Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Third Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 3, 1946, 4:15 p.m.²⁸

Paris, July 3, 1946, 4:15 p.m.

secret

Report of the Deputies

Mr. Byrnes opened the meeting and called upon Mr. Jebb, Chairman of the Deputies for that morning, to present the report of the Deputies.

Mr. Jebb stated that the Deputies had begun but had not completed an examination of the Report of the Economic Committee (CFM (46) 174²⁹) which gave the present state of the economic articles of the Treaty of Peace with Italy. The Deputies had settled certain outstanding points and had reserved others for later discussion, including the question of the procedure for settling disputes concerning the restoration of property and restitution. Two points had been referred to the Foreign Ministers. The first concerned special provisions regarding insurance. The second concerned general economic relations. Included in this latter point were two items: (a) foreign participation in Italian state monopolies; (b) civil aviation. The Deputies instructed the Economic Committee to prepare a similar report on the economic clauses in the Treaty with Rumania. The Deputies also agreed to submit to the Foreign Ministers the Report of the Legal Experts on the Interpretation of the Treaties (CFM (46) 180).³⁰ The decision of the Ministers was requested on the two texts contained in that Report. The Deputies had decided also to submit to the Ministers the text of the article on the Dodecanese submitted by the Drafting Committee (CFM (46) 182).³¹ The U.S. Deputy had thought that the additional paragraph proposed by the Soviet Delegation, which concerned the withdrawal of Allied troops within a period of a certain number of months, was unnecessary. The U.K. Deputy was also doubtful of the necessity for such a provision, especially since it had already been decided to provide for the demilitarization of the islands, but he had stated that he had no objection to its inclusion. The French Deputy had said that he was ready to agree to any solution acceptable to the United Kingdom Delegation.

Mr. Byrnes asked for comments on the Report. Hearing no comments, he said that the Foreign Ministers would have to consider the Report accepted and with it the various questions which had been referred to the Ministers by the Deputies.

Records of the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th Meetings

Mr. Byrnes said that the Secretariat had submitted to the Ministers the records of the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th Meetings with the request that they be passed upon. Was there any objection to approving the minutes as submitted?

There was no objection and the minutes were adopted.

The Free Territory of Trieste

Mr. Byrnes said that the Council would now return to the consideration of the agenda which had been agreed upon some days before but had not been completed. When they had adjourned yesterday they had still been discussing the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. At the time of adjournment it had been agreed that the French Delegation would circulate the proposal which had been made by M. Bidault. This proposal was now before the Council.³² The U.S. Delegation had also submitted a paper giving its views.³³ Did any other member of the Council have a document to submit? The discussion could take place on these documents.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation was prepared to accept the proposal of the U.S. Delegation as a basis. The Soviet Delegation had certain amendments to propose. In the first place the Soviet memorandum had referred to the area as the “autonomous district of Trieste”. In the American paper it was called the “free state of Trieste”. Could they be more modest and call it the “autonomous district of Trieste”?

Mr. Bevin felt that it was merely a question of language.

Mr. Byrnes said that it had been referred to as a “free state” at the meeting of the previous day. He thought it was simply a question of what terminology one was accustomed to. Americans used the term “autonomous” as describing a subordinate part of some sovereign entity.

M. Molotov suggested calling the area the “free district of Trieste”, to avoid the use of the word “state”.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was sure that they could agree on a name. They might call it the “free state”, or the “free territory”, or the “free district”.

M. Bidault thought that there should be no difficulty on this point. He had intended suggesting the use of the term “free territory”. This would avoid use of the word “state” and also would avoid discussion of the words “independent” and “autonomous”.

Mr. Byrnes thought that this was a good suggestion.

M. Molotov had no objection.

Mr. Bevin thought that the text should read “a free territory of Trieste will be established” instead of “the free territory of Trieste will be established”. (All Delegations agreed.)

Mr. Byrnes asked if they could agree to have each Delegation appoint a representative, thus forming a committee which would have the task of reconciling any differences concerning the language as put forward in the U.S. proposal.

M. Molotov said that he had some further amendments to suggest. He proposed that paragraph 3 be placed where paragraph 5 was and vice versa. He proposed that at the end of paragraph 3 there be added the words “in accordance with the procedure established by the decisions of the Moscow Conference”.

M. Bidault said that he had no objections on that point since France had adhered to the Moscow procedure, but he thought that careful attention should be given to the use of the word “decision” in the final drafting. He suggested that the phrase be worded as follows: “in conformity with the procedure established at the Moscow Conference”. (All Delegations agreed; they also agreed to M. Molotov’s suggestion that paragraph 5 replace paragraph 3 and vice versa.)

M. Molotov then proposed that paragraph 4, in order that it might conform with paragraph 6, should be amended to read as follows: “The permanent statute shall be subject to the approval of the United Nations Organization as represented by the Security Council.” This amendment would also be in conformity with paragraph 2.

Mr. Byrnes stated that paragraph 2 referred to assuring the integrity and independence of the free territory. This was a function which would properly be exercised by the Security Council, which was the administrative body of the United Nations. But the approval of a statute for Trieste required the determination of a question of policy. It was not a question of enforcement or administration. Under the organization of the United Nations it would appear to be more appropriate that the statute, after being approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers, should be submitted for approval to the General Assembly. The Security Council being a body charged with the enforcement of peace, it seemed far better to leave this question to the General Assembly. It should be emphasized, however, that the statute would not go to the General Assembly until it had been passed upon by the Council of Foreign Ministers under the procedure which had just been suggested by the Soviet Delegation and had been approved.

M. Molotov said that the effect of the American proposal would be to create a very complicated structure, since the Conference of Twentyone Nations, the Security Council, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the General Assembly were all involved. If the Security Council, which was continually in session, was charged with this task, it would be easier for it to cope with it. This should be quite a satisfactory settlement of the question from the standpoint of the interests of the U.N.O.

Mr. Byrnes said that if recommendations were made by the Peace Conference and were agreed to by the Council of Foreign Ministers, there would not be much difficulty in securing the approval of the General Assembly. That approval would mean, however, that the constitution of the free territory of Trieste would have the formal approval of 51 governments instead of the 11 represented on the Security Council.

Mr. Bevin wondered whether there might be a combination of proposals along the following lines: “The permanent statute shall be subject to the approval of the Security Council, which will report the matter to the General Assembly.”

M. Molotov agreed with Mr. Bevin’s proposal.

Mr. Byrnes said that he respectfully submitted that the members of the General Assembly who read the newspapers would know about the statute. Reporting to them would serve no purpose if they could not approve it or disapprove it.

Mr. Bevin said that if the Security Council presented a report, it was open to the General Assembly to accept it or reject it. Unless the matter was reported to the General Assembly and was accepted by it, the question of finance would immediately arise and the cooperation of the Assembly would be necessary. That body would therefore have the last word in any case. It had occurred to him that if the statute could not go into effect until approved by the General Assembly, there might be a delay until that body met a year from next September, unless a special session of the Assembly should be called.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would like to defer for a short while consideration of Mr. Bevin’s suggestion as he wished to consult the text of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Bevin referred Mr. Byrnes to Article 15.

M. Bidault said that it went without saying that it was highly expedient to refer to the Charter, in which there were a number of interesting things to be found. Articles 10 and 11 (paragraph 2) and 15 were pertinent. They supported what Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov had said, namely that it was not possible to separate too sharply the Security Council from the General Assembly, since in actual fact they were not so separated.

M. Molotov wished to remind his colleagues that the Statute of Danzig had been approved not by the Assembly of the League of Nations but by the Council. That was a fact which could be verified by reference to the Charter of the League of Nations. The same procedure might be followed in charging the Security Council with the function of approving the statute of the free territory of Trieste. That would clarify the situation.

Mr. Byrnes requested that this matter also be deferred for the moment, if his colleagues agreed, on the understanding that they would come back to it at the same meeting.

M. Molotov had an amendment to suggest to paragraph 5 of the American proposal. That paragraph referred to a joint commission which would submit preliminary suggestions to the Peace Conference. Would it not be more correct to say that the Commission should submit agreed provisions instead of preliminary suggestions?

Mr Bevin said that this would mean that the Council would find itself in the same old position, namely that if they could not agree on these points they could not submit anything to the Peace Conference. To follow this line would probably produce a deadlock and would upset the present plans to hold the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov suggested the phrase “preliminary agreed texts”.

Mr. Bevin said that he had no objection to those words if the phrase “if possible” were added. He felt that would be much better.

M. Molotov thought that it was quite possible to agree on the statute so long as they could establish a basis.

Mr. Bevin said that if they were agreed, the Soviet Delegation with its insistence on strict legal interpretations would insist that it be carried out to the letter. If the words “if possible” were added, however, it would seem to be a workable proposition.

M. Molotov asked for time to think this proposal over. He then referred to paragraph 6(1) which concerned the appointment of the Governor. He wished to propose that the Governor be appointed by a committee representing the four states which were represented here and were on the Security Council. The purpose of this suggestion was to facilitate the work of the Security Council and at the same time to make its work more fruitful in practice. It seemed to the Soviet Delegation that on such a question the representatives of the Four Powers on the Security Council could reach agreed decisions. He recalled the fact that this was precisely the French proposal, which had also said that the Governor should be appointed by agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy and failing such agreement by the Four Powers. He was willing to agree to the language of the French proposal, or if necessary was ready to agree to the language of the American proposal amended as had just been suggested.

Mr. Byrnes said that the U.S. Delegation wished to go as far as possible to meet the views of the other members of the Council, but that, as he had stated the day before, the United States was insistent that if the plan of internationalization was to work it should be under the control of the United Nations. When the approval of the Security Council was obtained, that meant that the agreement of the Four Powers represented at this table was also obtained. Should an attempt be made to appoint a subcommittee of the Security Council, limiting its membership to representatives of those Four Powers, the very character of the control would be destroyed. It would no longer be the United Nations but the Four Powers who were in control. By doing that the Council of Foreign Ministers would not only be setting up a territory but would also be running it. It would be assuming the right to enforce obligations and to administer territory. To claim the right to name the Governor would be to place the Four Powers in the position of saying in paragraph 2 that the integrity and independence of the colonies would be assumed by the Security Council, while the Security Council could not appoint the Governor because that right was claimed by the Council of Foreign Ministers under paragraph 6 if the Soviet amendments were accepted. He urged on his colleagues that they should not insist on the right to act as a subcommittee of the Security Council. He did not believe that they had that right. He believed that the other nations represented on the Security Council would say that they could not allow four members to assume these rights but would insist that any such rights could be asserted only by the whole Security Council. He did not wish to repeat himself but felt he must emphasize that if the Security Council named the Governor, the Four Powers would agree to it. The only question was whether they were going to deny to the other nations on the Security Council the right to participate in the action of the Council.

Mr. Bevin stated that there was the additional point that the annual report of the Governor had to be submitted to the Security Council, this seemed to him to be a logical correction to make in connection with paragraphs 2, 6(1) and 6(4).

M. Molotov suggested that the Committee could also hear experts on the subject.

Mr. Bevin stated that this was a point which they had discussed on the previous evening. He suggested that they not break down the Conference over it. It was, however, a question of principle. He had to say that he must take a firm position on it.

M. Molotov suggested saying: “The Governor shall be appointed by agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, and failing such agreement by the Security Council.” In view of the fact that both Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin would find it difficult to accept the proposal for a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Four Powers, the Soviet Delegation would not insist on that proposal and would like to suggest the new amendment which had just been read.

Mr. Bevin suggested considering that point for a while and passing on meanwhile to other questions.

Mr. Byrnes said that, before they did that, he wished to suggest that it would be impossible to give the Security Council the task of responsibility for guaranteeing the independence and integrity of a territory without examining the question of the appointment of the Governor, who would be a representative of the Security Council in this area. All agreed that they wished to preserve the dignity and prestige of the Security Council. If any one of the four Council members was sitting on the Security Council, and the proposal was made that some other members exercise such power, he would resent it very much. Another point was that the U.S. Delegation had thought, in agreeing with the proposal of the Soviet Delegation, that this should not be a temporary regime, that its permanence would lead to stability. If there should be a permanent regime, it was better that the nomination of the Governor should be made by the Security Council and not by Italy and Yugoslavia.

M. Molotov asked why it would not be possible, if a Governor were named by Yugoslavia and Italy, for the Security Council to approve him.

Mr. Bevin said that, supposing the Governor put forward by Yugoslavia and Italy was not considered suitable by the Security Council, which had the ultimate responsibility, would it be possible, under the Soviet proposal, for the Security Council not to accept him? He (Mr. Bevin) had asked for an adjournment of the question because he could not accept the words which M. Molotov had suggested, but he could agree to a provision to the effect that, after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy, the Security Council would give due consideration to any proposals they made but would not be bound by them. According to this preliminary view the statute should make it clear that the Security Council must pay some attention to the views communicated by Italy and Yugoslavia before making its final decision.

Mr. Byrnes felt that what they were trying to do was establish a free territory, not a territory dependent on Italy or Yugoslavia, but a free state. If they left the matter of the appointment of the Governor to bilateral agreement, the Security Council might regard whomever was chosen by Yugoslavia and Italy as incompetent to carry out the Security Council’s idea of the administration of a free territory. If there was to be a Governor, let him be a Czech or a Norwegian, for example. Choice of a candidate would be up to the Security Council.

M. Molotov suggested that they refer to the Security Council also paragraph 4 instead of to the General Assembly. This would be consistent with the language suggested by Mr. Bevin for paragraph 6(1).

Mr. Bevin said that he had also been considering whether the statute should provide for taking into account any representations made by the legislative council representing the inhabitants of the district. All three of the outstanding proposals might now be examined and passed upon.

M. Bidault objected to passing over any of these points unless it should be for only a few minutes. He supported the proposal of Mr. Bevin for a recess of a few minutes which could be used to examine the points which had been made and which would allow time to clarify the situation.

Mr. Byrnes said that before calling a recess he wished to ask whether M. Molotov had any further remarks.

M. Molotov said that he had none.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether he had understood M. Molotov correctly in believing that he had said that the Soviet Delegation would agree to paragraph 6(1) on the Governor, if M. Molotov’s proposal for paragraph 4, as interpreted by Mr. Bevin, was accepted.

M. Molotov said that that was correct. He thought it possible to mention the Security Council both in paragraph 4 and in paragraph 6(1). This would allow a more unified structure.

Mr. Bevin said that he assumed that M. Molotov had no objection to providing, in paragraph 4, for approval by the Security Council, with the Security Council reporting to the General Assembly.

M. Molotov said that he proposed that in both paragraph 4 and in 6(1) the Security Council should be mentioned, bearing in mind the fact that the Security Council under Article 15 of the Charter would make its annual report to the General Assembly.

Mr. Byrnes wished to ask how the proposal would read under the amendment proposed by Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Bevin said that his proposal would read as follows: “The permanent statute shall be subject to the approval of the Security Council, which shall report it to the General Assembly under Article 15 of the Charter.”

M. Molotov agreed to this wording.

Mr. Byrnes said that, if they were agreed, did M. Molotov agree to the American text of paragraph 6(1)? The U.S. Delegation would agree on that basis.

M. Molotov thought that agreement could be reached on this basis but desired a little time to think the matter over. He would give an answer before the end of the meeting.

Mr. Bevin asked whether M. Molotov could accept the addition of the words “if possible” in paragraph 3?

M. Molotov desired to think this over.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was desired to have a recess during which these matters could be considered.

M. Molotov said that he thought they should go on with the meeting.

Italian Colonies

Mr. Byrnes said that, according to his recollection of the agenda, the next question was the Italian colonies.

Mr. Bevin said that the United Kingdom, as one of the countries, with France, very much affected by this question, had submitted a draft article for the Peace Treaty and also a draft declaration. He hoped that his colleagues would be able to accept both of these documents. They were contained in CFM (46) 177.³⁴

M. Molotov proposed that the Council accept as a basis for agreement the proposal made by the French Delegation with the amendments proposed by the American Delegation (CFM (46) 89³⁵) and that there be added an additional paragraph reading as follows: “There shall be established in the colonies advisory and exploratory councils (this title was of course subject to change) consisting of representatives of the Four Powers who would be entitled to submit recommendations at the request of the Allied Command or to their respective governments.” Should there be general agreement on these points, the question of the text of the declaration could be referred to the Deputies.

Mr. Bevin said that he was afraid he could not accept M. Molotov’s proposal. The establishment of councils could not be agreed to by the United Kingdom Delegation. Two of the powers had been administering these territories for a long time in connection with the duties which were incumbent upon them as occupying powers. Until these colonies were disposed of the United Kingdom Delegation could not agree to the establishment of any advisory councils for that period. Nor could the American proposal to add the words “unless the four principal powers otherwise determine” be accepted. They were dealing with the interim period prior to the ultimate disposition of the colonies. He (Mr. Bevin) wished to ask for an expression of confidence in the two Allied powers who were administering the colonies for that period. He could agree to the establishment of, commissions to study the question of the ultimate disposition of the colonies, so long as they were limited to that. Provision was made for that in paragraph 4 of the draft declaration. M. Molotov had asked the other day whether he (Mr. Bevin) could marry these two ideas, the advisory council and the investigating commission. He had tried to do it in his proposal, but it was a marriage that could not last owing to incompatibility of temperament. Another difficulty presented by the American draft was the phrase “acting on behalf of the collectivity of the United Nations”. How could that be reconciled with the proposal that for a year the Four Powers were going to deal with the colonies? It seemed to be inconsistent with the declaration. After the year the United Nations will have responsibility but not during the interim period.

Mr. Byrnes replied that the intention of the U.S. Delegation in proposing to add those words was simply to meet the argument that Italy would not be renouncing the colonies to the Four Powers for themselves but to them as trustees, since the disposition of the colonies was to be made within a year. This proposal was like many others offered in the hope of reconciling differences; it was satisfactory to no one. The U.S. Delegation agreed that the first paragraph of the document subsequently circulated by the U.K. Delegation would be preferable since it avoided the suspicion that they were requiring Italy to renounce its colonies to the Four Powers represented at the table for their own selfish purposes.

M. Bidault said that he was in full agreement with Mr. Byrnes on the question of the unpleasant character of conciliatory proposals. That being so, he would give his frank opinion. He felt that the wording of the British text was the best; in any case it was the least bad. He wondered whether it would not be possible to refer to the Special Committee on Colonies the draft declaration attached to the British draft article. The Committee could advise the Council concerning the commissions which would be neither commissions of inquiry nor advisory commissions but would at any rate be commissions. Perhaps the Council could agree in a general way to accept the article as submitted by the U.K. Delegation and thus make some progress in dealing with the question of the colonies.

M. Molotov suggested that the earlier wording of the Soviet proposal be replaced by the following clause: “There shall be established in the colonies by the Four Powers commissions of study which will also perform functions of observation in order to be able in case of necessity to make recommendations to their governments.” Was that acceptable?

Mr. Bevin said that he was very sorry but it was not acceptable. He had gone as far as he could go in agreeing to the Soviet proposal for commissions of inquiry or study, and this had been included in paragraph 4 of the draft declaration. Great Britain could not admit any interference with the administration during the interim period.

M. Molotov said that there would be no interference.

Mr. Bevin said that, if there was no desire to interfere, then he would agree to M. Bidault’s suggestion to ask the Deputies to find some words describing commissions which might study the matter. He could not go any further than that. The object of the study would be to advise the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning the ultimate disposal of the colonies.

Mr. Byrnes said that the U.S. Delegation had proposed at the last session in May that there be a postponement of a decision on the disposal of the colonies for a period of not more than a year during which the Four Powers would try to agree on a proper disposition, and if they could not agree that question would be decided by the United Nations. This proposal had been offered in an effort to bring about an agreement. He wished to say that in making it the U.S. Delegation had not had the idea that during the time when the Council of Foreign Ministers was considering the question of disposition there would be any change in the administration of the colonies. The U.S. Delegation had no reason to make such a proposal. It had agreed, however, to the idea of appointing commissions to go to the colonies to ascertain the views of the local inhabitants and then report to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This was an excellent idea because it might help the Council in deciding upon the ultimate disposition of the colonies. The U.S. Delegation was not particular concerning the language used to describe these commissions, but would certainly not wish to be put in the position of interfering with the administration of the occupying government. That job was hard enough anyway without adding to its difficulties. Accordingly, the United States had no objection to the document circulated by the U.K. Delegation but would like only to suggest the addition of two words in paragraph 2, point (3) of the draft declaration so that it would read: “Trusteeship to be exercised either by the United Nations as a whole, by Italy, or by any one of the United Nations individually.” The idea of commissions of inquiry was a good one. These commissions should be authorized to consider the question of the possibility of Italy acting as trustee as well as the other questions. In that case it seemed necessary to mention Italy by name in the declaration since it was not one of the United Nations.

Mr. Bevin had no objection to the amendment proposed by Mr. Byrnes. He had not included reference to Italy in the draft because he had assumed that, the French Delegation having proposed Italy as trustee, this could be one of the proposals to be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers before a final decision was taken.

M. Bidault said that Mr. Bevin was right in believing the French Delegation adhered to its previous position. In order to have this point covered in the draft declaration it would be necessary to have the draft re-examined as he had previously suggested. The declaration as it stood was not being accepted textually but was being referred to the Special Committee.

Mr. Bevin said he had no objection to this procedure. He was not sure just where in the declaration the reference to Italy as trustee should be made.

Mr. Byrnes asked if there were any chance that the Council could agree at once on the article for inclusion in the Treaty. This was a matter on which he thought they had reached agreement sometime ago. M. Molotov had found the American proposal of May 15 acceptable. That proposal had been sent to the Committee on Colonies. It would be desirable to avoid sending the question back to the Committee again. Could they not make some headway and agree now on the text of the article for the Treaty?

M. Molotov wondered whether there would be any objection to mentioning the commissions of inquiry in the Treaty article itself. It might be that if they were not mentioned in the article they would not be mentioned in the declaration either. He thought they could reach agreement without difficulty on the text. He was prepared to make concessions in this matter in the hope that when the Council considered the question of reparation to the Soviet Union they would be able to come to an agreement on that in the same way as on these other problems. Could they not agree now to make some mention of the commissions in the draft article, within the limits acceptable to Mr. Bevin? They could send it to the Committee on that basis.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that they could agree to paragraph 4 of the draft declaration which mentioned the commissions.

M. Molotov said that he had no objection to that course.

M. Bidault agreed.

Mr. Byrnes said that the paragraph concerning the establishment of commissions could then be considered as agreed. The next question was whether it went into the Treaty or into the separate declaration. M. Molotov favored the former course but it did seem that this was a temporary matter and more appropriate for inclusion in the declaration. If they agreed to it now on that basis, they had the assurance that it would go into any declaration that was agreed to. It was provided in the Treaty article that the disposition of the colonies should be made in the manner laid down in the joint declaration issued on that date. Thus what they had just agreed to concerning the commissions, if kept as a part of the declaration, would become by reference a part of the Treaty.

M. Molotov had no objection. He suggested that they instruct the Deputies to draft the declaration.

Mr. Byrnes said that he agreed on the substance and that they would refer the declaration for drafting to the Special Committee on Colonies instead of to the Deputies. (All Delegations agreed.)

Date of the Peace Conference

Mr. Byrnes reminded M. Molotov that he had said on Friday that he would be willing to make a decision in two or three days on the question of the date for the Peace Conference. This being the fourth day, there should be no trouble in reaching agreement on this point.

M. Molotov agreed that he had made such a statement. He had, however, maintained the view that they could settle the question of the date of the Peace Conference at the present meeting provided that they also settled the question of reparation to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Delegation had put forward a new proposal on that subject on Sunday.³⁶ With regard to the date, July 20th was perhaps too near to give enough time to the other governments to become acquainted with the draft treaties. The date might be set somewhat later. However, the Soviet Delegation had no objection to coming to a decision on this matter. On the subject of reparation the Soviet Delegation had the understanding that the acceptance of the sum of $100,000,000 to be paid to the Soviet Union by Italy presented no difficulties for the other delegations. The main differences, in the view of those delegations, had been connected with the other questions on which so much time had been spent but which now had been settled, the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste and the question of the Italian colonies. Decisions having been reached on these questions there remained only the question of reparation to the Soviet Union still awaiting solution. This was a question of particular importance to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Delegation had placed a proposal before the Council.

Mr. Byrnes wished to say that when the question of fixing the date of the Peace Conference had been taken up on the previous Friday, it had been passed at the request of the Soviet Delegation, which had indicated that it could be settled in two or three days. It was then placed on the agenda and had now been reached in the regular order of procedure. Would not the Soviet Representative be willing to dispose of it now? The previously suggested date, July 20th, would fall on a Saturday. Would M. Molotov agree to July 22nd, which would be a Monday? If that were not satisfactory, the Soviet Representative could suggest another date, the U.S. Delegation would agree, and then there would be no objection to going on and discussing the question of reparation. He (Mr. Byrnes) was ready to take up reparation at this meeting and to discuss it until it was disposed of before any other question was taken up. On the question of a date, if his Soviet friend preferred July 25th, that would be quite satisfactory.

Mr. Bevin thought that the procedure suggested by Mr. Byrnes would be the best. He felt that they must take into account the feelings of the peoples of the world who had been waiting so long for this Peace Conference. It would be the better approach to settle that point first and get away from having this sword hanging over their heads requiring them to agree on certain questions before they could be sure that the Peace Conference would be called. He had no objection to taking up reparation after the date of the Peace Conference was settled, as Mr. Byrnes suggested.

M. Bidault said that he believed that every one of the Ministers had in his turn done a good deal toward the removing of this sword of Damocles. In the matter of the agenda his recollection was the same as that of Mr. Byrnes, the date of the Peace Conference being the next item after the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and the Italian colonies. On the question of reparation he wished to recall that the French Delegate’s position was well known. He was convinced that, without the sword of Damocles, they would be able to settle this question just as they had settled the other outstanding questions. He thought there would be no fundamental difficulty on reparation and hoped that the Soviet Delegation could agree to have the date of the Peace Conference fixed immediately. The chances for an agreement on reparation would not suffer thereby.

M. Molotov suggested that September 1st might be a possible date for the Conference in view of the fact that there were still no final drafts and that it was necessary for the other 17 nations to become familiar with the drafts before the Conference. Perhaps September 1st or 15th would be a date more acceptable to those nations. Certainly July 20th or 22nd was too close at hand.

Mr. Byrnes thought that, if the Council could finish its discussion of the five treaties, the staffs of the four delegations, having worked on these questions since the previous September could within a week or ten days have ready the drafts of the treaties to be submitted to those nations which would attend the Peace Conference. The U.S. Deputy had informed him that it could be done in five days but he had been willing to estimate it at ten. Certainly the Council must consider that if it postponed the date later than that it would make it difficult for the representatives of the other nations to attend the General Assembly of the United Nations in September. He knew that there was no reason why the Peace Conference could not be called for the 20th. He had been willing to allow five more days since others thought that a little more time might be necessary. Certainly they should be able to agree on July 25th, giving the governments of the other nations ample time to look over the draft treaties. September 1st would of course not be possible. The meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations was already fixed for September 4th. They must have some respect for the convenience of the governments of the world which expected to attend the General Assembly. The 17 nations would be entirely willing to come to Paris on July 20th in order to go into the questions connected with the peace treaties. Most of those countries were in Europe; only a few would have to send delegations from a great distance. He knew that if they were asked they would prefer to come to Paris on July 20th or 25th.³⁷

M. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes was right in noting that they had to reckon with the date of the General Assembly. Perhaps the date should be not September 1 but August 25 or a little earlier. The General Assembly might be asked to put off its meeting for two or three weeks. There were precedents for such a request. The Council had to put its own house in order in the preparation of the draft treaties. Information available to the Soviet Delegation showed that it would not be possible to do the final drafting within five days. Perhaps that information was not correct. The Deputies might be asked to estimate how much time it would take them to finish the drafts.

Mr. Byrnes thought that so much of the drafting had been completed that the U.S. Deputy was right in saying that it would take only a few days to finish. All the Deputies were here at the table. They might be asked to give their own opinions. This was only July 3rd and there would still be three weeks before the date which he had proposed for the Peace Conference.

M. Bidault said that he would speak in place of his Deputy and assume the full responsibility which belonged to him. The French Deputy was filled with faith, hope and charity, but everything did not depend on him. He thought that the work could be done rapidly but was somewhat less optimistic than Mr. Dunn. The French Deputy envisaged a delay twice as long as the U.S. Delegation had suggested. By twice as long, since the U.S. Delegation had mentioned two figures, 5 days and 10 days, he meant twice as long as the average between those two, namely about two weeks.

Mr. Bevin suggested asking the Deputies to consider on what date they could complete the drafts for submission to the other nations, on the understanding that the Peace Conference would be held not earlier than July 22 and not later than August 5. It might be that a date midway between could be taken such as the 29th. The Deputies should in any case have a definite date toward which to work. That date should not be later than the latest date he had mentioned, August 5.

M. Molotov said that, speaking in agreement with his Deputy, M. Vyshinsky, he thought it would be a good thing to instruct the Deputies to examine the question of how much time they would need to complete the preparation of the drafts. The Ministers could examine the Deputies’ report the next day.

Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to impress upon his colleagues that they had told the world that the Peace Conference would be called on May 1. The Soviet Government had taken the position that the preparation of the draft treaties must be completed before the Conference could be called. Those drafts would be completed. The Deputies had just now said that it could be done in two weeks. There was no reason for putting off a decision any longer, even for one day. He knew that this did not mean anything to some people, but it did mean something to the governments of the world whose soldiers had fought this war just as much as those of the four governments represented here.

M. Molotov said that, this being so, the Council should decide the remaining outstanding question, that of reparation.

Mr. Byrnes stated that they had made an agreement on the previous Friday (June 28). This Paris Agreement of four days ago had been made subsequent to the Moscow Agreement and was just as sacred. They had agreed on an agenda under that Agreement. Following the items on that agenda, they had now reached the question of the Peace Conference. Let that day now be fixed in accordance with the Paris Agreement of the previous week. He wished to make clear to his Soviet friend that when this question of the date was settled, he would agree to add the question of reparation to the agenda and to put it ahead of all other questions if his colleagues agreed. They would remember that on the agreed agenda the German question was to follow that of the Peace Conference. He would now agree to substitute reparation in place of the German question.

M. Molotov said that it was well known that the Moscow Decision provided that the Council of Foreign Ministers would prepare draft peace treaties for submission to the Paris Conference. During the previous weeks’ discussions Mr. Byrnes had listed the questions which were considered important and fundamental. These were the Italian-Yugoslav frontier, the Italian colonies, and reparation from Italy. The Soviet Delegation had agreed that it would be necessary to settle those questions before the Conference was convoked. What was the present position regarding those questions? That of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste had been settled. The Soviet Delegation had withdrawn its reservation that very afternoon on one of the items which had remained in disagreement. The Soviet Delegation regarded that decision as final. On the question of the colonies it was known that the Soviet Delegation had agreed to accept the proposal of Mr. Bevin, who represented the country most directly interested in the question. Of the three questions the only one now outstanding was reparation. It was well known that there was virtually no objection on the part of the other delegations with respect to the amount of reparation to be paid by Italy to the Soviet Union. When this question had been discussed on Saturday there had been no draft proposal in writing. It had been requested that one be submitted. The Soviet Delegation had circulated such a proposal on Sunday. This was the only principal question still outstanding, and he did not see why it should be postponed. If it could be settled, it could be said that the preparation of the draft treaties for the Peace Conference was, to all intents and purposes, completed.

Mr. Byrnes said that M. Molotov was correct in saying that two important questions had been settled. He hoped that he would not insist on the position that the date of the Peace Conference, which was the next item on the agenda, could not be fixed until there was a decision on the question of reparation to the Soviet Union. Let the Council fix the date and then go on to discuss the question of reparation.

M. Molotov said that, if they first set the date for the Peace Conference, they would be doing so without having completed the preparation of the drafts. If it appeared difficult to take up the question of reparation immediately, let both questions be postponed and tomorrow they could take up the question of Germany.

Mr. Bevin said that he would like to appeal to M. Molotov. He thought it was a good method to deal with this question right now and get agreement. When the three Foreign Ministers had met at Moscow they had agreed that the preparation of drafts would be completed before the Peace Conference, but they had also fixed the date of the Conference. Both statements were contained in the same document. This may have appeared to be inconsistent, and it turned out that they could not keep the commitment to open the Conference on May 1. Certainly they could not do anything about that now, but they had reached the point were there was agreement on most points and the other governments and peoples which were to be invited to the Peace Conference should know when it would take place. To make such a decision would actually facilitate the discussion on reparation, and this was said advisedly. There were some other questions which still had to be settled but there was no intention of holding up the Peace Conference until all of those were disposed of. He had suggested two dates. Could they not agree that the Deputies should report the next day, recommending some date between the two which he had mentioned? All Delegations had agreed to take up the question of reparation next. It would be an act of faith on the part of M. Molotov to agree now to the date of the Peace Conference. Then they could get on with the question of reparation the next day.

M. Molotov said that, in view of these circumstances, they might postpone until the next day the question of reparation and also that of the date of the Peace Conference. The Council had managed to settle quite a few questions at this meeting. If it was difficult to settle the other two questions, they might be settled the next day.

M. Bevin wished to make one final observation. He trusted that when they met the next day the first item on the agenda would be the date of the Peace Conference. They should not let this one item place them in a situation which they ought to avoid.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had suggested another course, that they try to settle both the question of the Peace Conference and that of reparation at their present meeting. If that were not to be done, they must at least have in mind that they were working on a fixed agenda. On that agenda the question of the Peace Conference followed the Italian colonies, and they would start with it at the next meeting. There was not going to be discussion of any other questions ahead of it.

M. Molotov said that they had no such procedure as would make it impossible for them to examine various questions, the consideration of which had not been completed at previous meetings. There was no procedure which would exclude discussion of any particular problem or which would make it impossible, if they had not completed their discussion of the Peace Conference, to take up the question of reparation first. They had not yet drawn up an agenda for tomorrow. He thought that the preparation of the draft peace treaties ought to be completed. In the view of the Soviet Delegation it was not possible to consider that work completed until the question of reparation had been settled. Therefore, he suggested that tomorrow the Council take up first the question of reparation and afterward the question of the date of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Byrnes said that there was nothing to prevent the Council from making any agenda it wished. It could take up the next day some of the items in the economic sections of the Balkan treaties or any other subject but it had been the custom of the Council, when it had an agenda and when discussion on some items had not been completed, to continue with that agenda at the next meeting and to go on with those items. The Council could set aside its agenda if the four Delegations agreed. But in this case the four had not agreed because the U.S. Delegation would not agree to any such setting aside of the agenda. If there was disagreement and no further headway could be made at the present meeting with the discussion of these subjects, he wished to know the opinion of his colleagues on the question of whether they should continue the present meeting or adjourn.

Mr. Bevin said that he was very anxious to prevent any further loss of time. They had been waiting for quite a long time. He wished to urge that the Deputies meet in the morning and take up the question of how long it would take to put the draft treaties into shape. With that information available, the Council could then fix the date of the Peace Conference as soon as it met; then it could go on with reparation, the Danube and other questions. He was quite sure that this suggestion would not prejudice the position of any delegation. It would make for good feeling and allow them to get on with their job.

M. Bidault said he was willing to agree to this proposal if his own proposal was unacceptable. Although he was just as tired as his colleagues, he wished to ask if it were not possible to settle the question of the date of the Peace Conference without reference to the question of reparation. He felt that M. Molotov had suggested this earlier when he had mentioned that the Peace Conference might be convened late in August or early in September. This showed that M. Molotov believed, as did M. Bidault, that they had made progress in their work und that it was possible to hold the Peace Conference. Both questions might be settled that evening, and it might be done very rapidly.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had stated several times that he was entirely willing, when the question of the Peace Conference was settled, to discuss reparation. But he did not want to enter any discussion on the basis that the Peace Conference could not be fixed until reparations were settled. He knew that the Soviet Government was very much interested in reparation, but all the world was interested in the date of the Peace Conference. If it was the wish of the Council that they fix the date of the Peace Conference and then proceed with the question of reparation, that was all right; if not, the Chairman would entertain a motion to adjourn.

M. Molotov said that they had all held the view that the calling of the Peace Conference should be preceded by the settlement of at least the three important questions: Trieste, the colonies, and reparation. Two of those three questions had already been settled. The third remained outstanding, although a draft proposal had already been circulated. He wished to suggest that they complete their examination of this third question and after that decide the question of the date of the Peace Conference. The Soviet Delegation would not regard the work as completed when only two out of three questions were settled. He recalled the fact that the Soviet Delegation had already made substantial concessions on the first and second questions. The Soviet Delegation had made those concessions bearing in mind the fact that the settlement of the reparation question, the outlines of which could already be discerned, would not meet with any objection.

Mr. Byrnes called attention to a previous remark of M. Molotov which indicated that the latter was laboring under a misunderstanding. He (M. Molotov) had said that he (Mr. Byrnes) listed three important questions which had to be settled before the Peace Conference could be called. He wished to say to the Council that he had made no such statement. He had been trying ever since last September to have a date fixed for the Peace Conference. He had asked M. Molotov whether the Soviet Delegation considered those three questions the fundamental ones and whether the Peace Conference was going to be vetoed until those questions were disposed of. That was the only time he had spoken of those three questions. Only about 30 minutes before the Soviet Representative had said that he could agree to calling the Peace Conference for September 1 or September 15. The question of reparation had not been settled when he made that statement. Therefore, it was not clear why the Soviet Representative could not agree, before the discussion of reparation, to let the Deputies recommend a date, after surveying the situation, or to fix the date on July 25th, as the U.S. Delegation had suggested.

M. Molotov said that he did not refuse to discuss the question of the date of the Peace Conference. But that date could be set only when the question of reparation had been settled.

Mr. Bevin said that he wished to make one further effort. He asked that the Deputies be instructed to meet the next morning, study the position of their work, and report to the Ministers on the question of a date for the Peace Conference. When the Council had received that report it would proceed to discuss the question of reparation.

M. Bidault remarked that he had already said that if his proposal could not be adopted he would support any other proposal. He could not work miracles every day.

Mr. Byrnes asked if it were proposed that, when the Deputies submitted their report, the Council would then discuss reparation.

Mr. Bevin said that that was not his intention. The Council would decide whether it accepted the Deputies’ report or not. He had proposed that the Deputies consider their work and estimate the time necessary for its completion, whether 5 days or 10 days or whatever it was, and then report their conclusion on the earliest date when, in view of the state of their work, the Peace Conference could be held. That report could then be accepted or rejected when it was placed before the Council. He hoped that, on the basis of such a report, they could agree on a date and then pass on to other questions.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether the Council could agree to that proposal. If not, were there any further comments?

M. Molotov had no objection to having the Deputies study how much time it would take to complete the preparation of the drafts. He was willing to hear their report the next day, then they would place on their agenda first the question of reparation and then the question of the date of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Bevin said that anyway he had tried.

Mr. Byrnes said that the proposal had not been agreed to. Unless some member of the Council had something to offer, he thought they should adjourn.

Mr. Bevin said that he did think they really ought to know how long it would take the Deputies to finish their drafts. The Deputies ought to report tomorrow on that point without prejudice to anything else. Could they agree on that?

Mr. Byrnes stated that a proposal had been made that the Deputies be requested to consider the next morning how long it would take them to prepare the draft treaties, assuming that the Foreign Ministers would have completed their consideration of the treaties within the next few days. If there were no objections, the Deputies would be so instructed.

There were no objections.

The meeting adjourned at 8:30.

28. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
29. Not printed.
30. Ante, p. 726.

31. C.F.M.(46) 182, July 2, 1946, Report of the Deputies on the Work of the Drafting Committee, not printed. The first part of that report read as follows:

    “I. Dodecanese

    • “1) Former text of Article 12 in C.F.M.(D) (46) 177 is accepted.
    • “2) Soviet Delegation propose that Article 13 shall become the second paragraph of Article 12. This last paragraph shall be as follows:
    • “‘The procedure and the technical conditions governing the transfer of these islands to Greece will be determined by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Greece and arrangements shall be made for the withdrawal of foreign troops within a period of — months.’
    • “3) Certain delegations wish to receive instructions from the Deputies.” (C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: CFM Documents)

32. C.F.M.(46) 181, July 2, 1946, p. 722.
33. C.F.M.(46) 186, July 3, 1946, p. 752.
34. Ante, p. 713.
35. C.F.M.(46) 89, May 15, 1946, p. 423. The French point of view on the disposition of the Italian colonies was set forth by Bidault at the 4th Meeting of the Council, April 29; see the United States Delegation Record of that meeting, p. 153.
36. The reference here is to C.F.M.(46) 176, June 30, 1946, p. 697.
37. Telegram 3248, Secdel 402, July 3, 1946, not printed, reported the observation of Herschel Johnson, Acting United States Representative to the United Nations, that 19 American Republics and most of the Near Eastern States would not be represented at the peace conference and might resent postponement of the General Assembly meeting because of the conference (740.00119 Council/7–346).