Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Twenty-Fifth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 24, 1946, 5 p.m.⁹⁹

Paris, June 24, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Franco-Italian Frontier

M. Molotov opened the meeting and stated that the question of the Tenda–Briga area remained on the agenda since the discussion had not been concluded at the morning’s meeting. Since objection had been raised to his proposal to set up a special committee to examine the question, he suggested that it might be possible to defer the matter until a later meeting on the understanding that it would be studied in the meantime by the various Delegations, with particular attention to the document submitted by the Italian Government on May 7.¹

Mr. Bevin said that during the recess he had had a chance to look up all the papers on this subject. He found that the document in question had been taken into account by the Commission which had visited the Tenda–Briga area. He could not see why there was any reason to postpone a decision. Everything which was in the document to which M. Molotov had referred had since been put forward in one or another of the documents submitted by the Italian Government and had received full study.

M. Molotov stated that not a single Soviet representative had participated in any discussion of this document by any committee.

Mr. Bevin said that it was his understanding that the Soviet Government had been represented on the committee of investigation which had visited the area.

M. Molotov agreed that there had been a Soviet representative on that Commission, but the Commission had not examined the Italian document of May 7 at any of its meetings in which the Soviet representative had participated.

M. Bidault remarked that he had the most lively desire to have the question re-examined in the light of the Italian document of May 7. He noticed that on page 1 of that document there was a statement to the effect that it was generally considered that the geographic boundary between Italy and France passed through French territory along a line which would in effect leave the whole department of Alpes Maritimes in Italy. He was willing to have this document examined because examination could have no other effect than to reinforce the French position. He then quoted the text on page 1 as follows:

“Geographers and historians, foreigners as well as Italians, mark as follows the geographic frontier between Italy and France: a. The line of the watershed of the Alps … b. The course of the Var from Mont Enchastraye to the sea”.

The point of departure of the Italian thesis was that the geographical frontier between France and Italy follows the river Var.

In stating the position of France M. Bidault stated he must repeat what he had said that morning concerning the fact that there were some 50,000 French speaking persons in the Val d’Aosta whose sentiments in favor of France are well-known. He said that it had not been easy for France to sacrifice the interests and feelings of the French speaking peoples on both sides of the frontier. He referred not only to the Val d’Aosta but also to the Susa Valley and to the Ventimiglia area. According to this Italian document of May 7 the area claimed by France contained only 3800 people. In view of the great concessions already made by the French Government, M. Bidault stated that it was apparent that a compromise had already been made and that the position of the French Delegation must remain unchanged.

M. Molotov said that he had no new proposals to make.

Mr. Bevin suggested that they sit and wait until the documents could be studied at the table. He did think that a decision ought to be taken, or else a definite disagreement registered.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had objected at the morning’s meeting to the submission of this matter to a committee for study merely on the grounds of the circulation of a document on May 7. The United States Delegation had had that document for a long time, had considered it, and did not care to consider it any further. As he understood the situation, the British and French Delegations had also considered it and saw no reason for further study of it. The Soviet representative, on the other hand, apparently had not considered it and wished time to study it. Under the procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers, if any Delegation took the position that it was not ready to vote on a question, there was no way in which the Council could proceed to a vote. He had hoped that M. Molotov would find it possible to read the document during the recess and would be ready to consider it at the present meeting. But M. Molotov had said that he was not ready to consider it. Therefore there was no use in wasting further time in discussing the subject, and the Council should go on to the next item on the agenda. The United States Delegation did not intend to object to having the question of the Tenda–Briga area deferred on the request of the Soviet Delegation, but it did object to deferring it on the ground that further study should be given to it by a committee. Three of the Delegations had already studied it, and there was no reason for further study.

M. Bidault said that he also thought that it would be wise not to prolong the exchange of views in view of the circumstances stated by Mr. Byrnes.

Before leaving the subject the French Delegation would like to make it clear that this was really a question of negligible importance and that common sense supported the French thesis. The French Delegation was confident that common sense would prevail when a final decision was taken.

Limitation of Italian Navy

M. Molotov stated that the next item on the agenda was the report of the Naval Committee on the Limitation of the Italian Navy and the Disposal of Surplus Units (CFM (46) 121),² and asked for observations.

Mr. Bevin said that he understood that in the Committee the French Naval Expert had proposed a compromise on cruisers which the British and American Experts had been willing to accept. On behalf of the British Delegation he was ready formally to accept that compromise. The main purpose of his acceptance was to get a settlement of the dispute over cruisers. He should have liked to have the original UK–US proposal accepted, as that solution would be more in conformity with what he thought had been the purpose of the Council, namely to give Italy a fleet worthy of the name, but since no agreement had been possible on that he was willing to accept the compromise on cruisers without prejudice to the decisions on other questions.

M. Molotov felt that the question had not been sufficiently studied by the Committee of Naval Experts since they had made no proposal which would permit the settling of the matters in dispute concerning cruisers and destroyers in a way which would clearly indicate which cruisers and destroyers would be distributed among the Powers concerned. The Soviet Delegation believed that the Experts had to complete their work and to determine the classes of ships which would be allocated to each of the Allied Powers, giving the specific names of the cruisers and destroyers. It seemed to him that the Council could settle the question by drawing lots to determine to which Powers the various lists of ships would be allocated. This had been done in the case of the German navy and the same course might be adopted in this case.

Mr. Byrnes said that in the view of the United States Delegation the Council of Foreign Ministers had determined the numerical limits of the Italian Navy. In its instructions to the Naval Committee the Council had charged them first to determine what specific ships, within the limits set forth for each category, should be left to Italy.³ The Committee had studied the question and had made recommendations concerning the ships to be left to Italy within the general limitations agreed upon. That had nothing to do with the question of the disposition of war trophies, which was a matter not connected with the treaty and not appropriate for inclusion in the treaty. Under the decisions taken at Potsdam creating the Council of Foreign Ministers the first duty of the Council was to draw up a peace treaty with Italy. Those matters which would figure in the treaty should be settled first, and any other matters should be left until later. The proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom Experts seemed to be a wise proposal. However, if it would help in reaching agreement and in getting along with the work on the treaty, the United States Delegation was ready to agree to the French compromise proposal. As stated in the report of the Committee, that proposal contemplated leaving to Italy two of the cruisers specified in the UK–US proposal and two of the cruisers which were named in the French–Soviet proposal.

M. Molotov considered that the question of the ships to be left to Italy and that of the distribution of the remaining ships were closely connected. On the first point a decision had already been taken by the Council. No new decision was required. The problem was merely to determine precisely what ships would be left to Italy under that decision. This was clearly linked up with the question of what ships would be left over for distribution among the Allied Powers.

M. Molotov wished, moreover, to make a statement in connection with certain remarks which had been made by the British Deputy in the preliminary discussions on this subject. The British Deputy had indicated that there was danger of the Italian Navy being scuttled by the Italians in connection with the forthcoming decision of the Council on the disposal of that Navy. The Soviet Delegation found it necessary to propose that the Council of Foreign Ministers issue a warning to the Italian Government to the effect that if any Italian ships were scuttled by their crews or if any damage were inflicted on those ships, the Italian Government would have to bear the full material responsibility for that damage to the interests of the Allied Powers, and in particular that Italy would have to replace scuttled or damaged units with ships which would otherwise have been left to Italy.

Mr. Bevin remarked that the Italians would not scuttle the ships which were now under discussion, since these were the ships which the Council was going to leave to Italy. Therefore he did not think that the question of scuttling arose at all.

M. Molotov said that the Council might adopt a provisional decision along the lines of the French compromise proposal on the understanding that the Italian Government would not, for the time being, be informed of that decision, and also on the understanding that a final decision would be deferred until the other questions which concerned the Four Powers in connection with the Italian Navy were settled. For the moment he was ready to accept a provisional decision along the lines of the French proposal.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was in favor of the compromise proposal but would not agree to it with any conditions. The Council of Foreign Ministers had properly instructed the Experts that “after it is determined what specific ships within the limits set for each category shall be left for Italy, and after the claims of Greece and Yugoslavia have been taken into account, the balance of Italian war vessels (except submarines) shall be allocated equitably among the U.K., U.S.A., Soviet Union and France, …”. In the view of the United States Delegation the question of the ships to be left to Italy should be settled immediately on the basis of that decision. The language governing it should go into the treaty, and that was the only language which could go into the treaty. Under the Potsdam decisions it had been agreed to settle the treaty questions first. It was therefore suggested that the Council agree on the treaty clause and only after that have the Naval Experts, in accordance with their instructions, go into the matter of the disposition of war trophies, first taking into account the claims of Greece and Yugoslavia and deciding what should go to those two countries, and only after that taking up the question of how to divide up the balance.

Mr. Bevin said that what Mr. Byrnes had said was also the position of the United Kingdom Delegation. He wanted to carry out the decision which the Council had already made. The allocation of ships to Italy arrived at by the Council should be firm and final without any conditions. Then the Experts should go ahead with the question of claims of Greece and Yugoslavia and finally take up the matter of dividing up the remaining ships which were war booty. Incidentally, this was the only booty which Great Britain was going to get.

M. Molotov had no objection to this proposal but reserved the right to revert to the question should it become necessary to do so after the receipt of the next report of the Experts.

Mr. Bevin said that in that case he should have to go back to the original UK–US proposal for the allocation of ships, or even go back to the position that the war booty would not be divided at all. This was the only instance, to his knowledge, of a decision to divide war booty captured by one or two of the Allied Powers, in this case by the United Kingdom and the United States. If M. Molotov insisted on reserving the right to go back on the decision to accept the French compromise proposal, that would put the British Delegation in an unfair position, and that could not be accepted.

M. Molotov stated that he had no new observations to make.

Mr. Bevin said that it was obvious that they could not agree and that the Council should go on to the next subject.

Freedom of Navigation on the Danube

M. Molotov said that the Council should then proceed to consider the outstanding questions connected with the peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Taking the Rumanian treaty first, the first point was the article on the Danube.

Mr. Bevin recalled that at the previous session the question of the Danube had been discussed and also the question of freedom of trade. These matters were considered in connection with the treaty with Rumania and also with the treaties for Hungary and Bulgaria. The United Kingdom and the United States Delegations had put forward a proposal which appeared under Article 35 of the draft treaty with Rumania (CFM (D) (46) 182.⁴) That was where the matter now stood.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had already stated its views on the question of the Danube. It still held those same views. The question of the Danube could not be made the subject of articles in the individual peace treaties. The Soviet Delegation had more than once stated its reasons for taking this position and it saw no reason to repeat them. However, the Soviet Delegation thought that it would be proper for the Council of Foreign Ministers to adopt a decision concerning the Danube apart from the peace treaties. Such a decision would constitute a reply to certain questions which had arisen in the minds of certain of the Delegations now present. The Soviet proposal was that the Council should adopt a decision as follows: “The Council of Foreign Ministers expresses its confidence that the riparian states wall maintain navigation on the Danube and on its navigable tributaries and connecting canals on terms providing that navigation will be free and open to the nationals, the merchant ships, and to the commerce of all nations, on the understanding that, during the period in which forces of occupation are stationed along the Danube, the orders of those forces in the areas in which they are stationed will be observed”.⁵

Mr. Byrnes said that if the Council stated that it was confident that this would be done, then obviously the Four Powers believed that it should be done. If they believed that it should be done, why should they object to asking Rumania to join them in this expression of confidence? The agreement on the part of Rumania and of the other states concerned would be worth more than any expression of confidence by the United States or of France on the subject. If there was a proposal providing for a detailed arrangement to govern the regime of the Danube, it would be understandable that these details should be left out of the treaty and should be arranged with Rumania sometime in the future. But this was not a proposal for a detailed arrangement. What M. Molotov had just stated was a statement of principle. Mr. Byrnes thought that all the Delegations agreed to that principle. Why then should they not ask Rumania to accept it in the treaty?

M. Molotov stated that the question of the Danube did not concern only Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, but also certain Allied countries such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which were not present at the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the Soviet view it would be incorrect and inexpedient to examine the question of the Danube in the absence of representatives of those states. That was why the Soviet Delegation considered it inexpedient to include the question of the Danube in this or that peace treaty. The Soviet Delegation had accordingly suggested that a decision be taken which would facilitate the settlement of these questions in a practical way.

Mr. Byrnes asked if it were not true that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had before the war been parties to agreements which had provided for free navigation on the Danube. If that were so, there would be no reason to think that they would be opposed to such a principle now. The American, British, Soviet and French Delegations had indicated that they favored the principle. If this statement of principle, given in paragraph 1 of the American proposal, were included in the draft treaty, it would then go before the Peace Conference. If Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia had any objection to it, they could make those objections known at the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov stressed the fact that neither Czechoslovakia nor Yugoslavia was present at the moment. For that reason it was understandable that, whatever views were expressed by the Four Delegations present, it would be inexpedient to make any final decision without the participation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and of the other riparian states such as Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would agree with the point of view if it were a question of a final decision. But it was known that this was not a final decision. In some matters M. Molotov had taken the position that certain questions could not be referred to the Peace Conference because there was no agreement among the four Delegations present. But on this point the four Delegations were agreed, and other interested countries could express their views on the proposed clause at the Peace Conference. There would be no final action until the Council of Foreign Ministers decided after the Peace Conference on the clause to be included in the peace treaty. That was what the Peace Conference was for.

M. Molotov said that this was a complex question. It seemed to him that it would be incorrect to include any clause on it in the peace treaties since the Danubian states themselves would not participate in that decision. There was no reason to assume that all questions on which the four Delegations were agreed should go into the peace treaties. Should they adopt the decision suggested by the Soviet Delegation, it would be of great value and would certainly contribute to a clarification of the situation and to a final settlement of the question of the Danube. Such a final settlement, however, should be made only with the participation of the riparian countries, since it was a matter which primarily concerned them.

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not wish to prolong the discussion but only wished to say that there could be no final agreement at present. It was a matter which had to go to the Peace Conference, and after the Peace Conference it would of course come back to the Council of Foreign Ministers for final agreement.

Mr. Bevin remarked that he had not had a chance to read the proposed Soviet draft. What he was about to say would of course be subject to any new remarks he might wish to make after getting a copy of the proposal in English. He had been wondering, if such a general statement should be adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, stating that the four Powers would take steps to bring about the purpose stated by the resolution, whether the matter could stand over until after the Peace Conference when the Council, in undertaking the final drafting, would have before it the views of the various riparian states. It seemed to him a matter which could be held over until the final conference of the Council after the Peace Conference. The situation seemed to be that any decision taken by the Four Powers today as the general expression of their views on the Danube question would be discussed by the Peace Conference. The Peace Conference would be in a position to make recommendations on the subject, and any such recommendations could be discussed by the Council before it decided on the language of the final treaties. The Four Powers would thus present to the Peace Conference a concerted opinion on what should be done, and the form in which these principles should be put into effect would be left to the final conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers which would be held after the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov said that the Peace Conference would, as they all knew, be attended by representatives of 21 nations. Among the nations would be Norway. What did Norway have to do with the question of the Danube? Norway had never dealt with this question and would not in the future. The same was true for Brazil or Ethiopia. Why should these countries be involved in the question of the Danube? It was obvious that it was not appropriate to discuss the question of the Danube at the Peace Conference and that it would be out of place to include in the peace treaties which would be discussed at the Peace Conference any decisions respecting the Danube. On the other hand, it had been said that it was necessary to take some action on this question in the near future. That was correct. If it was possible for the Council to take any steps along these lines, it should take steps of a practical nature which would have the result of furthering navigation on the Danube. By adopting the proposal of the Soviet Delegation the Council would promote a settlement of a practical question connected with navigation on the Danube. In the view of the Soviet Delegation it was a question of taking measures which would be of assistance in developing navigation on the Danube. It was not a question of deciding on clauses for the peace treaties. The British Delegation had expressed the wish to examine the Soviet proposal more closely. It was quite right that they should do so. At a later time the Council could take the matter up again. For his part, M. Molotov thought that the proposal was so clear that there was no need to postpone a decision on it. If the Council was ready to make a decision, it would be best to make it immediately.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would like to see the text of the proposal and to study it that evening.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would agree to a proposal along the lines outlined by the United Kingdom Delegation, but that he saw no reason to agree to a statement that the Four Powers had confidence that certain things would be done; they did not have such confidence and could not have it unless they took steps to see that those things were done. Instead of expressing confidence it would seem more proper to request the ex-enemy states to do these things, as had been suggested in the British Delegation’s proposal. If it could not be agreed to by corresponding clauses into the peace treaties, then at least the problem should be put in this way. Mr. Byrnes also wished to disagree with what his friend M. Molotov had said about countries other than the riparian states not being interested in the question of the Danube. Norway, for example, was certainly interested since it had a large merchant fleet and since its vessels would wish to use the Danube. Brazil also was interested since it had merchant ships and probably would have commercial relations with Rumania. The Rumanians might want to buy coffee from Brazil, and the ships bringing the coffee would wish to use the Danube. Aside from those particular points, all the 21 nations which would be represented at the Peace Conference were interested in maintaining the peace of the world. Since the settlement of the question of the Danube along lines providing for free navigation would be a contribution to peace, all those nations necessarily had a real interest in the question of the Danube.

M. Molotov said that perhaps the words in his proposal “expresses its confidence” could be replaced with the words “finds it proper” or “finds it important”. The Council could state that it considered it important that the riparian states maintain freedom of navigation on the Danube.

Mr. Bevin said that he thought it would be better to postpone further discussion until the Soviet proposal was available in writing and could be studied.

Compensation for Personal Injuries

M. Molotov pointed out that the Council had come to the end of the agenda before it and asked whether there were any suggestions.

Mr. Bevin said that on his list of topics there was another point, namely the question of compensation for personal injuries. The United Kingdom Delegation had submitted an article for inclusion in the draft treaty with Rumania on that point, Article 32 of CFM(D) (46) 182.⁶ The British Delegation was now ready to withdraw that proposal.

M. Molotov remarked that the same question was under discussion in connection with the Italian treaty.

Mr. Bevin said that, so far as he was concerned, he had withdrawn it in connection with the Italian treaty and he was now withdrawing it in connection with the Rumanian treaty.

Mr. Byrnes had no objection.

M. Bidault recalled that both the British and French Delegations had proposed such an article in the Italian treaty and had consented to its withdrawal. Thereupon the proposal had been made that the article be expanded to include compensation for persons injured outside Italian territory. On that basis the French Delegation had made another proposal, which had not been accepted. In these circumstances the French Delegation considered that it was simpler to delete the whole subject from the Italian treaty. If agreement could now be reached to delete it from the Rumanian treaty, that would be the first agreement registered by the Council at the present meeting.

M. Molotov said that he wished to support the idea expressed by M. Bidault and that he would not press for inclusion of an article on this subject.

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not know what the proposal was but that he hastened to agree.

M. Molotov pointed out that Rumania had been paying reparations for two years. The Soviet Delegation was willing to agree to the deletion of this proposal from the Rumanian draft treaty.

Mixed Arbitral Tribunals

Mr. Bevin said that another item on the present agenda was the question of Mixed Arbitral Tribunals in connection with the Rumanian treaty. This question had also arisen in the case of the Italian treaty.

Mr. Bevin said that he had circulated a formula for the corresponding article of the Italian treaty. No agreement had yet been reached on it. The formula proposed a bilateral conciliation commission, and in case of a disagreement on the commission, the matter in dispute would go to an independent third party.

M. Molotov said that the question had not been settled for the Italian treaty since the Deputies had not yet finished their study of the British proposal. The Soviet Delegation hoped that the Deputies would soon come to some conclusion on it, in order that a final agreement might be reached. They should continue their study of it.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was informed that the matter had been discussed by the Deputies and that the latter, having reached no agreement, had passed it up to the Foreign Ministers again. He was ready to consider it immediately. According to the United States Deputy it had been discussed fully by the Deputies and it was useless to send it back to them. It was up to the Foreign Ministers to take a decision. Mr. Byrnes thought that it would be a good thing to see if they couldn’t agree on something; even if only on a provision for the settlement of disputes.

M. Molotov said that he was advised that the Deputies had discussed the question and had reached no agreement, but that they had not decided to re-submit the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Probably it would come back to the Council later, but it might be better for the Deputies to finish their discussion first. They might narrow the problem down to two alternative solutions, thus making it easier for the Ministers to reach a conclusion. Were the other Delegations pressing for an immediate discussion of this question or would it be better to defer it?

Mr. Bevin was willing to let the Deputies take it up the next day and try to reach agreement.

The Council agreed to let the Deputies continue their study and discussion of the subject of procedure for the settlement of disputes.

It was decided that the Deputies should make a rapid survey of the matters which had been deferred by the Council and were still on its agenda and of the matters which stood referred to the Deputies. These lists were to be ready by the time of the Council’s next meeting at 4 o’clock the next day.

The meeting adjourned at 7:25 p.m.

99. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
1. Not found.
2. Dated June 22, 1946, p. 584.
3. The Council’s instructions to the Committee of Naval Experts are contained in the Record of Decisions of the Council’s 3rd Meeting, April 27, 1946, p. 138.
4. The Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, C.F.M.(D) (46) 182, is not printed. The United States and United Kingdom proposal set forth in article 35 of that document is identical with the United States and United Kingdom proposal under article 34 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania referred to the Peace Conference; see vol. iv, p. 79.
5. Molotov’s proposal was subsequently circulated to the Council as C.F.M.(46) 135, June 24, 1946, p. 613.
6. Not printed.