CFM Files

United States Delegation Journal

USDel (PC) (Journal) 70

The Byelorussian representative, M. Kisselev, opened the meeting by reviewing the damage inflicted during the war on the Soviet Union and in particular on the Leningrad region, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, and Finno-Karelia. He pointed out Finland’s participation in this destruction and looting during the fighting and the period of occupation. Finland surrendered, however, and has subsequently taken the democratic road, and the Soviet Union has no spirit of vengeance. Nevertheless it asks compensation, although only in small part, for the damage done. This is indicated in Article 22 of the Treaty, providing that Finland pay $300 million over an eight-year period. The United States and Canada, generous at the expense of the Soviet Union and professing concern for the Finnish economy, have asked that the reparations figure be reduced to $200 million. The motive for the United States proposal is, instead, the desire of certain circles in that country to destroy friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union. Canada, if she is to act in line with her professed motives, should reduce the sum of $20 million due her from the Soviet Union for nickel mines in Finland.

The Finnish Treaty, Mr. Bevin (UK) stated, reproduces the more permanent terms of the Finnish Armistice.49 He felt that his Soviet colleagues would agree that the Finns have loyally fulfilled the Armistice terms and other related obligations. In spite of the difficulties of reconstruction Mr. Bevin hoped that Finland can look forward to better days and indicated that Britain is ready to welcome Finland [Page 841] back, reborn and truly democratic. Mr. Bevin then turned to the consideration of the work of the Conference as a whole and suggested that the general progress of the Conference not be allowed to be obscured by the difficulties and disagreements which centered around four or five of the principal Articles of the treaties. The job of the Conference was to consider the Council of Foreign Ministers drafts and send back recommendations to the Council and to hear the ex-enemy countries as well as all of the Allies; this has all been accomplished and should lead to successful final drafting of the treaties in New York.

Senator Vandenberg (US) spoke about reparation payments by Finland, pointing out initially that he had no intention of minimizing the damage done by Axis aggression nor to keep from any of our Allies any of the pitifully small percentage of reparation which it may be wise for them to collect. Further recognizing the limited part played by the United States in relation to the Finnish Treaty he said, however, that the United States wishes to register its concern lest the treaty result in inequity and injustice. He drew the attention of the Conference to Article 22 of the Finnish Treaty which sets the reparations to be paid by Finland at $300 million. By the same tests by which the Rumanian and Hungarian reparations burdens are to be judged, Finland should be expected to pay one-third as much as these countries rather than the standard figure of $300 million. The fact that Finland has begun to pay toward the higher sum does not indicate its justice but rather recalls her record of scrupulous fidelity to fiscal obligations. Moreover the reparations burden on Finland is greater in that, with the system of pricing that is called for, the reparations totals would approach $450 million at present prices. Compared with Finland’s reduced production capacity and national income reparation payments totaling $300 million present a severe problem; payments already made in the first year represented 15% of the total national income. The Finnish Government itself has said that it hopes that the reparations burden “does not exceed her (Finland’s) economic capacity and destroy the economic resources which if they are preserved, can allow her to make her best contribution not only to the reconstruction of her own recovery, but also to that of the whole world”. The United States Delegation therefore is obliged to vote against Article 22. This should not be construed as a refusal to recognize any Finnish obligation but only as a means of registering the United States conviction that $300 million is too heavy a burden for Finland. The United States Delegation had earlier tried to have a lower figure of $200 million considered, but this was ruled out because of procedural difficulties in the Economic Commission. It is hoped by the United States that other nations will support it in rejecting [Page 842] Article 22, meaning not the end of Finnish reparations but the reconsideration of the figure $300 million in the light of the circumstances and considerations outlined above. In conclusion Mr. Vandenberg recalled that in an earlier speech the United States motives on this matter had been attacked in a manner already too familiar to the Conference. He said he refused to act as a defendant before Allies to whom the United States has given every aid and support. The United States will continue, he said, to speak for the American conception of justice and fair play, hoping for a re-establishment of the sympathetic unity which in the past made possible the common victory.50

M. Molotov (USSR) pointed out that those provisions which were submitted to the Conference, having already received approval of the Council of Foreign Ministers, also were adopted by the Conference. But on Trieste, for example, in the Conference there was a retreat from the Council of Foreign Ministers decision in the adoption of several anti-democratic clauses; the United States, UK, and France were responsible for this retreat by violating obligations they had assumed earlier. Other places were the Council of Foreign Ministers agreement would have improved the work of the Conference are the matters of compensation for damage done to United Nations property, the foreign assets of ex-enemy countries, and navigation on the Danube. It has been clear that in the Conference there has been a group of states which refused to come to agreement in the Council of Foreign Ministers and have dominated the Conference and dictated to some of its members in order to achieve its ends. When in some instances this group failed to achieve its purposes in the Commissions it brought about a 15–6 decision in the Plenary Session. An example of this is the pressure which made Norway, India and Ethiopia vote as they did on the Danube question. It may be imagined that in a matter like this in which the Indians themselves were not directly concerned their voice would have been more impartial if it had been the voice of an independent India. In the matter of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier the same British representative who, in the Council of Foreign Ministers voted in favor of one definite frontier, headed a group of 12 other states and took a totally different position on this matter in the Bulgarian Commission. As a result there has been no decision on this frontier. Bulgaria may rest assured that the vote on this subject in the Conference was incorrect and will not be adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers and could not have been approved before and will not be approved after the Conference. M. Molotov said that it was evident through the Conference that the [Page 843] most convincing arguments lost any weight if not in line with the position of the dominating group. The United States in voting first has continually set the tone for 12 or 13 subsequent voters. Further indication of the game the United States is playing with the small countries is its effort to prove that the reparations requested are too heavy for Finland to pay. The attitude of the United Kingdom toward the seizure of foreign assets in Finland, as contrasted with its position on this question with regard to all other ex-enemy countries provides a further demonstration. These countries are playing the same game as before the war, the game which put the Finnish Government into a position which led it into the war on the side of the Axis. The Soviet Union desires cooperation and unanimity among the great powers and all nations. In speaking as he did of the veto M. Spaak, Chairman of the General Assembly, leveled reckless criticism at one of the most important decisions of the United Nations in regard to unanimity. In closing M. Molotov referred to Mr. Stalin’s recent statement that the latter believes fully in the possibility of cooperation between the East and West, despite ideological differences. Wherever there exists a desire for such cooperation, which was so fruitful during the war, the Soviet Union will support it.51

  1. See footnote 15, p. 7.
  2. For text of Senator Vandenberg’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 27, 1946, p. 744.
  3. For text of Molotov’s statement, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, p. 221.