CFM Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick T. Merrill of the United States Delegation
| Participants: | Mr. Ferenc Nagy, The Prime Minister of Hungary |
| Mr. Szegedy-Maszak, Hungarian Minister in Washington | |
| Ambassador Smith | |
| Mr. Bonbright | |
| Mr. Merrill |
The Prime Minister explained at some length the extremely difficult and delicate course he had been forced to adopt in Hungary in order to preserve what he described as the western idea of democracy. He pointed out that in this respect he had been more successful to date than any other democratic leader in Eastern Europe. He then illustrated some of his difficulties, particularly the Slav pressures on [Page 371] Hungary. Moreover, in three neighboring countries—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria—the Communists were now in control, whereas in Rumania there too the Communists held the real reins of power. He said that he and Mikolajczyk were the only peasant leaders in Europe (in addition to several in Rumania) who were leading the fight against the eastern form of democracy. Hungary, he said, needed a period of political calm for reconstruction, but there had lately been a feeling of hopelessness among the Hungarian people as a result of the negotiations on the peace treaty in Paris. Nagy intimated quite clearly that unless Hungary could get Western support for the easement of the treaty’s provisions, he could not hold out much longer as prime minister. This would mean a serious political situation in Hungary, leading possibly to civil strife. He implied it was in the interest of the U.S. to prevent this situation as Hungary was in fact a bulwark of western culture and political ideas.
Ambassador Smith replied that it was the Secretary’s firm opinion that the ex-enemy states of Eastern Europe must be given a chance to breathe again, and that this was not possible until the occupation forces were withdrawn. This was the foremost objective of the U.S. Government. Moreover, he wished to reassure the Prime Minister that the U.S. had no intention of receding from its previously expressed policy of assisting the peoples of Eastern Europe to reconstruct their countries on a sound economic and political basis. The American Government had therefore taken a great interest in Hungary, particularly in regards to its economic problems and this had been well illustrated during the past year. As the Prime Minister knew, the U.S. had always believed in the right of all nations to trade freely. International waterways such as the Danube should be accessible to all on an equal basis. Ambassador Smith then asked Nagy to be specific as to what Hungary wanted in the proposed peace treaty.
The Prime Minister said that it was most important to Hungary that a part of Transylvania be returned. He admitted that there were certain economic difficulties involved, should certain large cities be returned to Hungary without their hinterland and in reply to a question put by Ambassador Smith, confessed that Hungary wished frontier rectification largely for political and psychological reasons. The Prime Minister then went on to say that it would be impossible for Hungary to receive the 200,000 people the Czechs proposed to expel from Slovakia. He stressed particularly the economic aspects involved in the resettlement of these people at a time when there was growing unemployment resulting from a standstill in the building industry and the recent dismissal of 100,000 government employees. He said these expelled people would always be a very difficult problem [Page 372] for Hungary, resentful, impoverished and disillusioned. He understood that the U.S. opposed this proposal of the Czechs. Ambassador Smith reassured him on this point.
A discussion then ensued regarding the Czech territorial claim on Hungary, i.e., the Bratislava “bridgehead”. According to the Prime Minister, the Czechs had made this demand primarily for strategic and prestige reasons. Ambassador Smith expressed the hope that it might serve as a basis for some give and take, and that both sides should be willing to make concessions in order to reach some agreement on the outstanding problems between the two countries.
The Prime Minister concluded by expressing for the second time his disappointment at not being able to see the Secretary. He said he was greatly appreciative for the encouragement given him by the Ambassador.
(Actually it was learned later that he returned to the Hungarian Legation in a deeply pessimistic mood and expressed the opinion to several members of the Hungarian Delegation that the western democracies apparently were either unable or unwilling to oppose Soviet policies in Eastern Europe.)