) recommendations adopted by a two-thirds majority

(2) those which received more than one half but less than two-thirds of the votes of the members of the Conference.

Both types of recommendation are to be referred to the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers.”

In this way the Commission suggests that proposals which are adopted not by a two-thirds majority but only by a simple majority should also be regarded as recommendations. In this matter the proposal made by the Council of the Four Ministers that the Conference should adopt its recommendations by a two-thirds majority of votes is annulled. It is now sufficient for eleven delegations out of the twenty-one to support this or that proposal for this proposal to become a recommendation to the Conference even if ten other delegations objected to it. In this way one delegation of the twenty-one here present may attribute to this or that proposal the character of a recommendation for the whole Conference. And recommendations of this kind are supposed to have the same important weight at the Conference itself or in the public opinion of the democratic countries. The Soviet Delegation thinks that those who view the matter in this light will suffer a great disappointment.

We all know that a recommendation adopted by the Conference has no binding effect on the Council of Foreign Ministers. On the other hand we all acknowledge that it would be useful for the Conference to pronounce in favour of such and such recommendations and thus assist the final preparation of the peace treaties. Everybody understands that such recommendations which are unanimously adopted will carry a great weight with each of us and with the entire international opinion. While insisting that any recommendations should be adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes, the Soviet Delegation was interested not so much in the number of votes cast as in an endeavour to ensure that the voting procedure itself assists in the adoption of unanimous recommendations to the Conference. Therein lies the political meaning of the proposal made by the Council of the Four Ministers when it recommended that the voting procedure on questions and recommendations of principle should be by a majority of two-thirds of the votes. The decision adopted by the Commission on procedure has upset this proposal. It has ignored the need to endeavour to obtain unanimous decisions. It assists those who do not endeavour to reach unanimous and, therefore, authoritative decisions.

The Commission on Procedure, in suggesting that the Conference should accept recommendations even if they are adopted by a majority of only one vote, has made an egregious error. Such recommendations can have no authority; they will only confuse the work of the Conference. If the Conference approves this erroneous proposal of the Commission on Procedure it will undermine the authority of such recommendations as it adopts. Those to whom the authority of the Conference and the recommendations made by it are precious cannot vote in favour of such a proposal made by the Commission on Procedure.

Why did the Commission on Procedure allow such an error to be committed? How could it have happened that such an obviously erroneous proposal was adopted by the Commission on Procedure despite every warning made by a number of delegations?

The responsibility for this situation lies with the British Delegation which had tabled this proposal and with the American Delegation which had so actively supported the adoption of this decision in the Commission on Procedure. The British and American Delegations acted together in this matter in order to pass this decision in the Commission on Procedure. They had evidently thought of ensuring for themselves the adoption at the Conference of recommendations which were desirable to them but they were carried too far by this sort of consideration. They have even failed to reckon with the fact that at the Council of Ministers they had given their assent to the adoption of recommendations by a majority of two-thirds of the votes. They referred to all kinds of reservations which they had made in adopting this decision at the Council of the Ministers. Now what kind of significance could this or that reservation possess considering that a proposal on voting procedure agreed between the Four Ministers is placed before the Conference for its consideration. Any reservations could have reference only to such questions which were either not agreed or not discussed by the Council of the Four Ministers. Otherwise it comes to this that the right hand does not know what the other one is doing. The British and American Delegations may have withheld their assent at the Council of the Four Ministers in the case of this or another proposal on the voting procedure for the Conference. They actually did not give their assent at once. Yet after a long discussion an agreed decision was adopted by the Council of the Four Ministers. Nevertheless both Delegations at the Conference withdrew from this agreed decision and returned to their original proposal that the voting on recommendations placed before the Conference should be by a simple majority.

In the long run it does not matter that the British or the American Delegation finds itself in an ambiguous position. The position is more serious. The error committed by the British and American Delegations has led to the adoption of an erroneous decision by the Commission on Procedure. This Commission now recommends to the Conference to approve its erroneous decision. The problem now is to save the Conference from committing the same error which was made by the Commission on Procedure.

How could this mistake arise? Does the U.K. or the U.S. Delegation prefer to vote as a member of a simple majority and not as part of the two-thirds of the Delegations of the Conference? I do not think so. The Soviet Delegation believes that everyone would like to vote not only by a two-third majority but unanimously and would like our decisions to be adopted as representing an opinion that had been thoroughly thought out and agreed upon between us all and would like such an opinion to carry proper weight. But Dr. Evatt, the representative of Australia, takes a different view. He has explained why he supported the British and American Delegations in changing the decision of the Council of Four Ministers about voting recommendations by a two-thirds majority. In his speech in the Commission on Procedure he said:

“Let us assume there is a draft amendment proposed by one country. The Soviet Union disagrees with this amendment. It will be quite impossible to get a two-thirds majority for that draft amendment. That is quite clear.”

Dr. Evatt did not reveal on what he was basing his assumptions. He merely hinted but refused to show his cards. What he is most interested in is securing by the most convenient method the adoption in the Conference of recommendations unacceptable to the Soviet Union. He does not expect that he will succed in obtaining two-thirds majority for recommendations directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. That is why he is making such great efforts in the Conference to have recommendations adopted by simple majority. Certain spheres of public opinion have a good comprehension of Dr. Evatt. The day after the decision taken in the Commission on Procedure a number of Paris newspapers were very happy to support Dr. Evatt. Yesterday the newspaper Cité Soir wrote as follows: “The Western Powers have scored over the U.S.S.R.” The same tone is discernible in the Etoile du Soir and elsewhere. That is how the Commission of Procedure’s decision about the method of voting was received and the delegates to the Conference cannot ignore the fact.

The Soviet Delegation, however, feels that the purpose of the Peace Conference is not to ensure that one particular Power or one particular block of Powers should score a victory over the U.S.S.R. or any other State. I would go further and say that at a Peace Conference it should not be possible for all the Great Powers jointly to score a victory over any single State whether great or small. If anyone attempts to follow that path, he will certainly fail in his design and do political damage firstly to his own State and also to the authority of the Peace Conference.

You know that when the struggle had to be fought with our common enemy, the U.S.S.R. was not in the rear ranks of the Allies. The Soviet Union is proud of having saved European civilization from Fascist barbarism. The Soviet Union is proud of having freed quite a few European States from the Fascist grip and of having helped countries in whose capitals Hitler’s lackeys had only recently been settled to embark on the path of democratic development, is proud of having raised the flag of freedom and national re-birth all over Europe. The Soviet Union has made unheard of sacrifices in this struggle—seven million human lives. The achievements of the Red Army and the irreparable losses of the Soviet Union entitle us to point out here that the voice of the Soviet Union, like the voice of the other democratic countries which are appealing for the greatest possible unanimity in international affairs—that voice deserves to be heard. And now that we have achieved victory and have the duty of seeing that lasting peace is established, nothing good can come from attempts to set the majority of the Conference against the minority. Such attempts will meet with no sympathy from democratic public opinion; they will only undermine the authority of the Conference which we should all cherish.

The Soviet Delegation takes this opportunity of insisting on the mistake made by the Commission on Procedure being rectified. A mistake can be corrected if there is still time, but a mistake can become more serious if we persist in following the wrong path. The Commission on Procedure has committed a serious mistake and has dealt a blow at the prestige of the Conference. The Soviet Delegation proposed that the mistake be corrected and in this way the international authority of the Paris Conference will be maintained.

The Soviet Delegation moves the rejection of the Commission on Procedure’s proposal on voting and the adoption of the proposal made by the Council of Foreign Ministers on this question.

Dr. Evatt (Australia):

Mr. President: I have no speech prepared. I was surprised at the continuation before the Plenary Conference of the debate which lasted for so long in the Commission, and I think the question behind the immediate matters raised by M. Molotov is one of very serious import to this Conference as a Conference.

First of all, let us recall what he asked. He asks the Plenary Conference, consisting of the same countries, the same persons for the most part as the members of this commission, to reverse their decision. The decision was reached after many days’ argument and the vote was fifteen votes to six in favour of the amendment to which M. Molotov now refers. M. Molotov thinks there’s magic in the fraction two-thirds. If there is such magic in that fraction, then there is magic in the vote of fifteen to six, because that is more than a two-thirds vote. And therefore I can hardly imagine that his purpose in objecting is a serious purpose of asking delegates to go back, within twenty-four hours, from the decision so carefully taken after such long debate.

But, Gentlemen, I say the thing goes a little deeper than that. It is not that M. Molotov asks us by argument to reconsider our decision for the purpose of reversing it—no, that’s not his language—his language is of this character: he insists—that is the word—that the error be rectified. What is done should, in his view, not be permitted—those are his words. He refers to the grievous error of the fifteen, thereby implying the infallibility of the six.

But behind his point of view is the assumption that his “No” should be conclusive, as his “No” is able on the Security Council to block decisions on the Security Council, even though ten countries favor what is done, M. Molotov can, at that point, say “No”, and no decision can be taken by the Security Council. That was agreed at San Francisco, agreed to in spite of the keenest opposition of many countries, including my own, and what we have got to face as a Conference, not bound by a veto system, is whether we can or should yield to dictation of that character.

Mr. President, what is the issue? It’s very simple—and so much of what M. Molotov said about it is correct and is completely elementary. He says that what we do by way of recommendation to the Council of Foreign Ministers has no obligatory force. That is correct. We decide by two-thirds to make a recommendation: it goes on to the Council, but it has no binding force on that body. If we decide by a simple majority to make a recommendation it does not bind the Council of Foreign Ministers, and he correctly points out that is the position, but, Mr. President, that is precisely the reason why the Conference, through its agency, thought it proper not to include recommendations of this Conference from getting to the Council of Foreign Ministers merely because they failed to get a two-thirds majority. That is the decision, and so two types of recommendation go forward—a simple majority recommendation and a two-thirds majority recommendation. It is quite true also that the simple majority recommendation does not speak with the same vigour and voice as the two-thirds majority recommendation, but at any rate a majority of the Conference can, through the present decision, have its voice heard in the precincts of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and so the decision is a sound one. It takes up the situation at the point made by M. Molotov that there’s no binding force to the recommendation, but will let this at any rate be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Is that too much to ask, that the majority of the twenty-one nations here assembled, all of whom have taken an active part in the war and contributed to victory should not by a majority have their views listened to by the Council of Foreign Ministers, listened to organised as a Conference? That seems so elementary from the point of view of justice and fair play and democracy that I am amazed that opposition to it is still maintained.

Again he says, quite truly—so much of what he says is true that they amount to truisms and really don’t carry anything in the way of argument—he says we must have unanimity. That is perfectly true. A peace treaty must be agreed to unanimously, but the method of getting unanimity is just as important as unanimity itself. You can get unanimity by dictation—you can say, you must agree, and you have no means of having that order refused—that’s not what we stand for. We don’t believe in it as a system. The means of getting unanimity are important, and this system is the means by which the Council of Foreign Ministers can review things at the end. I cannot understand—I repeat, I cannot understand why so reasonable a proposition, accepted by so overwhelming a majority, is still objected to.

Mr. President, M. Molotov was good enough to refer to me by name. He stated accurately some portion of what I said. I did point out to the Committee, by way of illustration only, the great difficulty of getting a two-thirds vote to support a recommendation, and I took the case of Soviet Russia by way of illustration of that fact, but I said, supposing there are modifications of these treaties to which Soviet Russia will not agree, or will not agree at this stage, then I said, in such a case it seems to me in the voting as I said it before the Commission, very difficult, if not impossible, to get a two-thirds majority. That is what I said. I only took that case by way of illustration. It would apply equally to other countries—the great difficulty to get fourteen votes or two-thirds votes at this stage of the proceedings.

It seems to me from my point of view, not affected by any animus of any kind towards M. Molotov or his country—over and over again in my country I have paid tribute to the great efforts of the Soviet people in the war—at the same time, M. Molotov mustn’t think because we differ from him on democratic forms and procedures that we are going to be dissuaded from putting our view forward, because he does not agree with us. He must really in the long run understand that we are entitled to put that point of view, entitled to persuade, if we can. Any attempt I’ve made to persuade delegates has been made in the light and not done in secret, and I’ve asked delegates and tried to put the view before them. I made no apology for it. That’s the way of democracy. You cannot do it in any other way. You either do it by persuasion or you do it by force, and I believe in argument and democratic exchanges of views.

I say, Mr. President, that what is more serious than the precise question before us is the continuous substitution of an assertion for argument, to keep on repeating the same argument over and over again as has been done to-day. Mr. Molotov will himself admit that no new argument has been made. He has charged the Commission, his own colleagues, with a grievous error, but he’s not added any new fact to the facts before the Commission. I submit that these methods tend to confuse us, they tend to become a kind of repetition. I mean it is what is called in some countries filibustering, that is, keeping on with repetition when you know that it cannot really alter the conviction of the persons you are addressing. Indeed, in some of the expressions he has used, what he would insist upon, what he would not permit, there is the suggestion almost of dictation.

His references to the Press, for instance. Why should he quote one Paris newspaper which says something—I don’t know whether he approves or disapproves of it, but I gather that he disapproves—and use it as an illustration in the committee. He read another illustration from the Populaire, of which he approved and thought that its guidance should be followed by the Committee. I don’t suppose that he would approve of everything said in Populaire. Newspaper opinion all the world over, world public opinion—the phrases are there. There are differences of opinion on these matters throughout the world wherever there is a free press there will be these differences and all you can hope to achieve in the press of the world is accurate statement of the facts with a fair and free comment by all of them, and I don’t ask the newspapers of these countries to agree, and I’m not even going to ask Mr. Molotov to have my speech printed in full in his own country, because I don’t think that would be a reasonable request, and we couldn’t reciprocate in our country because we have no control over the organs of the press in our country.

Mr. President, I submit therefore, in short, that the decision has been come to after long consideration, the decision is sound. All that it does is to give the twenty-one nations here sitting as a Conference the right by a majority decision to have a recommendation considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers, that’s not much, surely, is it, to concede to the nations which were partners in the struggle against their enemies in Europe and the Far East. M. Molotov referred quite impressively to the efforts of his own country, and his own armies, and I, with other delegates here, I join in tribute and homage to the magnificent achievements of that Army, but we must remember, too, that other nations have put all they have into this struggle, that they are entitled as belligerents to express their opinions at this Conference, they are entitled as a very minimum, in my opinion, to have their recommendations considered under the conditions stated in this British proposal. The real reason we are here is because of the sacrifices of our soldiers, our airmen and sailors and every people of the world. And I repeat quite clearly, that I’ll freely express my views on behalf of my country at any stage and every stage of this Conference if I think it is for the benefit of the world and world peace. The peace settlement has to be worked out, the views of every country to be heard. In the end we’ve got to reach unanimity, but the course of reaching unanimity we’ve got to employ, if possible, a course of procedure that will enable a fair and just and impartial decision to be made by the ultimate authority, and that ultimate body of which Mr. Molotov is a member—the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The British proposal does no more than that, and I submit we can do no more than affirm and repeat, if necessary, the decision reached at the point of the Procedure Commission, and reached by the two-thirds majority, namely, a vote of fifteen votes to six.

President (Interpretation)—I call upon Mr. Kardelj, Yugoslav Delegate.

Mr. Kardelj (Yugoslavia) (Translation).

Mr. President, Gentlemen: The Yugoslav Delegation explained in detail, in the course of the discussion of rules of procedure, its point of view on the question of rules, and, especially the question of the method of voting accepted at this Conference. On account of this it does not wish to repeat all the arguments it brought forth during the debate in the aforesaid Commission, but it wishes to stress particularly two facts. First of all, the Yugoslav Delegation considers that the decision on voting, adopted at the Commission of Rules of Procedure, is harmful for the future work of the Conference and especially harmful for the efforts that all of us should make in order to create at this Conference the needful spirit of agreement and attain the greatest possible unanimity. The Yugoslav Delegation emphasized from the very beginning, that it is indispensable that such a spirit should reign at this Conference. The decision on the method of voting, made in the Commission, does not promote the creation of such an atmosphere at this Conference, but, on the contrary, can only encourage the tendencies transforming this Conference into a pure formality, where one group of States imposes its will on another group of States. This is the first reason why the Yugoslav Delegation considers that the method of voting, adopted by the Conference, is a very bad and unsuitable means for establishing such an important thing as Peace. The argument that we are making recommendations only and not final decisions, cannot justify such a decision. Although the recommendations adopted at this Conference will not have the weight of final decisions, there will be a tendency to give them a certain moral value, which means that the responsibility for the adoption of these recommendations is, in fact, no whit less than it would be if final decisions were adopted.

Dr. Evatt said just now that it was necessary to listen not only to the voices of the big Nations, but also to those of the small ones. On that point I agree with him. For that very reason we ask for at least two-thirds majority voting, if it is impossible to obtain unanimity. A simple majority stifles the views of countres which are not in a particular block of States.

There is, however, another formal side of this question. The history of international law does not know a single case of formal rules of procedure ever being worked out for international congresses and conferences, rules according to which a conference should adopt binding decisions. In the matter of procedure the principle of unanimity was the rule at international congresses and conferences. According to this rule, which is one of the basic principles, of international relations, at no international conference, and still less at a peace conference, consisting of independent and sovereign states, may a majority impose its will on the minority, or even on a single state.

Exceptions from this generally accepted principle were made only in the case of permanent international bodies, organisations, commissions, etc., which had special rules of procedure and rules for the adoption of decisions. In these cases the states renounced their sovereign rights expressed in the principle of unanimity of their own consent. They could afford to do it because the statutes of these bodies gave sufficient guarantees that no issues involving the sovereignty of the member states should be raised, the aims of these organisations having been clearly defined in advance. At peace conferences, on the other hand, decisions on the most vital interests of the states taking part are taken and the foundations of a new international order laid, and for this there are no objective rules nor limitations of any kind worked out beforehand. Therefore, there is no precedent known to international law, that States should renounce the principle of unanimity and bind themselves in advance to accept the decisions of a conference adopted by a majority.

Despite this fact, Yugoslavia accepted the two-thirds majority system in order to facilitate the work and the organization of the Conference, but she did so with the reservation contained in her amendment to the effect that in territorial matters, that is when the ethnical territory of an Allied State is in question, the agreement of the State concerned will be sought for. The Yugoslav Delegation withdrew this amendment when the system of voting by a two-thirds majority was rejected and the justification for our amendment thus disappeared. But the Yugoslav Delegation wishes especially to emphasize, that Yugoslavia can in no case agree that her acceptance of a qualified majority for the adoption of decisions on international problems, for which a solution is now being sought, should be interpreted as meaning that it refers to the question of the fixing of her frontiers. Still less can she agree to a procedure which makes all these questions dependent on a vote by a simple majority.

In the opinion of the Yugoslav Delegation, the task of this Conference and its recommendations is, first of all, to provide the possibility for the joint signing of Peace Treaties. This practically means that in the first place an agreement should be reached among the States immediately concerned. Were it not reached, no decisions, by whatever majority they are adopted, would be carried out, since the States, immediately concerned, would not recognize them.

This clearly shows that this Conference has no right to bind the members of this Commission by a procedure not generally agreed. Consequently, this Conference has overstepped its powers by adopting a decision on voting against the will of several of the sovereign States here present. In so doing it casts a doubt on the real value of all its decisions.

However, this fact by itself would not be decisive—since the final decision, anyhow, is to be taken by the particular Allied State concerned—were it not for the other, more difficult and practical aspect of this question. I mean that such a procedure made it formally possible for a group of States or a block to impose, in every case, their decisions on another group of States. Clearly, this would mean that this Conference would lose the character of a Peace Conference. Instead of preparing peace it would on the contrary encourage all the elements in the world which are engaged in instigating fresh wars. This is where the gravity of the proposal on voting accepted by the Commission on Rules of Procedure lies. That is why Yugoslavia cannot accept such a decision or such an interpretation of the rights of this Conference.

For all these reasons, the Yugoslav Delegation stated in the Commission on Rules of Procedure, that it would not consider itself bound by the decisions taken on the basis of a procedure with which it did not agree. The Yugoslav Delegation herewith again announces that it adheres to this point of view. If, nevertheless, the system of voting proposed by the Commission on Procedure is accepted, the Yugoslav Delegation hereby announces that its further participation in the Conference will be subject to reservation.

The Yugoslav Delegation will await concrete evidence as to whether the Conference will endeavour to reach as unanimous decisions as possible, and especially whether it will remain imbued with the wish not to accept decisions without the agreement of the Allied States most directly concerned. Otherwise, the accepted procedure will be only a means for one group of States to impose their will on other States. While endeavouring for its part and as its powers permit, to see that the Conference follows the correct path, the path of mutual understanding and greatest possible unanimity, the Yugoslav Delegation will continue to take an active part in the Conference, reserving for itself the right to define its final attitude according to the real results of this Conference.

Mr. Alexander (U.K.):

Mr. President and fellow delegates: It seems to me that this Plenary Session to-day has been presented with a proposition by M. Molotov which will hardly bear examination. It is, in brief, that we should reject the recommendation of the Commission on Rules and Procedure, which has carried its will by fifteen votes to six. In the Commission every Delegation, every nation was represented. They sat for eight days and some nights. They had the continuous advice and the views of M. Molotov and M. Vyshinsky, and at the end, after the fullest and widest consideration, came to their decision by a ratio of five to two, far more than the two to one desired to be adopted by M. Molotov as a general rule. This Plenary Conference is, of course, right open to the free expression of the views of any Delegation, but it is, I suggest, merely taking up unnecessary time to use the Plenary Session for long and tedious repetition of what has already been said and published to the world. Because the world wants us to get on with making the peace.

All Tuesday evening M. Molotov protested against my use of the word “obstruction” as being groundless.⁵⁶ I am bound to confess that my view is that M. Molotov’s speech to-day seemed to indicate, and for whatever reason he knows best, further delay in action to avoid getting to the real business of the Conference.^* The extraordinary thing is that Mr. Molotov proclaims that he has the honour to defend unanimity, and by his further argument seemed to infer that there should never be a minority unless it is sponsored by the U.S.S.R. And then, and then only, that minority must have the right to hold up any resolution which the majority has considered to be progress. In other words, to put the position of this Conference, if there is a vote taken in a Commission or in the Conference of thirteen votes to eight, the resolution, in the view of M. Molotov, should be declared as being defeated.

Mr. President, M. Molotov quoted to-day, in making a playful reference to my friend, Dr. Evatt, from the French newspaper the Cité Soir, but for some reason he didn’t see fit to quote the Paris paper Humanité of to-day, a paper which usually supports M. Molotov’s point of view. To-day Humanité says: “To resume, yesterday’s and this morning’s decisions were by no means negative and the manoeuvre essayed by the dividers was actually checked. The two-thirds emerged triumphant from the struggle”.

Then what is the matter with the U.S.S.R. about this recommendation if that is the view of the paper which so strongly supports M. Molotov at all times? I should have thought he would have been contented to accept it. As this recommendation of the Commission is supported, not only by more than two-thirds majority, but by three out of four the Council of Foreign Ministers, I do not see, Mr. President, what course the Conference can pursue to-day but adopt the report of the Commission.

I support Dr. Evatt in deprecating the actual language used by M. Molotov when he stated, if he was correctly interpreted and I am always, of course, open to correction from the interpreter, when he stated that he must insist upon his view being adopted, and that he could not permit the acceptance of the majority view. Sir, the adoption of this kind of attitude would prevent peace at any time. I would, with all responsible delegates and everybody working for peace in the world—I would recognize that the first and last consideration required from us to get where we want to get is goodwill, and not merely haggling.

The Yugoslav Delegate said just now that what they wanted to do was to put us all upon the right road. Well, I’m glad if that is an expression of goodwill, but there are some of us who feel that we could not accept it as being the right road if we were put into a position where we must always accept, say, a single list of candidates at an election, or give way any time a minority says it wishes to stand in the road of what the majority considers to be progress.

Sir, I do not put myself or any of those who speak for my country in a secondary place in paying tribute to the services of the forces of the U.S.S.R. to which M. Molotov rightly referred to-day. We have a very great appreciation, both of their determination in face of advancing armies and of the skill and speed with which they advanced after recovery to expel the invaders and to assist in the liberation of other countries. But if this is the kind of testimony required in our efforts for peace and every country must establish its right to speak upon that basis, well, then, let me say that my country is not ashamed of its contributon to peace, for we have continuously fought since 1939, and in 1940, only with the aid of our sister nations within the British Commonwealth and India and those remnants of the oppressed countries in Europe which escaped and came also to our help, we have fought a fight without which we would not be sitting here to-day discussing peace. We also have a right to be here.

Another thing I would like to say before just refuting one argument of M. Molotov. He referred to his impression that in the Commission the U.S.A. and Great Britain had joined hands. Well, they voted for the same thing, but they had stood for the same thing right through the war and when the U.S.S.R. were retiring in their gallant rearguard action and when they were going back to the defence of Stalingrad, the U.S.A. were coming, with the help of Britain, to the aid of the U.S.S.R. They joined hands. I am not ashamed that we joined hands in defending the rights of small nations and the principles of democracy to-day.

Now, Sir, I must protest against M. Molotov’s attack upon Great Britain and the U.S.A. as regards their attitude on these matters in the Conference, having regard to what has happened in the Council of Foreign Ministers. The informal meetings which were held—and they were quite informal—between representatives of the Council of Four, the Ministers only being accompanied by an interpreter: in them there were no very detailed records taken by us, but I am going to quote from a record that we hold and, within the limitations which I have described, which we believe to be accurate, to refute the suggestion which is made that either ourselves or the U.S.A. have been in any sense guilty of a breach of faith or anything of that kind in our attitude upon this matter in the Commission.

I quote from the British extract, our own record, of the informal meeting of Ministers on July 8 of this year, which says: “Mr. Bevin repeatedly asked for assurances from M. Molotov that his colleagues would only be asked to agree to the points now at issue and that an agreement on these points would not be taken as a starting point for further demands or as an implied undertaking to support the whole of the proposed rules in the Soviet draft. Mr. Byrnes asked for an assurance that the U.S. Delegation would be free to vote as they wished on any reasonable and sensible amendment to the rules which might be proposed, at the same time stressing the fact that the U.S. Delegation would stand by any and every article in the treaties to which they had agreed. M. Molotov said that such questions must be left to the discretion of the heads of Delegations, and there would be no accusation of ill faith if the head of a Delegation decided to vote for an amendment of that kind without prior consent from the other three.”

In view of that, I cannot imagine why the kind of inference is made against the U.S. and ourselves which has been made to-day. Sir, in conclusion, may I say that we wish to get on with the business of the Conference of approving the peace treaties in the light of the criticism of the delegates here assembled of twenty-one nations. We want them all to be free, as my Prime Minister said on Tuesday of last week. We want them all to be free to express their views and for recommendations to be put up for the consideration of the Council of Four. But I do repeat this. There will be no real progress in peace unless we can adopt the spirit of peace and good will in our hearts, in our minds, in our expressions towards one another, and when M. Molotov says that he wants to get something better than even a two-thirds majority, he wants unanimity, then I am with him all the way, if we do it by persuasion and not by insisting or non-permitting.

Mr. Alexander (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I am informed that there are certain mistakes and omissions, at least in the French Translation. I hope that a complete verbatim will be prepared in French and circulated to the Press and all others concerned.

The Chairman: It is the Chairman’s duty to safeguard everybody’s freedom of speech and, naturally, to see that the speeches are reproduced in full with all proper attention.

The texts will be corrected.

Gentlemen, there were still three speakers on the list: Mr. Byrnes on behalf of the United States, Mr. Manuilski on behalf of the Ukraine and Mr. Kiselev on behalf of White Russia. I am informed that Mr. Byrnes has left the hall and that the two other speakers wish to reserve their explanations for a future meeting.

I think that the Conference will agree to adjourn and to resume the discussion to-morrow morning.

If there are no objections, the Conference will meet to-morrow morning at 10 a.m.

The meeting is closed.

(Close of meeting: 7:15 p.m.)

54. For text, see vol. iv, p. 796.
55. The proposal was presented at the 6th Meeting of the Commission on Procedure, August 5; for the United States Delegation Journal account of that meeting, see p. 123.
56. The reference is to the 11th Meeting of the Commission on Procedure, August 6; for the United States Delegation Journal account of that meeting, see p. 128.
57. In the course of the French translation M. Manuilsky (Ukraine) at this point interjected the word: “Scandalous!” [Footnote in the source text.]