CFM Files
United States Delegation Journal
USDel (PC) (Journal) 53
M. Vyshinsky (USSR) spoke for an hour, primarily in reply to remarks made to the Commission on September 23 by Mr. Thorp (U.S.) when he introduced the U.S. amendment to Article 24, paragraph 4, Rumanian Treaty.52 M. Vyshinsky noted that the U.S. had changed its position and now, like the USSR, favored the principle of partial compensation. It was logical that there should be partial compensation for damaged U.N. property on Rumanian territory just as reparation provided only partial compensation for damages suffered on U.N. territory. Much of the damage in Rumania had resulted from Allied bombing and some of the American bombing had been unnecessary. This should be considered in the assessment of compensation claims. The dispute as to the general principle of compensation was at an end, in view of the changed U.S. position.
M. Vyshinsky then said that Mr. Thorp’s remarks of September 23 bore no relation to paragraph 4 but were directed against the policy of the Soviet High Command in Rumania. He said that if what Mr. Thorp had said were true, it might be an argument to decrease the economic obligations of Rumania. But, M. Vyshinsky said, the armistice terms were just and legitimate. The U.S., U.K. and USSR had agreed to these terms. Article 10 of the armistice required payment of occupation costs. Rumania should pay these costs and the obligations should not be questioned. U.S. and U.K. troops were costing Italy money. M. Vyshinsky wondered if Mr. Thorp would wish to give figures on the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in bases throughout the world. Mr. Thorp had given a figure of $325 million. This figure stood not for the maintenance of troops but for the expenses of war and for war equipment. It represented the price of victory. The U.S., which dealt in figures did not seem to realize this. In connection with Article 11 of the armistice terms, Mr. Thorp had said that the $300 million reparation obligation amounted to $450 million, in current dollars. But, M. Vyshinsky said, if 1944 prices had been taken, the Soviet Union would have received about one-third the cost of buildings constructed in 1937 and 1938 and destroyed during the war. In connection with Article 12 of the armistice terms on restitution, Mr. Thorp had given a figure of $175 million. M. Vyshinsky asked what rate of [Page 565] exchange had been taken, implying that the figure was exaggerated. He also asked if Mr. Thorp had wished to defend looting. He gave figures to show what Rumania had taken from the Soviet Union and what remained to be restituted, pointing out that the Soviet Union had waived half of its remaining claim.
M. Vyshinsky then turned to Mr. Thorp’s estimate of the future economic burden on Rumania at $1 billion. He noted that this included the transfer of German and Italian assets. He said that this was in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement and that no one had a legal or moral right to question this decision. He thought that the U.S. did not appreciate the destruction and misery that had been inflicted on the USSR in Leningrad and elsewhere. He said Mr. Thorp was hiding behind a statistical veil and, moreover, had based his information on Rumanian sources which he (M. Vyshinsky) knew about. Mr. Thorp made an estimate of damages to U.N. property in Rumania and this was necessarily guesswork. Actually, M. Vyshinsky said, there were two main American firms in Rumania. These were Romano-Americana and Astra-Romano [the latter is not an American firm]53 Their profits during 1943 amounted to 726 million lei and 800 million lei, respectively, which profits were very large in relation to the damage suffered by these firms. M. Vyshinsky ended his talk by observing that while the Soviet Union was being subjected to attack, these U.S. corporations were making huge profits.
Mr. Thorp (U.S.) replied in less than three minutes that he should like nothing better than to discuss and reconcile the statistical differences but that, as he understood M. Vyshinsky, these differences did not sufficiently affect the orders of magnitude involved to change the general conclusion of the U.S. Delegation. Had M. Vyshinsky been present at earlier discussions of the Commission, he would have had less difficulty in understanding the purpose of the remarks and might not have felt it necessary to defend the Potsdam and Armistice Agreements, since it was not the intention of the remarks to question these agreements. The concern had been exclusively with the extent of the obligations on Rumania created by these Agreements and this did have a bearing on paragraph 4. Mr. Thorp felt that M. Vyshinsky’s first interpretation of the U.S. comment had been correct. It had been an argument for partial compensation. Logic had long since led the U.S. to feel that full compensation would be justified, but the facts had led the U.S. to consent to partial compensation.
M. Vyshinsky made another brief speech, the substance of which was that the U.S. was subordinating facts to policy, whereas the USSR subordinated policy to facts.