C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation97
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Cohen | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
Mr. Molotov said he had asked to come to see the Secretary in order to discuss with him means of accelerating the work of the conference. He said he had not in mind the small questions which had occupied them this morning but the big question of Trieste.
The Secretary said he agreed on the desirability of accelerating the work of the conference and he did feel that solutions must be found even though they were not perfect since it was difficult to stay indefinitely in Paris.
Mr. Molotov said he felt some progress had been made but he wished to discuss Trieste. He recalled that on Friday night he had mentioned that while M. Bidault’s suggestion was known to him, the attitude of the United States had not been fully stated.
The Secretary said that the attitude of the United States was that we had abandoned the line of our expert and were willing to accept the French line. The next proposal of the United States was if no agreement could be reached on that basis the matter should be referred to the 21 nations which would discharge our responsibility in view of the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any direct interest in the question of Trieste. As to M. Bidault’s proposal he said he had not given it serious consideration because on Friday night Mr. Molotov had stated that it was not acceptable to him. He added that almost every delegation had had a proposal which it had modified and he felt it was now up to the Soviet Delegation to make a new proposal.
Mr. Molotov said he thought M. Bidault’s proposal was of doubtful validity and he did not feel that the peace conference could be very helpful on this subject unless there was some preliminary agreement [Page 599] among the four. He said the Soviet line97a could be adjusted in the north and that any of the lines would require modification north of Trieste. He said he admitted none of the proposals so far submitted offered much prospects for agreement but that he was prepared to take a step in that direction basing himself on the Secretary’s statements that the other open questions could be easily settled if a solution for Trieste was found. As he understood M. Bidault’s suggestion it was to separate the Trieste area from Italy and place it under UN administration for a definite period, say for ten or fifteen years, and then hold a plebiscite. He felt this was a very vague solution but the idea of UN participation in this solution might be accepted if in advance there was reason to hope that such a decision would facilitate the solution of other questions. He recalled that the Secretary had said that other questions could be settled in 25 hours.
The Secretary said he felt that if we could settle Trieste, the other questions would not be too difficult and mentioned that the other questions besides Trieste were Reparations, Colonies, Dodecanese, and Navigation of the Danube.
Mr. Molotov remarked that he felt the other four treaties present no particular difficulty.
Mr. Molotov then said that his suggestion in regard to Trieste was as follows: to declare Trieste and its surrounding area autonomous district under the supreme sovereignty of Yugoslavia under an international statute to be worked out by the four powers. The legislative authority for this autonomous district should be a House of Representatives elected by the people on the basis of universal secret ballot and equal sovereignty, the Governor of the district to be appointed by Yugoslavia. Under this idea the drawing up and the responsibility for the execution of the international statute would rest on the four powers. The frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy and other parts of Venezia Giulia should be drawn according to ethnic principles. He said it would of course be necessary to draw up a careful plan for this project.
The Secretary said he thought this was quite different from M. Bidault’s plan, which provided for United Nations administration, which would mean a Governor or High Commissioner appointed by the United Nations. To leave it to Yugoslav authority and with a Yugoslav Governor he felt would cause great friction and a conflict of authority between the four powers and the Yugoslav Government. He continued that he thought that if the United Nations took over the administration they could find a neutral figure, as they have done in the case of Lie,98 to administer the problem. He felt that only under [Page 600] UN could equal rights to all nations be assured. He said if the area were placed under UN, a neutral High Commissioner or Governor could be appointed who would be responsible for the administration of the area. This would be fair to both Italy and Yugoslavia.
Mr. Molotov said that under his scheme the four nations—England, France, Soviet Union and the United States—would draw up the constitution and supervise its execution. He felt that the United Nations had so many tasks to do that it would not be able to concentrate on this problem. (In regard to Lie, Molotov had misunderstood the Secretary to mean that Lie himself should be appointed. This was cleared up.)
The Secretary repeated that under Yugoslav sovereignty with a Yugoslav Governor there would be a continual conflict between the Yugoslav Governor and the representatives of the four powers. He repeated that a satisfactory plan for UN administration could be worked out.
Mr. Molotov repeated that this would be a very vague solution and that the responsibility for administration would rest on no one country. Under such vague administration he felt that Trieste would become a fertile field for conflict and give rise to great friction.
The Secretary repeated that if a neutral Governor were appointed by UN there would be an advisory council of the representatives of the four nations. The Secretary then said that he still felt that if the Ministers could not reach a solution here the only thing to do was to refer the matter to the peace conference for recommendation. The Ministers would have done the best they could and the responsibility would then be up to the peace conference.
Mr. Molotov said he did not feel that the peace conference would be helpful. On the subject of UN administration he said that he thought that the Trusteeship Council had been created to deal with backward areas, which was not the case in regard to Trieste.
Mr. Cohen pointed out that the Charter merely referred to dependent areas.
Mr. Molotov replied that the principle of trusteeship was designed to apply to territories which were not developed politically, economically or culturally to a point where they were fit for independence.
Mr. Cohen said that if the Trusteeship Council was not suitable, the UN can set up a special commission for Trieste.
Mr. Molotov again repeated that unless one state was responsible for the administration of the area there would be great difficulty.
Mr. Cohen said that it would be particularly difficult to have a Yugoslav Governor over such an area since, as he understood Mr. Molotov, the boundary line of that area was to be drawn according to ethnic lines and this would mean predominantly Italian area.
[Page 601]Mr. Molotov explained that he had meant that the frontier in other parts of Venezia Giulia should be drawn on ethnic lines but that Trieste and surrounding areas should be separated off.
Mr. Molotov said that for example in the case of the Memel district, which had a population 75% German after the last war, the Governor General had been a Lithuanian, so that a precedent existed for such a solution. He concluded by saying that he thought M. Bidault’s proposal would only create a confused situation and that the only thing in common between his proposal and M. Bidault’s was that there should be an international statute drawn up by the four powers.
The Secretary promised to think over Mr. Molotov’s suggestion.