CFM Files
United States Delegation Journal
USDel (PC) (Journal) 55
The Commission agreed to depart from its agenda to consider a Yugoslav resolution relating to Articles 3, 4, and 16 (the Italo-Yugoslav Frontiers and the Free Territory of Trieste). The proposed resolution (as subsequently modified by the Yugoslavs) read as follows:
“The Conference refers the determination of the frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy, and of the frontier of the Free City of Trieste, to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which will come to a decision after consultation with a view to arriving at an agreement with Yugoslavia.”
M. Kardelj (Yugoslavia) spoke in support of the resolution. He reiterated that the Yugoslav people cannot accept the French line80 and that the Yugoslav Government as well as its Delegation at the Conference could not recognize it. If the Conference supported the decision accepting the French line he added the Yugoslav Government would find it impossible to sign the Italian peace treaty. He concluded that it was for this reason the Yugoslav Government proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers be left free to find a compromise formula with Yugoslavia. Senator Connally (U.S.) replied to Kardelj by recalling that the Council of Foreign Ministers had convened the Conference for the purpose of obtaining the views of the 21 nations and that the Conference could not sidestep the issue as the Yugoslav amendment suggested. In effect it would mean no decision by the Council of Foreign Ministers without Yugoslav agreement. He expressed regret that the Yugoslavs had renewed their statement that unless the Conference determined on a line agreeable to Yugoslavia that country would refuse to sign the treaty or be bound by 13 votes to 6 with Ethiopia abstaining. Articles 3, 4, and 16 (1) Senator said, display a proper spirit for a Peace Conference, nor does it frighten anyone. No one is trembling in his boots. The Yugoslav attitude was particularly regrettable since the United States is friendly to Yugoslavia and in the formation of that country after the last war it was President Wilson who was largely responsible. In any event, he concluded, the Yugoslav resolution is futile since the Council of Foreign Ministers will consider this question, but it desires the aid of the Conference and should have its advice. He urged the Commission to give it. M. Vyshinsky (USSR) answered the Senator and spoke in favor of the Yugoslav resolution. He did not find the Yugoslav position undemocratic or extravagant. He interpreted the resolution as only asking the Council of Foreign Ministers to find a final solution and did not consider it inappropriate for Yugoslavia to be heard before the final decision. He concluded that in any event neither the Conference nor the U.S. Delegation nor the Yugoslav resolution could in the final analysis prevent the Council of Foreign Ministers from arriving at a decision. Sr. Fernandes (Brazil) said that his Delegation would support the Yugoslav resolution if its draft could be modified as suggested by Vishinsky to provide that Yugoslavia should be consulted again before the Council of Foreign Ministers reached a final decision and that such consultation would not exclude the other party concerned (Italy). The Yugoslav Delegation rejected the Brazilian suggestion, pointing out that its sacrifices during the war entitled it to special treatment and consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers.
[Page 581]After some discussion as to whether the Yugoslav resolution would render a subsequent vote on Articles 3, 4 and 16 unnecessary, the Chairman accepted the Yugoslav interpretation that there was nothing incompatible in voting on and accepting both the Yugoslav resolution and the CFM draft articles. The Yugoslav resolution was defeated by 13 votes to 6 with Ethiopia abstaining. Articles 3, 4, and 16 (1) were then adopted by a vote of 12 to 5, with 3 abstentions. It was agreed to postpone consideration of the remainder of Article 16 (2 to 6 inclusive), the related Annex, and proposals until after the receipt on Monday of the report of the Subcommittee on the Statute of Trieste.
M. Kardelj made a further declaration of Yugoslavia’s position for the Record in the following terms: The Yugoslav Government again insists that it will not sign the peace treaty with Italy if the terms are not satisfactory to Yugoslavia and that she will maintain her troops in Istria.
The representative of Yugoslavia introduced his Delegation’s amendment to Article 77 (CP(IT/P)Doc. 97)81 providing for the inclusion of Albania as one of the states which might accede to the treaty and thereafter be deemed an Associated Power for treaty purposes. The amendment was rejected by 14 votes to 5 with 1 abstention.
Mr. Dunn (U.S.) introduced an American proposal to create between Articles 77 and 78 a new article which reads as follows: “The provisions of the present treaty shall not confer any rights or benefits on any State named in the preamble of the present treaty as one of the Allied and Associated Powers or on its nationals unless such state becomes a party to the treaty by deposit of its instrument of ratification.” He referred to the provisions of Article 78 making provisions for the treaty to come into force and said that the United States proposal was designed to clarify the manner in which the treaty would become effective with respect to the powers other than the four sponsoring states. He concluded that, in taking advantage of the rights and benefits conferred by the treaty, it was appropriate that all the Allied Powers should be required to ratify the treaty. The American proposal was supported by the representative of Australia and opposed by the delegates of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It was adopted by 11 votes to 8 with Greece abstaining. M. Vyshinsky expressed the opinion that the American proposal was in effect an amendment to Article 78, an agreed Article, and that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had acted in an inappropriate manner in voting for them. The Soviet Union, he said, protested against the adoption of the U.S. proposal and would protest against it in the future on every possible occasion. He concluded that the U.S. and [Page 582] U.K. had by their action made a breach in the agreement of the four sponsoring powers which had been effective up to now. He reminded the Delegates that no amendments should be put forward affecting CFM decisions unless preliminary agreement on them had been reached among the 4 sponsoring powers.