CFM Files

United States Delegation Minutes

[Extract]
secret
CFM (D) (46) 113th Meeting

Present

U.S.S.R.
M. Vyshinsky (Chairman)
M. K. Novikov
General Slavin
Admiral Karpunin
M. Gerashchenko
M. Stetsenko
U.S.A France
Mr. Dunn M. Couve de Murville
Mr. Reber M. Wolfrom
Captain Pryce M. de Courcel
Mr. Achilles Lt. Colonel Clementin
Mr. Guthe M. Beaumarchais
Mr. Campbell M. Beaumarchais
U.K.
Lord Hood
Mr. Sterndale Bennett
Mr. McAlpine

Italian-Yugoslav Frontier in the Region of Merna

M. Vyshinsky: The next item is the Italian-Yugoslav frontier. Will the chairman of the appropriate Committee make a report.

M. Geraschenko: The report of our Committee to the Deputies (CFM (D) (46) 191)83 gives the results of our examination of the description of the French line in the region of Merna. The French, British and American representatives think that the description given by the French Delegation should be left as it was. They believe that the map submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers on July 3 was not sufficiently detailed in the Merna region. The French representative pointed out that the French Delegation had not intended that the line should cross highway no. 55. The Soviet representative believes that the line on the map of July 3 should be described as fully as possible and that the description given by the French Delegation does not correspond to the map.84 The report to the Deputies includes the [Page 429] description of the line in the Merna region as the Soviet representative believed correct.

M. Couve de Murville: The French Delegation thinks that there is no doubt on this question. Highway no. 55 does not appear on the map (scale 1: 500,000) which was submitted to the Foreign Ministers. On the other hand, this highway is mentioned in the Records of the Commission of Inquiry, more particularly in the minutes of the meeting when the French representative made clear his position. Therefore, there is no doubt about the intentions of the French representative who drew this line. We always thought that it was not necessary to cut highway no. 55 needlessly. We thought that the frontier should go along next to the highway leaving it entirely on Italian territory. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the map and the description of the line in the French memorandum.

M. Vyshinsky: I raised this question in our last meeting because the description did not correspond to the map. We instructed our experts to see if it did. I think that their answer is “no”. Since the map was approved by the Foreign Ministers, it should be the basis of drawing the line. The question of whether in certain places it is convenient or not should be decided in the process of demarcation. There might be an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia to make certain changes but now we must be guided by the map, or else refer the matter back to the Ministers and have them change it. In the region of Merna the line on the map bulges toward Italy while in the French description the bulge is toward Yugoslavia. Since the map should be the basis we should change the description and take account of the fact that the road would be crossed twice by the frontier. We cannot change a decision already made by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

M. Couve de Murville: As highway no. 55 was not on the 1:500,000 map, we cannot draw the conclusion that the French line cuts it in two places. This is clear also from the map submitted by the Yugoslav Delegation. Although the Yugoslav Delegation did not sign the French memorandum it drew the same conclusion that we did.

M. Vyshinsky: I should like to ask M. Couve de Murville whether the description given by the French Delegation corresponds to the map which the Ministers accepted. Our experts say that it does not. The description should be changed accordingly. If the map is not correct, I should like to see a correct one. On the map the line is very near the railway. In the description the line is far from the railway. If the line was not plotted accurately on the map, we should appoint some new experts.

Lord Hood: We are arguing about a line running on the ground, which is not the same as a line drawn on a map. The line on the map [Page 430] which was considered by the Ministers, if put on the ground would be one kilometer or more in width. It seems to me that, without departing from the decision of the Ministers, we have to make up our minds without those limits where the actual frontier is going to run. If highway no. 55 had been on the map shown to the Ministers, I am sure that they would have decided that it would be inconvenient to have it cut twice within such a short distance. It is inevitable that drawing on a larger scale map the line which was drawn on a smallish map would involve certain changes. We are not departing from the decision of the Ministers but merely trying to interpret that decision clearly and reasonably in drawing the agreed line on a large scale map. In view of the explanation given by M. Couve de Murville, I think it is clear that the French description of the line is correct.

M. Vyshinsky: We are arguing not on where the line goes on the ground which involves certain questions of delimitation, but on its description on paper. The French description says that the line leaves highway no. 55 in Italian territory. Why does it say that? What is the basis for that? The map does not show it, and this was the map on which the Ministers agreed. If the line on the map is incorrect, we shall have to refer it to the Ministers again. But we cannot change their decision. In the region of San Pietro also the description given by the French Delegation does not correspond to the map. There is obviously an error in the description, this time in favor of Italy, but the French Delegation does not want to change it. I suggest that we make the description correspond to the map or else refer the matter to the Ministers.

M. Couve de Murville: I don’t agree that the description of the French line does not correspond to the map. The map does not give an exact idea of the situation because highway no. 55 is not on it. Since there is a doubt, I propose that we refer to the document which shows what the author had in mind. This document is the Record of the 73rd meeting of the Commission of Inquiry, Annex A, Section 1, paragraph B, and the French expert says that the line leaves to the west the highway from Gorizia to Duino, leaving Merna to the east.

M. Vyshinsky: Was that Record before the Council of Foreign Ministers?

M. Couve de Murville: All these Records were submitted to the Council.

M. Vyshinsky: Was it reported that that was where the line would run?

M. Couve de Murville: You know that the report of the Commission was before the Council of Foreign Ministers.

M. Vyshinsky: Here is the line on the map and the Council approved the map. If we cannot agree, let us refer it to the Ministers.

[Page 431]

M. Couve de Murville: I have no objection.

Mr. Dunn: Our feeling is that we accepted the French line. I feel that the French Delegation knew what the French line was better than we did. They had given us a description of it, we have studied that description, and had hoped that we could agree on the line as the French described it. If we cannot, I am willing to let it stand as “the French line”. I don’t see why we need spend so much time on this. The French are the authority on where the French line runs. My Delegation knows what the American line was and I would hope our description of that would be accepted. In a spirit of reasonableness I should like to see us all agree to the French description of the French line.

M. Vyshinsky: If we had a text in Article 4 describing the French line then Mr. Dunn’s observation would be correct. But we are now trying to draw up a more detailed description. In the Council of Foreign Ministers we took a map, plotted a line, and said that it was the French line. Now we have the problem of describing it in detail. The question is whether the description will correspond to that line on the map. If there is no agreement here we should refer it to the Ministers. Perhaps they may suggest other changes which would be favorable to Yugoslavia.

Lord Hood: I am afraid that I could not agree to refer it to the Ministers. This is the sort of thing which my Minister expects me to settle here. When they made their decision, the Ministers did not draw the line on the map. The French line was something we all knew about for weeks beforehand. It was the result of careful investigation on the spot.

M. Vyshinsky: The French line was not considered on the spot.

Lord Hood: The French Delegation had given to the other three Delegations a clear indication of where the French line was supposed to run.

M. Vyshinsky: The idea is on this map. I know of no other. That is the decision of the Ministers.

Lord Hood: Each Delegation explained to the other Delegations where its line ran. The map on which the Ministers took their decision was an illustration of the four proposals. It was a part of the French proposal that the French line should run east of highway no. 55. Every Delegation was aware of that as is shown by the minutes which M. Couve de Murville read. It seems to me that when the four Ministers accepted the French line, they accepted the point that the frontier would run to the east of highway no. 55.

M. Vyshinsky: With the situation as it is, I see no possibility of agreement. I have given my reasons. Let the Ministers decide our argument. M. Couve de Murville does not object to that.

[Page 432]

M. Couve de Murville: Before having the Ministers meet to consider this important question, should not each of us consult his own Minister on it.

Lord Hood: Could Mr. Vyshinsky say why he thinks that the French line does not represent the decision of the Ministers? It is clear that highway no. 55 is not on the map on the basis of which they took their decision.

M. Vyshinsky: I am talking about the line on the map. When transferred to a larger scale map it does not leave the highway on Italian territory. Each of us can consult his own Minister, and then we will see what to do next. I am ready to check again on whether or not my idea is correct. But if there is an error in the description, it should be corrected regardless of what is said in any report. Is the suggestion of M. Couve de Murville accepted?

Mr. Dunn: I know what my Secretary of State will say. He will say: “What do the French say?” Since it is a question of the French line, he would accept the description given by the French as long as it reasonably follows his understanding of the French line. However. I agree to consult him.

M. Vyshinsky: I think my Foreign Minister will say that we should follow the map.

Mr. Dunn: I say that we should follow the French line on the map. I think the French are right when they describe their own line.

M. Vyshinsky: We should follow the French line on the map, not in the description. (It was then agreed to defer further consideration of this question until the Deputies had had an opportunity to consult their respective Foreign Ministers.)

Motor Torpedo Boats for Bulgaria

M. Vyshinsky: We shall next consider the Greek amendment to Article 12 of the Bulgarian Treaty proposing the prohibition of MTB’s [C.P. (Gen) Doc.1.J.22]. This is a question which we have already discussed. Are there any new suggestions or will we merely engage in a repetition of what has already been said. If we take the 15th report of the Naval Experts (CFM (46) 260),85 we note that it says the Committee has agreed to reject the amendments and proposals which had been made. The report says that the Committee agreed to submit new clarifying amendments and suggests which delegation should sponsor them in the Military Commission. I believe their rejection of amendments includes the Greek amendment as well. On the question of substance the Soviet Delegation is opposed to the Greet amendment. We have an agreed Article in which no mention is made of MTB’s. Why should Bulgaria be deprived of them? They are [Page 433] rather important for the small Bulgarian Navy which is somewhat different from the U.S. Navy or the Italian Navy or even the Rumanian Navy. I see no reason to change the agreed Article and suggest we reject the Greek amendment.

Lord Hood: The Ministers took a decision last September on which all the military, naval, and air clauses are based. This was the principle that the maintenance of land, sea, and air armaments and fortifications should be closely restricted to tasks of an internal character and local defense. That principle appears in the opening article of the military clauses in each of these treaties. Its general purpose has been to enable these ex-enemy countries to maintain sufficient armaments to defend themselves but not to threaten or harm their neighbors. In our view MTB’s are essentially an offensive weapon. British MTB’s in the war were used entirely for attacking German coastal shipping. The Germans used them to attack our coastal shipping, and very tiresome they were too. In the Italian Treaty we have prohibited Italy from constructing, employing, or experimenting with MTB’s. We should like to see a similar prohibition included in the Balkan treaties. It has always been our intention that it should be included but the actual words were not put in because we thought the subject was covered by the reference to specialized types of assault craft. Looking at the several treaties, however, one will notice the discrepancy between the Italian Treaty and the others. The Greeks spotted this difference and tabled this amendment. As it is in accord with our intentions and with the original decision of the Ministers, the U.K. Delegation would like to accept it.

M. Vyshinsky: In none of these treaties is there any mention of MTB’s except in the Italian Treaty. I think our sailors can confirm the fact that MTB’s cannot be classified as assault craft. The latter are for landing operations, whereas MTB’s are an independent category of vessels. We prohibit them in the Italian Treaty because Italy used them during the war. And the experts tell me that Bulgaria did not use them during the war. Why should we then punish Bulgaria in this way? Bulgaria’s war against the U.S., the U.K., and France was an original kind of war. Even Bulgaria’s war with the U.S.S.R. came about through our declaration. The treaty prohibits Bulgaria from having battleships, aircraft carriers, and various other types including assault craft. If MTB’s are assault craft, we can leave the text as it is. If you ask that they be specifically mentioned, then you are assuming that they are not assault craft. Why should we put this obligation on Bulgaria? Bulgaria is not in the same position as Italy. We all know about Italian imperialists, but I have not heard of any Bulgarian imperialists. The Soviet Delegation opposes this amendment because this is an agreed article.

[Page 434]

Mr. Dunn: There is a definition of MTB’s in the Italian Treaty: they are boats with a displacement of less than 200 tons and capable of a speed of over 25 knots and of operating torpedoes. It cannot be contested that vessels of that type are assault craft or at least offensive craft. If they were defensive, they need not carry torpedoes. The Italian Treaty prohibits MTB’s or specialized types of assault craft; consequently MTB’s are a type of assault craft. This is the technical naval view and was agreed to by our experts, by the Deputies, and by our Foreign Ministers. In connection with the Bulgarian Treaty there was no mention of or discussion on MTB’s. It may be said that there was no agreement to prohibit them or not to prohibit them. Therefore, we have a new proposal, to prohibit Bulgaria from having MTB’s. There is everything to justify our giving consideration to the acceptance of this new suggestion. In view of the provision in the Italian Treaty and in view of the spirit of the first paragraph of Article 9, I hope we can agree to accept the insertion of a provision prohibiting Bulgaria from having MTB’s. The U.S. Delegation feels strongly that the ex-enemy states should not be allowed to have such vessels.

M. Vyshinsky: It is suggested that MTB’s be prohibited because they are offensive. But what about destroyers? They also carry torpedoes and have greater speed. Are not destroyers offensive? The only difference is that between an automobile and a bicycle, if each is armed with a machine gun. Italy can have destroyers and cruisers with torpedoes, but apparently Bulgaria cannot even have any little boat with torpedoes. If my technical knowledge is incorrect, it is the fault of Admiral Karpunin who is sitting next to me.

Mr. Dunn: Does Mr. Vyshinsky admit that MTB’s are offensive or are assault craft?

M. Vyshinsky: In the same measure as destroyers.

Mr. Dunn: Then why not allow Italy to have MTB’s?

M. Vyshinsky: We are allowing Bulgaria to have only 7,250 tons of war ships, while Italy will have some 100,000 tons. The experts understand the difference between the two situations. Admiral Karpunin tells me that Captain Pryce understands that as long as Bulgaria is allowed only 7,250 tons it might as well be allowed to have 100 MTB’s. If we deprive Bulgaria of that, it will not have anything. What danger does the Bulgarian Navy represent? Its bases are only on the Black Sea and could be of danger only to Black Sea powers. If Greece fears a Bulgarian Naval attack that fear is unfounded because the Bulgarian Navy is in the Black Sea and cannot go through the Straits. Since we are leaving Bulgaria only 7,250 tons, there is no sense in having a limitation on MTB’s. All weapons, except the atomic bomb, are both offensive and defensive. It is obvious to me [Page 435] that the Greek amendment is incorrect in substance. The Soviet Delegation objects to it on those grounds and also because it is an amendment to an agreed Article. If we have no agreement here let us leave it at that. It is an amendment to an agreed Article.

Mr. Dunn: No, the U.S. Delegation thinks it is something new.

M. Vyshinsky: It is possible to think anything. Anything can be thought. But this thought doesn’t happen to be acceptable to us.

Mr. Dunn: It is not an amendment to an agreed Article since there was never any agreement not to prohibit MTB’s.

M. Vyshinsky: That is right. It was never suggested that we add that prohibition.

Mr. Dunn: It is a new suggestion.

M. Vyshinsky: It is a new amendment.

Mr. Dunn: I do not consider it as such.

M. Vyshinsky: Let us refer it to the Academy of Science. At least I hope that Mr. Dunn will have a change of humor tomorrow and a new opinion.

Mr. Dunn: I do not think so.

M. Vyshinsky: We have a precedent for which I am grateful. The amendments to Articles 3, 4 and 16 were withdrawn.

Delimitation Commissions

M. Vyshinsky: The next question is the proposed addition to Article 5 of the Italian Treaty. Is this suggestion a new proposal or an amendment? The Article provides that the Commission shall have two members. The U.S. proposal refers to a third member appointed by the Security Council. We are opposed to this and consider it an amendment to an agreed Article. We oppose all three paragraphs of the U.S. proposal except the first part of paragraph 4 up to the words “and provided that no village …”

Mr. Dunn: The agreed part of Article 5 was agreed to before there was any question of a Free Territory of Trieste. If the Security Council has a certain responsibility in connection with the Free Territory of Trieste, it seems proper to have the Security Council take part in the delimitation of its boundaries.

M. Vyshinsky: That does not follow from the decision, we have Article 16. It sets forth the relation between the Security Council and the Free Territory. But what does the Security Council have to do with the demarcation of frontiers?

Lord Hood: Article 5 is based on the idea that there will be delimitation commissions composed of one representative each of the two parties concerned. These commissions will start their work on the coming into force of the Treaty. The Free Territory will then have [Page 436] ceased to be a part of Italy or Yugoslavia. It is logical that the commissions should contain representatives of the existing authorities of the Free Territory. All our statutes provide for a provisional regime, and the representative of that regime should, I feel, be represented on the boundary commissions. Therefore, it seems in keeping with the agreed Article 5 to provide for that.

M. Vyshinsky: Article 5 is clear. It says that the new frontier shall be determined on the spot by boundary commissions composed of the representatives of the two Governments concerned. There is nothing about a third member. Therefore, the U.S. proposal is an amendment to an agreed text. The Council of Foreign Ministers did not think that there should be a representative of the Security Council on the commissions. If you desire to have this matter discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers, it can be brought up there. The Soviet Delegation has already made some concessions on Article 5, we did not originally wish to have the provision whereby the four Ambassadors might appoint an impartial third commissioner. It is obvious that this is an agreed text. An amendment can be accepted only by agreement among us, otherwise we are breaking up the basis of our cooperation.

M. Couve de Murville: Does the reference to the two Governments concerned mean representatives of Italy and Yugoslavia or representatives of each together with representatives of the Free Territory?

M. Vyshinsky: It seems clear to me. It means representatives of the governments between whose territories the lines are being drawn. It is proposed now that the Security Council be in on it, but we reached no agreement on that idea. It is not within the competence of the Security Council.

Mr. Dunn: But Article 16 states that the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste shall be assured by the Security Council.

M. Vyshinsky: That is right. That is not a question of frontier demarcation.

Mr. Dunn: The reference to integrity means that the Security Council guarantees the territory within the boundaries which are drawn. Thus it is connected with the question of boundary delimitation.

M. Vyshinsky: When the frontiers are delimited and the Free Territory constituted, the Security Council then guarantees its integrity.

Mr. Dunn: We feel that when we ask the Security Council to insure the integrity and independence of the territory it will be proper for the Security Council to have some part in the demarcation of the boundary.

[Page 437]

M. Vyshinsky: That does not follow.

Mr. Dunn: I think it is only proper particularly when you come to paragraph 4 of the U.S. suggestion which requires that the commission not depart more than ½ kilometer from the line laid down. Thus there is not much leeway. We think that the Security Council should be brought into the picture at least to that extent. However, if you feel that this is a modification of an agreed Article, I shall be glad to take up that point with my Secretary of State. I do not think it is an amendment, but I am willing to take it up with him if you wish.

M. Vyshinsky: The Article clearly provides for representation by the two parties directly concerned. These would be Italy and the Free Territory for one section of the frontier, and Yugoslavia and the Free Territory for the other section. The Security Council does not come into it at all. There is no mention of a third member. You claim that this is not an amendment but a new proposal. But a change from two to three members is an amendment, not a new proposal. We have agreed that agreed articles could not be changed except by common agreement among all of us. I see no more use in arguments of this kind.

Mr. Dunn: Neither do I, as we would not agree. I am prepared to mention this to my Foreign Minister.

M. Vyshinsky: That is your right, you need no permission from me to consult Mr. Byrnes, but I wish to say that the Soviet Delegation will never agree to consider this a new proposal. It should be treated as an amendment. Can we go on to the next item?

Lord Hood: There are two questions at issue here. The U.S. Delegate proposed that this boundary commission deal with the whole frontier of the Free Territory of Trieste and consist of three members. You suggest, on the other hand, that there should be two commissions, each consisting of two commissioners.

M. Vyshinsky: I have proposed merely what Article 5 provides, namely, that there be boundary commissions to delimit the frontier on the spot. They shall be made up of two members in each case. The U.S. proposal is that there shall be three members of the commission; that is, that there shall be representatives in one case of Italy, the Free Territory, and the Security Council, and in the other case of Yugoslavia, the Free Territory and the Security Council. That does not follow from Article 5; it is an amendment and even in substance it is incorrect. The Security Council will guarantee the integrity of the Free Territory after it is constituted, but it is not concerned with the demarcation of the frontiers. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation cannot agree to the appointment of a third member by the Security Council.

[Page 438]

Lord Hood: Would you object to the appointment of the second member by the Security Council?

M. Vyshinsky: I cannot agree to that. It is contrary to Article 5. There will be a representative of the Government of the Free Territory.

Lord Hood: Would there be at that time a government there comparative to the Governments of Italy or Yugoslavia?

M. Vyshinsky: The Soviet Government has existed from the day of the October Revolution. If there is a Free Territory of Trieste, there will be a government. The Peace Treaty assures us that there will be a Free Territory. Within a few months after the Treaty is in force the Free Territory will be constituted and governing authorities established. The frontier lines are laid down by the Treaty. The actual demarcation might not take place until much later.

Lord Hood: I should think they would be delimited on the ground as rapidly as possible. Article 5 says it must be done in six months.

M. Vyshinsky: Yes, that is right. It will be done as soon as possible. Since Mr. Dunn wishes to consult his Foreign Minister on this matter, I do not insist on continuing the discussion.

  1. Not printed.
  2. With regard to the “French Line” and the map under reference, see footnote 7, p. 40.
  3. Not printed.