Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Sixth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 6, 1946, 4 p.m.⁶¹

Paris, July 6, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Report of the Deputies

M. Couve De Murville stated that the Deputies had examined the proposals on the organization of the Conference and the rules of procedure. Two French drafts (CFM (D) (46) 52 and 53)⁶² had been submitted on these questions and counter proposals had been put forward by the Soviet Delegation. In general agreement could not be reached on the following four questions:

1. The General Commission. Although a General Commission was provided for in the French as well as in the Soviet draft, the Soviet proposal gave this organ much more limited tasks. The United States expressed preference for the French proposal. The British and French Deputies stated that while they preferred the original French proposal they would agree to the Soviet proposal on the condition that it contain a clear definition of the General Commission and that it should state that the General Commission should discuss the recommendations of the committees and that there should be no public meetings while it was engaged in such discussions.

2. The organization of the committees of the Conference. The Soviet Delegation had proposed that nine committees be set up; one committee for each peace treaty on which representatives of the states at war and signatories of the individual treaties would be included,” a general military committee, a legal and drafting committee on which all the members of the Conference would be represented and two economic committees, one for Italy and one for the other peace treaties. The United States, United Kingdom and French Delegations proposed a similar organization of committees except that they had suggested that there be one economic committee which should deal with all economic matters and which would be composed of all the members of the Conference.

3. The Chairmanship of the Conference. The French Delegation had proposed that the Chairmanship go to each member of the CFM in rotation for one week. The Soviets proposed that the Foreign Ministers of the four inviting states be Chairman in rotation.

4. The Secretariat. The French Delegation proposed that there be ten members of a Secretariat, five from the CFM countries and five from other countries. The Soviet Delegation proposed that the Secretariat be made up of eight members, four from the CFM and four from the other countries.

The Deputies also discussed the draft rules of procedure. Many difficulties arose in view of the fact that no agreement had been reached on the organization of the Conference. The various Deputies reserved their position on paragraphs 1, 2, 10, 11, 13–20 and 25. Agreement in principle was reached on the other articles which were sixteen in number.

Two other points of procedure were discussed; invitations to other states and voting procedure.

1. The United Kingdom Delegate raised the question as to whether it would not be advisable to invite certain states to send delegates to express their views to the Conference. The United States and French Delegates agreed. The Soviet Delegate reserved his position stating that he had not received instructions on this matter.

2. Voting procedure. The Soviet Deputy proposed that the same voting rules apply in the committees as in the General Commission, namely that decisions be adopted by two-thirds majority. The French Delegate proposed that decisions be adopted by a majority of the members present and voting.

Record of Decisions Taken

The Ministers adopted the decisions of the minutes of June 26, 27 and 28.

Agenda

M. Molotov suggested that the agenda of the present session contain the following questions.

1. Organization of the Conference. Rules of procedure. Text of invitations.

2. Revised article on reparations.

3. Germany.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether questions which the Deputies were unable to solve would be placed before the Peace Conference. If not Mr. Bevin desired them on the agenda.

M. Molotov stated that these questions should first be considered by the CFM.

Mr. Bevin stated that if such questions were not solved by the Deputies or by the CFM he wanted to make sure that they would be placed before the Peace Conference as unsettled points.

M. Molotov stated that this question had not been discussed. When the CFM obtained a clear picture of the results of the discussions in the meetings of the Ministers and the Deputies it could decide what questions should be referred to the Peace Conference. It had already decided to refer certain questions as Italian reparations to Bulgaria.

Mr. Bevin stated that if the CFM, or the Deputies, did not come to agreement on certain questions he would reserve his position as to the right to raise these questions at the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov said that the CFM might revert to this matter at a later date.

M. Bidault inquired whether this question could not be put on the agenda before Germany, i.e., the principle that all unresolved points might be referred to the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov stated that this matter should be discussed when the CFM had completed its work on the outstanding questions. He did not anticipate any difficulties.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he also did not anticipate any serious difficulties but since the question had been raised he too would like to reserve his right to refer all open questions to the Peace Conference. He understood that M. Molotov was only speaking of the agenda for today. If so he would not insist upon the inclusion of the Austrian question. But if this agenda were to be one also for their future meetings he wished Austria included.

M. Molotov indicated that he was proposing only the agenda for today’s meeting.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not wish to quarrel over the order of the subjects on M. Molotov’s agenda. However, having agreed on the date of the Peace Conference he felt that the question of the invitations should be discussed first. He would not object to discussing the invitations and also the rules of procedure. He pointed out that the Deputies had been instructed only to draft the text of the invitation. They also examined the proposals on organization and procedure. When the Ministers had adjourned yesterday they had two items on their agenda, i.e., the draft invitation, and the rules of procedure. They should take up these questions today in the same order.

M. Molotov stated that since no agreement had been reached by the Deputies on the rules of procedure delays had been encountered in discussing the draft invitation. He suggested that both items be taken up together.

The Peace Conference. Rules of Procedure

Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not wish to admit that the invitation could not be sent until the rules of procedure had been agreed upon by the Ministers. There were two distinct questions involved. He would agree to the agenda if the same order was adopted as yesterday.

M. Molotov recalled that the Ministers had discussed the two questions jointly yesterday and that the Deputies had done the same thing today. Their report had been heard. He questioned the advisability to continue the discussion and to endeavor to come to agreement.

Mr. Bevin stated that the United Kingdom Delegation was willing to discuss the rules of procedure today but that it would do so without prejudicing its position that the invitations should go out today without including the last paragraph since no agreement had been reached on the rules.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that the CFM adopt its agenda and commence discussions. He suggested that the invitations be issued immediately. The French Government as the host government should forward the invitations and it might state that the rules of procedure would be forwarded at a later date. He stated that he would agree to the Soviet amendment reading “in accordance with its decision of July 4”. He suggested that the last sentence of the invitation be deleted.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation could not agree. On the one hand it was said that the rules of procedure were a simple matter. On the other hand it had been suggested that questions of this nature be postponed. The discussions of yesterday and today had demonstrated that procedure would have a great effect on the prestige of the Conference.

The CFM must see to it that the authority of the Conference be assured. It would not be possible to admit that the General Commission replaces the Conference. The Conference could not be pushed aside and it must play the important role assigned to it. The CFM bore the responsibility for the Conference. It could not admit the responsibility of any other organ.

M. Molotov suggested that the CFM discuss the proposals on the organization of the Conference and its rules of procedure and endeavor to find common ground. The Conference could not be made a rubber stamp of the General Commission. It should be the Conference itself and definite functions should be delegated to the General Commission. The Conference should not be a mere rubber stamp for the decisions of the General Commission. The substance of the question was that the Conference must be placed in its authoritative position. It should play the role assigned to it by the Moscow decision. The General Commission should be placed in a more modest position. It was a coordinating body. With respect to the organization proposed by the Soviet Delegation for five basic committees to deal with political matters the Deputies had come to the conclusion that the five committees should be set up as well as military, legal and drafting committees. Disagreement had been met on the economic committees. The Soviet Delegation believed it necessary to have two economic committees, one for Italy and one for the Balkan countries. It was not suggesting anything new since the CFM had been working with two economic committees. M. Molotov inquired whether the other Delegations did not agree to the Soviet proposal. He maintained that the establishment of two committees would be in the interest of the Conference.

Mr. Bevin stated that everything M. Molotov had said was contrary to the Moscow decision. He would not be a party to it. The Ministers had no right to lay down the rules of the Conference. They could make proposals and that was all they properly could do. The Conference could adopt or reject these proposals. The duty of the Ministers was to convoke a Conference. Now M. Molotov was saying that he would not convoke the Conference until the rules of procedure had been agreed upon. The Ministers had no authority to do this under the Moscow decision. And he, Mr. Bevin, did not intend to work out these rules. The Ministers could only work out recommendations. Mr. Bevin continued that he had not signed any document, either at Moscow or elsewhere, saying that the Ministers were responsible for drawing up the rules or that they could not convoke a Peace Conference until these rules had been decided upon by them. He asked M. Molotov to show him any document which requested the Ministers to take on such powers. The duty of the Ministers in the CFM was to convoke a Peace Conference. He would not be a party to tying down 21 nations to rules drawn up by the CFM and with the veto power of one of them. He would not remain in the conference room if this were decided upon. On the contrary he would be willing to elaborate suggestions which the CFM might put forward as suggestions for a basis of discussion on the rules of procedure. But he could not agree that these suggestions were a condition for the convocation of the Conference. This was a vital matter of principle and Mr. Bevin thought that the Ministers must face it.

M. Molotov stated that the CFM had been considering the organization of the Conference and its rules of procedure since March 26. Everyone knew that it was necessary to discuss these questions and it would not be understood that the CFM convoked a Peace Conference before discussing the matter. It had become clear that the Conference was being turned into a rubber stamp and its authority diminished. The Ministers must agree that the Conference should really be a conference and could not be replaced by a subordinate commission. The Soviet Delegation never could agree to this. Therefore it was necessary to examine the organization of the Conference and the rules of procedure. This had a direct bearing on the preparations for the Peace Conference and on its success. M. Molotov proposed that the Ministers discuss these matters. He pointed out that the Deputies had succeeded in reducing their differences to a minimum and for this reason M. Molotov anticipated success in the CFM discussions.

Mr. Bevin asked M. Molotov to show him where he had signed an agreement, in the Moscow decision, to discuss these questions. If M. Molotov could do so, he would be willing to talk them over. He asked M. Molotov not to evade the question by raising the question of the Conference and a rubber stamp. Where had he signed an agreement to discuss these matters? Mr. Bevin stated that he would not go beyond what he had signed at Moscow.

M. Molotov stated that he did not believe that he was bound to reply to Mr. Bevin’s question. Not only at Moscow but at Berlin had the four governments assumed responsibility for the Peace Conference. The Soviet Government never would have assumed this responsibility if it had thought that the CFM would have endeavored to change the Conference into a rubber stamp and if some other body besides the Conference made decisions. This had never been contemplated at Berlin or Moscow at which conference the responsibility for the convocation of the Peace Conference was assigned to the four governments.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he agreed that the Conference should not be merely a rubber stamp. Apparently M. Molotov feared that it would be if a General Commission were established. The proposal to establish a General Commission was contained in the Soviet as well as French papers. The proposal provided that the General Commission should be made up of the heads of all the state members. The composition of the Conference was the same. Therefore the Conference would be rubber stamping itself. Members of sovereign governments on the Commission would not mind being rubber stamps of the Conference or vice versa. But not one representative of a sovereign state would be a rubber stamp of the CFM. Therefore if everyone wanted to avoid the possibility of rubber stamping, would it not be advisable to say that the Conference should adopt its own rules of procedure. Mr. Byrnes believed that the Paris Peace Conference was the first in the history of the world whose procedure was being dictated by 3 or 4 governments. The members of the Peace Conference would naturally resent the assumption of the CFM that they could not agree to their own rules of procedure without dictation from the CFM. The Soviet, United Kingdom, United States and Chinese Governments had convoked the San Francisco Conference. They had never attempted to say how many committees should be set up, what the composition of the committees should be, etc. Agreement on the San Francisco date never would have been reached if the inviting powers had endeavored to dictate to the other nations in such a manner. Mr. Byrnes could picture a conference of 17 sovereign states convening. The CFM would hand to these 17 states the draft treaties which had been drawn up and they would be supported by the CFM. But if the CFM handed to the Conference its rules of procedure Mr. Byrnes could easily see these 17 sovereign states voting 17 to 4 against the CFM. They would say that they were free men and capable of drawing up their own rules. The CFM should not attempt to do anything like that. The CFM could draw up rules and submit them to the Conference as a suggestion but Mr. Byrnes would object to this unless such rules were submitted in courteous language which made it clear that the rules were only suggestions and that no attempt was being made to usurp the power of the Conference. Mr. Byrnes would be glad to cooperate, as the Deputies have done, in discussing such suggestions in order to assist the Conference but once this had been done Mr. Byrnes wanted it to be clearly understood that the United States Government would not try to force any other government to adopt the rules. If some other government made a suggestion which the United States Government considered fair and reasonable the United States Government would be prepared to agree with it.

Mr. Byrnes continued that the issuance of the invitations was only a confirmation of the agreement the Ministers had reached on July 4 regarding the convocation of the Conference on July 29. It certainly should not be confused with any decisions the Conference might take in the future on procedural details concerning the number of committees, voting procedure, etc. Mr. Brynes urged that the invitations be sent out promptly with a statement to the effect that suggestions regarding the rules of procedure would be forwarded at a later date. If the CFM followed this course there would be no difficulty in coming to an agreement on the rules of procedure. People liked to cooperate but they did not like to be driven.

M. Bidault stated that the French Government was issuing the invitations and that the invitations were being held up. He urged the CFM to terminate their discussion on this matter. The French Government was being placed in an impossible political situation for it was known that it should issue the invitations and was unable to do so.

M. Bidault continued that with respect to the rules of procedure there was no question of dictating the terms. He wished to point out that the last sentence of the invitation stated that “proposals” concerning the organization of the Conference and its rules of procedure would be transmitted. With respect to the proposals he wished to recall the San Francisco Conference. When the San Francisco Conference was convoked France was invited by the powers which took the initiative in issuing the invitations to be one of the sponsors. The text of the invitation mentioned the Dumbarton Oaks Agreements. The French Government had replied that a condition for its sponsorship of the invitations was that the Dumbarton Oaks Agreements be accepted only as a basis for discussion at the San Francisco Conference. This was not accepted and France unfortunately had not been a sponsoring power. Every nation at San Francisco had the right to make amendments in respect to the procedure of that Conference. Consequently it was out of the question that the CFM should now endeavor to restrict the rights of the members of the Paris Conference. He urged his colleagues to permit him to sign the invitations which were on his table and to issue them promptly.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was apparently in a position whereby he was forced to agree to every one of the rules of procedure put up by the Soviet Delegation in order to have a Conference. He agreed with M. Bidault that the draft rules were subject to amendment at the Conference. He proposed that the invitations be issued immediately and that the CFM then examine the rules of procedure. Where they were unable to agree the matter should be left to the Conference to decide. He must reserve the right of his Government to make reservations to these rules since it had never seen them. He did not believe that this would be going beyond the decisions of Moscow and Berlin.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government had already expressed its views on these important questions. He proposed that the CFM discuss the organization of the Conference and its rules of procedure and not waste time discussing other matters.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was sorry to remark that he saw that if he did not agree to everything M. Molotov suggested no invitations would be issued. He could not tolerate this whiphand over him.

Mr. Byrnes inquired whether the CFM might not agree that the rules be submitted as suggestions. Then he would be glad to discuss them. He wished to make sure, however, that they would not be binding on the Conference and that the Conference would have the right to draw up its own rules of procedure. He wished it further to be understood that the United States Government would not be bound to support any rules drawn up. Such rules should be presented only as suggestions.

M. Molotov stated that it was impossible to make certain decisions binding on countries not party to their drafting.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that such rules would be binding on the Ministers who participated in their drafting.

M. Molotov stated that he assumed that everything agreed to in the CFM would be voluntarily defended by the Ministers.

Mr. Bevin stated that he wished it to be clear that he was not in a position to bind his Government if what M. Molotov was proposing was not contained in the Moscow Declaration.

Mr. Byrnes stated that there was a difference between the drafting of the Treaties, which was entrusted to the Ministers according to the Potsdam and Moscow Agreements and the drafting of rules of procedure which was the work of the Conference itself and it was not charged to the Ministers. He suggested that the invitations be sent out promptly and that each Delegation be informed that they might propose rules of procedure and recommendations for the organization of the Conference. But the Conference itself, as customary, should adopt its own rules.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation considered that it was obligatory to draft such rules. The Soviet Delegation could not consider that its conduct towards the Peace Conference was a correct one if it turned the Conference into a rubber stamp. The CFM must reach agreement on this matter now that it was convoking a Conference. The responsibility for the Conference rested upon the CFM.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that in order to avoid any accusation that the Conference was being turned into a rubber stamp it might be better so say nothing about the organization of the Conference and its rules of procedure. Let the Conference draw up its own rules. Then there would be no danger of having the rubber stamp theory attributed to the CFM.

M. Molotov stated that it was precisely in order to avoid such an eventuality that the rules of procedure and the organization of the Conference should be drawn up by the CFM. If the CFM shut its eyes to the fact that the Conference might become a rubber stamp it would not justify the hope which the world had in the Council.

Mr. Bevin stated that obviously M. Molotov was devising a plan to veto the Conference unless the other members of the CFM agreed with him. M. Molotov was advocating a veto on procedure and that was going right back on what he had agreed to the other night. That was a practical fact which must be faced. M. Molotov had agreed to the convocation of the Conference. The other Ministers had carried out their bargain regarding the discussion of reparations. He did not think this was right and it would be better for the world at large to know what had happened. M. Molotov was now backing down on his word. Not one word was said about procedure when the Ministers had agreed to the Conference. Not one condition was made. Mr. Bevin stated that he, as always, had accepted M. Molotov’s word. The other Ministers had done what M. Molotov had requested. Now M. Molotov was going back on his word. Mr. Bevin pleaded that M. Molotov not make agreement on procedure a condition for the Conference.

M. Molotov stated that there could be various views as to the frankness of some of the statements made this evening. With respect to the decision concerning the date of the Conference, that decision held and no one challenged it. But the Conference should be a conference and not a rubber stamp. If the CFM had not wasted so much time setting forth all types of conditions for discussing the organization of the Conference and its procedure much progress would have been made. It appeared to him that no one wished to discuss these questions on their merits and he suggested that the Ministers enter into such discussions.

Mr. Bevin stated that he had no objections to hearing the Soviet proposals but no useful purpose would be served in advancing any counter proposals on the contested points.

Mr. Byrnes inquired why M. Molotov thought the Conference would turn itself into a rubber stamp. No other conference in history, when it made its own rules, had done so.

M. Molotov stated that this had become clear at the Deputies’ meeting this morning and had been objected to by the Soviet Deputy. It had been proposed that all the work of the Conference be assigned to the General Commission and not to the Conference. The Conference was called upon only to approve decisions. It was only natural that the Soviet Delegation could not agree to this.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that it would be better to let the Conference decide its own rules and organization. The Soviet Delegation would be at the Conference and if anyone proposed a rubber stamp organization the Soviet Delegation would have a chance to vote. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the French proposal also mentioned a general conference [committee?].

M. Molotov referred to the French and Soviet proposals. The result of these drafts, according to his understanding, was to push the Conference in the background and to assign all the work to the General Commission which would hold closed meetings. The Soviet Delegation did not object to a General Commission but it did not believe that all the work of the Conference should be assigned to it and that it should replace the Conference which would hold open meetings. The General Commission should have more restricted functions. The Deputies should sit in the General Commission and the heads of each delegation should sit in the Conference. But for some reason this had been objected to.

Mr. Byrnes wondered whether he and M. Molotov might agree to oppose all closed meetings at the Conference. The United States Delegation would be willing to vote against any closed meetings, in the committees or the Commission. If M. Molotov did share this view Mr. Byrnes felt sure that the two of them would find many supporters. The CFM was charged with the preparation of the draft treaties but now that this preliminary work was done there was no reason why the Conference should not hold open meetings.

M. Molotov stated that the Conference might well believe it advisable to have closed meetings. According to one proposal the General Commission would be made up of the heads of the delegations and would predetermine questions at closed meetings. The Conference would only approve the decisions. This was abnormal. The effect would be to turn the Conference into an automatic tool—a rubber stamp. This would impair the authority of the Conference.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the French Delegation repeat its proposal on this question.

M. Bidault stated that he would make another suggestion. He suggested that:

1. A plenary conference be established, composed of all the member states represented by the heads of the delegations. This plenary conference would deal with all of the draft treaties. It would refer them to committees. The plenary conference would receive reports, would discuss them and would make any needed recommendations.

2. A General Commission would be set up along with the plenary conference and would be composed of one representative from each member state. It would prepare the work of the plenary conference and coordinate the work of the commissions.

M. Molotov stated that he would like to receive M. Bidault’s suggestion in writing. The functions of the Conference were defined in the Moscow decision and certain correspondence had taken place in this connection between the United States and French Governments. There was no provision for establishing a General Commission with powers to decide in advance all the questions which would be placed before the Conference. The proposal to set up a General Commission was a novelty which violated the Moscow decision. The Soviet Government could not accept such a proposal.

M. Bidault stated that there must be some understanding. The French, as well as the Soviet proposal concerning a General Commission were no violation of the Moscow decision. The proposal was based on the experience gained at the San Francisco Conference. According to the proposal the General Commission was a body responsible for preparing the work of the Conference. It was no longer proposed that its members should be the heads of the delegations. M. Bidault could not see why the Conference would be deprived of any of its sovereign prerogatives by the establishment of a General Commission.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States Delegation considered as fundamental the right of the Peace Conference to determine its own procedure. The United States Delegation did not agree to any proposal which became binding on the Conference or on it. With that understanding and if it were agreed to issue the invitations Mr. Byrnes would be willing to consider the proposals made by M. Molotov and M. Bidault but he was not going to be bound by anything. He hoped that M. Molotov would agree to let the invitations go forward as he thought had been agreed to 48 hours ago. Then the CFM could discuss the French and Soviet papers and could possibly work out some informal suggestions for transmission to the Conference.

M. Molotov stated that the Moscow decision laid down the arrangements for the Peace Conference. Now it was being proposed to violate this decision and to assign a decisive role to the General Commission. This was not provided for in the Moscow decision. The effect would be to turn the Conference into a rubber stamp. He insisted that the CFM initiate discussions on the actual proposals.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he could not understand M. Molotov’s position. He had complained about the establishment of a General Commission and yesterday a General Commission was proposed in the Soviet paper.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation proposed that the General Commission be made up of the Deputies.

Mr. Byrnes read from the Soviet draft as follows: “The General Commission consists of all the invited states in the persons of their heads of delegation”. Mr. Byrnes stated that the Soviet draft did not contain one word about the Deputies.

M. Molotov maintained that the Deputies that morning had been informed of the Soviet proposal to restrict the functions of the General Commission and to place the Deputies on it. He inquired whether his colleagues would agree to these functions for the General Commission.

M. Bidault inquired whether his proposal would be acceptable, namely that a General Commission be established along with the plenary conference and that it consist of representatives of each state member. This Commission would prepare the work for the plenary conference, particularly coordinating the work of the various commissions. M. Bidault stated that no difficulties would be created by this procedure and that it was not different from the suggestions made by M. Molotov.

Mr. Bevin stated that M. Bidault’s proposal seemed acceptable to him as a basis for discussion.

M. Molotov suggested that M. Bidault’s proposal be referred to the Deputies for study or circulated in writing at the present meeting. He again stated that the Soviet Delegation maintained the view that no commission should be set up which would take the place of the Conference. He had no authority to change the Moscow decision which made no mention of the General Commission.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was not proposing the establishment of a General Commission. He again asked M. Molotov to show him anything in the Moscow decision which instructed the Ministers to draw up the rules of procedure.

M. Molotov inquired whether the Ministers had not been discussing this matter since last March.

Mr. Byrnes stated that at no time since last March had the Ministers instructed the Deputies to take up the question of procedure. The French Government, having the duty of summoning a conference, did exactly what any government would have done. It had the courtesy to draw up certain rules to be used as a basis. The Deputies had examined these rules and there had been no complaints but no decision had been made by the CFM to refer these rules to the Deputies for study.

M. Molotov inquired why a report from the Deputies had been heard today. On whose instructions had they been working?

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had said on July 4 after M. Molotov had agreed to the date that the Deputies should draw up a draft invitation. Not one word had been said about drafting the rules of procedure. Mr. Byrnes never would have dreamed that anyone would have contended that the carrying out of the Ministers’ decision regarding the invitation would depend on the drafting of the rules of procedure. Yesterday Mr. Byrnes had been informed by his Deputy that the Soviet Deputy had brought up the question of the rules of procedure. That was how the matter had gotten into the hands of the Deputies and was discussed at their meeting. Yesterday afternoon Mr. Byrnes had made clear the position of the United States Delegation. He wished to make it clear again in order that there be no misunderstanding. He would agree to discuss rules of procedure only on the condition that the views of the CFM go forward to the Peace Conference as proposals or suggestions and that the United States Delegation, as well as the Conference, should not be bound by them.

Reparations

M. Molotov stated that since it was obvious that no agreement was to be reached on this matter it might be advisable to adjourn. Before doing so he suggested that the revised statement on reparations be approved.

Mr. Bevin stated that he understood that the Deputies had not completed their work on this question.

M. Molotov stated that five points had been agreed upon. The item Mr. Bevin was referring to was not intended for inclusion in the treaty. He inquired whether there was any objection to the five points.

Mr. Bevin stated that he did not wish to discuss them until agreement had been reached on the last point.

M. Molotov urged his colleagues to agree to the statement.

Mr. Bevin remarked that he had agreed to the Conference and to the basic principles on reparations. M. Molotov had gone back on his word with respect to the convocation of the Conference.

Peace Conference and Rules of Procedure

Mr. Bevin continued that he had requested M. Molotov a dozen times to show him where he had ever agreed to make himself responsible for drawing up the rules of procedure. This was not in the Moscow decision. He stood by the Moscow decision, every word and comma of it. The Ministers had agreed on the Peace Conference and on reparations and he, Mr. Bevin, would stand by what he had agreed to. But he did not think that M. Molotov was right in insisting on something which was not in the Moscow decision. When Mr. Bevin was questioned by a Dominion Prime Minister on the Conference and on the question of procedure he had read the Moscow decision to him and also Mr. Byrnes’ letter to M. Bidault. He had assured the Dominions that the Conference would make up its own procedure. Now M. Molotov was trying to make him go back on his word. He could not do this and M. Molotov should not try to make a member of the CFM do it. He could not afford to break his word any more to a cabinet minister than to M. Molotov. He would be willing to sit with M. Molotov and try to come to agreement on rules of procedure which could be presented to the Peace Conference but M. Molotov was trying to make agreement on such rules of procedure as a condition for the convocation of the Conference. If the drafting of the rules of procedure was a task of the CFM and had been so stipulated in the Moscow decision he would stand by it. But it was not in the Moscow decision and M. Molotov admitted it.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation would study the French proposal and would state its views. But it could not agree to anything that would be counter to the Moscow decision. It could not agree to any Commission replacing the Conference and reducing the Conference to nothing.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States Delegation was not proposing a General Commission, a special commission or any committees for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. This was none of its business. The Peace Conference should establish its own rules and this would be carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Conference.

M. Molotov stated that it was clear that unless the rules of procedure were agreed to there would be a violation of the Moscow decision. For this reason the Soviet Delegation felt that agreement must be reached on this question.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States had not advanced any proposal on procedure, nor had the United Kingdom Delegation. France, as the host government, had had the courtesy to draft up some proposals. The Soviet Delegation had put forward some counter proposals. If M. Bidault and M. Molotov could not reach agreement on their proposals he, Mr. Byrnes, suggested that the entire matter be left to the Peace Conference. This would not violate any decision taken at Moscow. He regretted that the invitations could not go out tonight. He was willing to adjourn as the present discussion would certainly not bring about agreement.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation maintained the view that the authority of the Conference must be assured.

The meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m.

61. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
62. Ante, pp. 38 and 43.