CFM Files

United States Delegation Minutes

secret

Present

U.S.S.R.
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Novikov
Mr. Pavlov
U.S.A. U.K.
Mr. Byrnes Mr. Alexander
Senator Connally Mr. McNeil
Senator Vandenberg Lord Hood
Mr. Bohlen Interpreter
France China
M. Bidault Dr. Wang
M. Couve de Murville Dr. Quo Tai-Shi
M. Latour du Pain Mr. Chang
Also Present
Mr. Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium

Mr. Molotov, who was presiding, said he wished to recall that this was the fourth time they had met on the question of the General Assembly. This time, however, they had the Representative of China and Mr. Spaak, the President of the General Assembly. They should exchange views and endeavor to reach a decision on this question. He wished to repeat that it was impossible in the view of the Soviet Government to hold the two gatherings simultaneously. The Soviet Delegation therefore proposed to postpone the General Assembly to [Page 399] a suitable date. But if that should be absolutely impossible then it would be necessary to adjourn the Conference. He emphasized, however, that the Soviet Delegation thought it would be a mistake to adjourn the Conference. He stated that at the previous meeting Dr. Wang had suggested November 11 as the date and that the Soviet and French Delegations had expressed no objection. He urged that they attempt to reach an agreement on this point.

Dr. Wang said that at the last meeting no decision had been reached since the other members desired time to study his suggestion, particularly in the absence of Mr. Byrnes. He said he wished to point out that he did not believe that the Council should actually request postponement but merely suggest that the Secretary General ascertain the views of the members of the United Nations. November 11 has been forwarded merely as a basis for discussion.

The Secretary said that he had already attended two or three meetings to discuss this subject and had expressed the views of the United States. Through no fault of any of them it has not been possible for all the Foreign Ministers to be present at any one meeting on this subject. From the first it had been the United States view that it was not the business of the Council of Foreign Ministers to settle this question. The Council had been set up at Potsdam to work on the question of treaties. The matter of the General Assembly was for the United Nations to settle. There was, however, no reason why the countries represented at this table could not in their capacity as members of the United Nations make known their views. It is true, he said, that on previous occasions when the Council of Foreign Ministers was in session the Secretary General in the United States had asked their opinion as to the advisability of postponing the General Assembly and that the Council had stated its opinion. This time the Secretary General had sent his Assistant to ascertain these views and he assumed that the others had given them as frankly as he had. Thus these views were now known and he felt it was now up to the appropriate officials of the United Nations to decide. He pointed out he had no written request from the Secretary General. The United States position remained that the Council had no right to decide this question. He did not know how many delegations here at the Peace Conference were for or against the proposal. At the last meeting he attended he had suggested that Mr. Spaak, as President of the Assembly, might report to Mr. Lie the opinions of the various governments here or, if preferred, any government here could request an adjournment. He did not feel, however, that the Council as a body should do this.

Mr. Spaak said that since the middle of August, in view of the progress of the Conference, he had been worried about this question. [Page 400] He said he had no authority to deal directly with the matter but he merely desired to call it to the attention of the heads of delegations here. He agreed with Mr. Byrnes that the Council had no right to order a postponement. The Council of Foreign Ministers was one organization and the United Nations another. He said he thought the solution would be for the five powers here as members of the United Nations to ask the Secretary General to ascertain the views of the other states member concerning the postponement because of the continued session of the Peace Conference. He said he did wish to emphasize that time was short and that many delegations to the General Assembly would be getting under way in the next few days. For example, the Belgian Delegation would have to leave on Tuesday. He felt that if no decision was reached tonight the General Assembly would go ahead. He felt, therefore, that the five should make their views known to the Secretary General tonight as it would take him at least 48 hours to ascertain the wishes of the other states member. He felt that if only one country proposed postponement it would not get a majority, but if the representatives of the five great powers did so a majority of the other members would be obtained.

Mr. Alexander said he wished to express Mr. Bevin’s regrets that he could not be here. The British Government in general shared the views here set forth by Mr. Byrnes, namely, that it was up to the members of the United Nations to initiate and decide a question of this kind. He hoped that this principle would be kept clearly in mind. If the two conferences were to be held simultaneously the British Government felt that they could be adequately represented at both. But he recognized this might be difficult for a number of countries. Therefore, his government would not take a hard and fast line, and if a free decision was taken to postpone by other nations they would support. He thought there were two important aspects of this problem: (1) that the Secretary General should freely ascertain the wishes of the other members, whereas if the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers requested it as a body it would be resented by the other members. Therefore, any request or requests should be done individually or by several states but not by the members of the Council. (2) The second aspect was the future program of work of the Council of Foreign Ministers and that any date must be regarded in that light. The Council had the treaties to finish and then came the question of territories under Allied control, that is to say, Germany and Austria. He felt that the date to which the General Assembly would be postponed was of great importance. He said he doubted if his government would agree to postpone unless they had some guarantee as to the future work of the Council. He said if Mr. Molotov would recall at the last meeting Mr. Bevin had put certain questions to him on this point.

[Page 401]

The Secretary inquired if Mr. Spaak had informed Mr. Lie of the views he had expressed here tonight.

Mr. Spaak replied that he had told Mr. Sobolev when he was in Paris.

The Secretary then said that he thought it might be advisable if Mr. Spaak would telephone Mr. Lie tonight and advise him of the views of the countries represented here.

Mr. Molotov said that it would be a good idea for Mr. Spaak to inform Mr. Lie but first of all we should ascertain and try to bring together our views here. This would facilitate Mr. Lie’s task. He recalled that we had not thought it improper previously to request a postponement from September 3 to 23 because we felt that the Conference would not have completed its work. The same reason underlay his present, proposal and he thought it was equally proper in this instance. The Conference needed more time in view of the complexity of the problems. He repeated that having the two run simultaneously would adversely affect the work of both. He could see that it would be less inconvenient for the United States since Washington is near to New York, but if the General Assembly could not be postponed he and Vyshinski would have to go to New York, leaving here in Paris only Junior assistants. This would only further delay the conference. He felt in those circumstances it would be necessary to adjourn the Peace Conference while the General Assembly was in session. The Soviet Delegation did not wish to do this but would have to insist on an adjournment of the Conference if a meeting of the General Assembly was to take place. He added that everyone here was in agreement that the Council had no right to decide this question. It was up to the United Nations. But so far he had heard no arguments concerning the impossibility of postponement. It was only necessary to consider to what day it should be postponed. As to the other questions raised by Mr. Alexander, they would of course find time to discuss those. As to the form of approach to the Secretary General, the Soviet Delegation would accept any form agreeable to the others. As to substance, the views of China, France and tonight the British Delegation, as well as Mr. Spaak, were in favor of postponement. If it were possible to reach agreement with the American Delegation then it would be unanimous among the five powers. Mr. Spaak could address the Secretary General and would probably obtain the support of a majority of the United Nations. The date of November 11 or any other suitable date would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.

The Secretary said he merely wished to recall that the last time when the Secretary General had written him a letter he had released in the United States a separate communication stating that the building [Page 402] for the Assembly would not be ready by September 3. He repeated that if the United Nations officials desired postponement he would not object. He said he had one qualification and that was as to the date. He did not believe it should be too far distant. He had said before that he felt that either Mr. Spaak as President of the Assembly or any members of the United Nations who so desired could make the request and he would not oppose it.

Mr. Molotov inquired if that meant that no unanimous decision could be reached.

The Secretary said that the fact was they had not reached a common agreement but that he was sure that if say four members here made known their desire to the Secretary General for postponement the United States said it would not object, that this would have the same influence as a unanimous decision. He said the United States could not participate in the request for a postponement since it would have no difficulty in attending two conferences, but recognizing the difficulties of others it would not oppose.

Mr. Alexander said he was in complete agreement with Mr. Byrnes. He said that the British Government would likewise have no objection and would even support postponement if a suitable date could be selected and the matter of the future work of the Council be cleared up. He said he would like to restate the three questions which Mr. Bevin had put to Mr. Molotov. He added, however, that his government could not agree to a date later than October 23.

Mr. Spaak said it appeared to him that there was agreement on the following two points: (1) that it was not for the Council as such to make the request, and (2) Mr. Lie could only make his decision after consulting the other members of the United Nations. He said he wondered if he could not communicate to Mr. Lie the fact that a number of governments would find it difficult to have two delegations in two places at the same time and he must state that as far as Belgium is concerned it would be indeed difficult to have a delegation in New York and one in Paris and at the same time run the business of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels. He understood that in addition to the three or four here who wished postponement there were some 12 or 15 governments at the conference who shared that view. He said he had prepared a draft communication to Mr. Lie to the effect that the governments of . . . . . . . . . . . . because of the Peace Conference would find it difficult to give the necessary attention to the General Assembly which it deserves and therefore request Mr. Lie to ascertain the views of the other members as to postponement to . . . . . date. He said it could be added that the United States would not raise any objection to this suggestion.

Mr. Molotov said he would like to answer Mr. Alexander. He thought that the four governments could continue to consider questions [Page 403] which have already been discussed in accordance with the schedule already agreed upon. The Soviet Delegation was not suggesting any change in any decisions taken as to this program. As to the date of the General Assembly postponement he felt it should be one which would permit the Conference to finish its work. The Soviet Delegation would want a unanimous decision on this point or else they would be forced to insist on a recess of the Conference. He said that the reason for suggesting Paris or Geneva was merely to make it possible to take care of any overlap.

M. Bidault said he felt it was impossible to adjourn the Peace Conference. As to postponement of the Assembly the French Delegation had no objection. It was known to all that the political situation in France made the end of September difficult, and furthermore the Secretary General of the Conference had pointed out the technical difficulties, particularly in respect to interpreters, if the two were held simultaneously. He said he felt the main difficulty was in the question of unanimous decision. Dates he felt were of secondary importance. On the question of unanimity he inquired whether Mr. Byrnes’ statement that there would be no objection on the part of the United States could not be regarded as falling within the scope of unanimity and in the form of adherence to the wishes of the others.

Mr. Alexander said he felt that there was only one point outstanding, but first of all he wished to state that his Delegation felt it was not up to the Council to decide a recess of the Conference but up to the Conference itself. The British Government would not consider the question of transfer of the United Nations Assembly to Paris or Geneva. He said he felt they had made some progress, that all agreed that it was up to the United Nations but that if the question of the future work of the Council could be cleared up he would support postponement to not later than October 23. He would like to see the text of the communication proposed by Mr. Spaak, but he would like to obtain more specific answers to the questions concerning the future schedule of the work of the Council.

Mr. Molotov repeated that they would stand by their agreements, but that while in general November had been agreed upon for discussion of the German question no date had been set for the Austrian discussion. As to the treaties, he felt that they should be completed by the Council as soon as possible after the Conference.

Mr. Alexander said that his three points were as follows: (1) that the Council of Foreign Ministers should complete the treaties as an urgent matter even while the General Assembly was in session; (2) Germany should be discussed in November by the Council even though the General Assembly was in session; (3) that while no date had been fixed for the Austrian discussion the Council at its next session should [Page 404] discuss at what date it would be possible to consider the Austrian question.

After some further discussion Mr. Molotov agreed that the treaty with Germany could be discussed by the Council while the Assembly was in session if necessary and that the British Delegation or anybody else could bring up at an early session the question of the fixing of a date for discussion on Austria.

Mr. Spaak then reread his proposed communication with the addition that the United States would have no objection to postponement if the majority members so desired.

Mr. Alexander questioned the need for the last phrase since it was obvious that if the majority were in favor of postponement the United States could have no objection. He said that in view of Mr. Molotov’s clarification as to the program of the work of the Council he could provisionally agree to join in this request subject to confirmation by his government.

Mr. Molotov then proposed that in Mr. Spaak’s communication there should be a statement of the position of the Soviet Delegation that if there was no postponement of the Assembly the Soviet Government would insist upon a recess of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Alexander pointed out that this position of the Soviet Government had already been stated but that if the individual views of the delegations were to be included in the message all would have to be included.

Mr. Spaak said he felt that a recess of the Peace Conference had nothing to do with the United Nations.

After further discussion it was decided that individual views of any government could be communicated separately to Mr. Lie in addition to or apart from the general message from Mr. Spaak to Mr. Lie.

Mr. Bidault said that the French Government accepted October 23 although that was a very inconvenient date.

Mr. Spaak said he proposed to call Mr. Lie by telephone this evening and inform him that the governments of the Soviet Union, France, China, Belgium and provisionally Great Britain requested Mr. Lie to ascertain the views of the other members concerning postponement. He pointed out that inclusion of Belgium showed that it was not a request of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He proposed to tell Mr. Lie that the United States while not joining in the request was not opposing and that Mr. Byrnes was sending him a message to that effect.

The Council agreed to this procedure and each member reserved the right to send any separate or individual message to Mr. Lie in order to make its position clear.56

  1. Secretary General Lie announced on September 12 that since 37 of the 51 members of the United Nations had agreed to postponement, the General Assembly would now convene in New York on October 23.