Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Twenty-Third Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 20, 1946, 11 a.m.⁵⁷

Paris, June 20, 1946, 11 a.m.

secret

Franco-Italian Frontier—Rectification No. 4 (Tenda–Briga Area)

M. Bidault stated that since there was no report from the Deputies he assumed that the Ministers should take up the non-economic clauses of the Italian treaty. The first point on this agenda was the Franco-Italian frontier, that is, the rectification of the Tenda–Briga area. Since this subject had been discussed by the Ministers two things had happened, i.e., representatives of the Italian Government had been heard by the Deputies and a report by the Subcommittee on Hydroelectric Experts on existing power supplies in the Tenda–Briga district (C.F.M. D–46 163) had been drawn up.⁵⁸ M. Bidault understood that this report had been adopted with one reservation. This indicated that there were no difficulties regarding the power resources of the area among the representatives in Paris. M. Bidault also understood that even the minor reservation had been removed and therefore there appeared to be no objection to the allocation of the Tenda-Briga power. In that event, the final rectification of the area could be decided upon by the Ministers.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation wished to have more time to study an Italian document that had only been received yesterday.

Mr. Bevin stated that all the Ministers agreed that the question could be settled by the Ministers. He wished to recall, however, that representations were being made regarding the Mont Cenis area. The question of these two areas were bound together since it was primarily a question of electric power. He therefore suggested that the hydroelectric experts might look into the Mont Cenis area. Mr. Bevin stated that he thought he would mention this although he did not wish to infer that the Ministers should go back on what they had agreed upon regarding the Mont Cenis area.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he associated himself with Mr. Bevin’s suggestion since he would like to know whether it would be advisable for similar arrangements to be made in connection with hydroelectric power in the Mont Cenis area.

Mr. Bevin stated that was a question of the assurance of water power in the Mont Cenis area and not so much one of electric power.

M. Bidault stated that although the Mont Cenis area was not on the Ministers’ agenda he would not object to the Deputies’ looking into the question with a view to providing for similar arrangements as they were drawn up in the Tenda–Briga area. He pointed out, however, that the question of the disposition of the Mont Cenis area had not been settled by the Deputies but by the Ministers. The question before the Ministers at the present time was the Tenda–Briga area.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had associated himself with Mr. Bevin’s proposal because he felt that it might have some effect on the decision concerning the Tenda–Briga area. The question of the sovereignty of the Mont Cenis area had been settled. Nonetheless the U.S. believed that the report of the hydroelectric experts had great merit. The duty of the Ministers was to see that they did not deprive Italy of electric power. Italy had to import coal. Mr. Byrnes hoped that M. Bidault would stand by his original agreement to permit similar arrangements to be made for the Mont Cenis area.

M. Bidault stated that his government was prepared to conclude a bilateral agreement with Italy in order to give Italy every assurance in connection with water supply. He agreed to the Tenda–Briga report. He explained that the electric power stations in the Tenda–Briga area which was claimed by the French represented less than one per cent of the hydroelectric output of Italy. Approximately 150 million kilowatt hours came annually from the Tenda–Briga area. France was able to purchase power from Italy up to 700 million kilowatt hours a year. This showed that current was available. M. Bidault stated that France could reduce its contract with Italy by 150 million kilowatt hours. He maintained that the Tenda–Briga power stations were not essential to Italian economy. He said that it was not correct that Italy needed electric power from this area and this was proved by the fact that France was offered 700 million kilowatt hours a year, which represented 4½ times the amount of power produced in the Tenda–Briga valley. He also wished to point out that the Mont Cenis power stations which would be ceded to France produced 25 million kilowatt hours a year or 0.01 per cent of Italian output.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation had only yesterday received a new document on this subject from the Italian Embassy. He wished to study this document before expressing a final view.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he understood that Mr. Molotov had requested postponement.

M. Bidault said that he wished to observe that the French Government had made considerable sacrifices in fulfilling the requests of the French speaking population on the eastern slopes of the Alps. This must be taken into consideration. He then suggested that the Ministers pass to the second point on the agenda.

Treaty Commission (Allied Inspectorate—Articles 76 and 62)⁵⁹

M. Bidault stated that Article 76 contained U.S. and U.K. proposals. The French Delegation was in favor of establishing a treaty commission. The Soviet Delegation proposed deletion. M. Bidault inquired whether there were any new, or even old, observations on this question.

Mr. Molotov stated that the main point was that the treaty commission would have an effect upon the general relations of the four powers with Italy. Yesterday Italy was a great power. Today that country had not emerged from the position it had been placed in as a result of the position it took in the war. However, in the future Italy would become a great power. At the present time Italy had embarked on a democratic road and had elected a republican form of government. The Ministers should take these facts into account. The Soviet Government believed that it would be incorrect to have a clause in the peace treaty with Italy which would be a contradiction to the sovereignty of Italy. All the Ministers contemplated the admission of Italy into the United Nations in the near future. Mr. Molotov repeated that the Soviet Government believed it necessary to delete Article 76. In its place he suggested an Article in the treaty which would provide that control be exercised over the fulfillment of the treaty over a period of twelve months by the Ambassadors in Rome of the four powers who would act in concert. This would suffice to safeguard the interests of the Allies and would avoid anything which might have adverse effect on the national feelings of the Italian people.

Mr. Byrnes inquired whether he understood Mr. Molotov’s proposal to mean that a clause would be inserted in the treaty to the effect that the four Ambassadors would undertake to solve any treaty disputes. Mr. Byrnes stated that he was willing to agree to that proposal.

Mr. Bevin stated that the U.K. Delegation wished to make it clear that the United Kingdom never desired to interfere with the sovereignty of Italy after the peace treaty had been signed. It merely wished to set up some machinery to carry out the provisions of the treaty. Mr. Bevin stated that subject to what the Deputies might work out, Mr. Molotov’s remarks constituted a great step in advance and one which might well be realized.

M. Bidault stated that he understood that there had been general agreement among the Deputies on Mr. Molotov’s proposal and that the Deputies should put this proposal into final shape.

Withdrawal of Allied Troops

M. Bidault referred to Article 64 of the Italian treaty, which contained U.S. and U.K. proposals.⁶⁰ He expressed the hope that agreement might be reached on this Article, thus making it possible to consider today as a red-letter day. He said that the French Delegation was ready to accept either proposal or any compromise solution.

Mr. Bevin stated that Mr. Molotov had raised the question of the retention of troops for maintaining communications to Austria. If the Austrian question were settled this problem would not arise. If it were not settled the British could maintain lines of communication through Germany subject to U.S. agreement. There was another point in this connection. Mr. Bevin referred to the decision reached in London regarding Bulgaria.⁶¹ He said that the British Delegation was anxious that the London decision be confirmed and that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Bulgaria. If Allied troops should be withdrawn from Italy the withdrawal of the Soviet troops should be on the same basis. Mr. Bevin stated that he was ready to withdraw all British troops from Italy 90 days after the signing of the treaty. He was anxious to get these troops out. He referred to the latter part of the Soviet proposal concerning unused currency and property and stated he could not accept this part of the Soviet proposal at the present time. This matter was dealt with under the revised armistice terms. The British Government was returning unused currency and property and was extending credits to the Italian Government but he would agree to the withdrawal of British troops 90 days after the signing of the treaty subject to arrangements made with the U.S. Government on the supplying of British troops in Austria through U.S. zone in Germany. This, however, might not be necessary if the Allied troops in Austria were withdrawn. He proposed to let the London agreement on Bulgaria stand and stated that he preferred the first two lines of the U.S. proposal subject to the points he had already made. He said that he wanted to make it clear that he did not expect that these reservations would be in the Italian treaty.

Mr. Byrnes said that some doubts might be raised as to the exact meaning of the words in the Soviet proposal reading “after conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy.” Would it not be better to use the words of the American draft which read “upon the coming into force of the treaty”. In order to come to agreement he would not oppose the second part of the Soviet proposal regarding unused currency and property.

Mr. Molotov stated that in connection with the withdrawal of Allied forces from Italy it would be acceptable to the Soviet Government to make the same decision regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Bulgaria. With regard to the passage of British troops through the U.S. zone in Germany, this was a matter which concerned the U.S. Government. He hoped that since the U.S. Government enjoyed facilities in the British zone for the transportation of American troops whenever necessary it would be agreeable to the U.S. to grant similar facilities to the United Kingdom. Mr. Molotov continued that all the nations were anxious not to postpone the withdrawal of Allied troops. He continued that he thought it hardly necessary to fix a time limit of 90 days. Perhaps this might be reduced since there was sufficient time to prepare in advance for the withdrawals. Similar measures would be taken in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Bulgaria.

Mr. Molotov stated that the fact is known that the Italian people are anxious to see the Allied armies of occupation withdrawn from Italy as soon as possible. This is quite understandable. However, there is another question; namely, why certain steps of a military nature have been taken in Italy. Mr. Molotov referred to the construction of new airfields and the extension of existing air facilities. He said the Foggia Airfield is reported to have been extended. This created the impression that Allied troops proposed to stay in Italy for a long time and created suspicion among the Italians. Measures should be taken not to increase Italian concern in this connection. This should be avoided. Steps must be taken to expedite the withdrawal of Allied troops. This is in accordance with the interests of the Allies and would be welcomed by Italy. This should be kept in mind when decisions are made concerning the withdrawal of Allied forces.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the reason he had suggested the language “upon the coming into force” instead of “after conclusion” was because he did not know exactly what was meant by the conclusion of the peace treaty.

Mr. Molotov said that this meant the signature of the treaty.

Mr. Byrnes referred to the final clauses of the treaty which stated that it would come into force immediately upon the deposit of ratifications by France, U.K., U.S. and U.S.S.R. That was the definite time fixed by the treaty and it would be preferable to adhere to that time rather than to state that the withdrawal would take place after the conclusion of the treaty. As to what Mr. Molotov had said regarding the passage of British troops through the American zone in Germany the position of the U.S. Government was that it desired foreign troops to be removed from areas of occupation as soon possible. If the U.S. could make arrangements which would help the British to expedite and facilitate the withdrawal of such troops it would do so. Concerning Mr. Molotov’s suggestion that the 90-day period be decreased Mr. Byrnes stated that he was not a military man. He had been advised that it would take some time to make arrangements for the withdrawal. He would like to say “not later than 90 days” so as to make it clear that the armies of occupation did not have to stay 90 days in Italy. Mr. Byrnes continued that he did not know anything about the reports concerning the enlarging of the airfields in Italy. He could say, however, that if the Ministers did what they should do in Paris, that is, conclude a peace treaty with Italy, U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Italy within 90 days. Mr. Byrnes stated that he heard reports every day on what Soviet troops were doing in Austria and Bulgaria and from these reports it would seem that these troops intended to stay in those countries for some time. He did not believe these reports and he recommended that his friend, Mr. Molotov, also disbelieve many of the reports he might hear.

M. Bidault stated in summary that he did not believe that the Ministers were far from agreement. The Soviet Delegation had been asked to substitute the words “after conclusion” with the words “upon the coming into force.” The U.S. and U.K. had been asked to agree to keep in the last part of the Soviet proposal concerning unused currency and property. M. Bidault suggested that the Soviet Delegation might accept the words “upon the coming into force” and the U.K. and U.S. Delegations might be asked to accept the last part of the Soviet proposal.

Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he agreed.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would like to ask his financial experts to look into the second part of the Soviet proposal. He was not well informed on this point. However, he would agree in principle to M. Bidault’s suggestion. It was possible that some words might be needed to safeguard the British position. There might be an overlapping period during which unused currency and property should be returned. However, with this reservation as to drafting he would agree. He explained that under the revised armistice terms the British have returned to Italy unused currency. They did not obviously wish to pay twice. He suggested that the financial experts look over Article 21 of the Rumanian treaty⁶² which had been agreed upon by all. This question, it seemed to him, was better expressed in the Rumanian treaty.

M. Bidault said that it appeared that agreement in principle had been reached on Article 64 and that it only remained to draft the final text of this Article. He was glad to find that out of three questions two were immediately agreed upon. He did not wish to comment any further on the fact that no immediate agreement had been reached on the question of the Italian-French frontier.

Restricted Meetings of the C.F.M.

M. Bidault stated that the next item on the agenda was a very important one. Would it not be advisable to adjourn for the time being.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he agreed to adjourn. He suggested that the Ministers revert to the smaller meetings as they had done during the first Paris session. He proposed that the Ministers meet at four or five o’clock this afternoon.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would agree to start the smaller meetings. He wondered whether the smaller meetings could really be informal or more informal than the larger ones and whether subjects could be discussed frankly and views exchanged in the smaller groups. He suggested that such exchanges of views not be released to the press.

M. Bidault supported the views expressed by Mr. Bevin. He believed that the meetings should be really informal. He offered as a possible suggestion that the four Ministers and two interpreters proposed by them constitute the small meetings.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was not thinking so much of the number of representatives. He continued that in making peace treaties if the Council of Foreign Ministers could not have really informal talks without being criticized by the press they might as well continue to have large meetings. He said that the Ministers must be able to speak frankly in order better to understand each other on the many important questions involved.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation did not object to the proposals advanced. He was willing to have a restricted meeting this afternoon. He remarked that usually the Soviet press was unable to catch up as quickly with what was going on as the press of the other countries.

M. Bidault inquired as to what form the afternoon meeting would be in. He said that he would not insist on his suggestion—it might be reverted to at a later stage. Would one Minister with two advisers and one interpreter meet this afternoon or would the meeting be more limited. As to the press the French had no fear since their position was absolutely clear. As far as he was concerned the meeting could take place at Place de la Concorde. He said that he was also convinced that the meetings should be really informal if any useful work was to be done.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he knew nothing about the press. In London it had been agreed that no statements would be made and for this reason all the correspondents had stopped speaking to him. He had read what they had written and they apparently had pretty good reports on what was going on. He didn’t know how to handle the press, he never did know how and he was too old to learn at the present time. However, he would agree to either proposal concerning the informal meetings. If the Ministers so desired, each delegation could be made up of four representatives as in the past. If no headway was made in these meetings the representation could be limited to the Ministers alone and the interpreters. He preferred, however, to follow the previous example.

Mr. Bevin stated that he agreed.

M. Bidault stated that according to his understanding his colleagues had agreed to resume the former procedure concerning the informal meetings. If no favorable results were obtained some other formula might be attempted.

It was agreed that the Ministers would meet at five o’clock p.m. and that M. Bidault would act as Chairman.

Meeting adjourned.

57. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
58. At their 54th meeting, May 27, 1946, 4 p.m., the Deputies heard the representative of the Italian Government on the question of the rectification of the Franco-Italian frontier in the Upper Valley of the Roya. At their following meeting on May 28, 11 a.m., the deputies decided to establish a Committee of Experts on Hydro-Electric Power to examine certain problems concerning the valley of the Upper Roya. The Report of this Committee of Experts, C.F.M.(D) (46) 163, June 11, 1946, which was approved by the Deputies at their 72nd Meeting, June 13, is printed on p. 483.

59. In the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, C.F.M.(D) (46) 177, Part IX Treaty Commission, Article 76 reads as follows (brackets appear in the source text and indicate unagreed language):

    “(U.S. and U.K. proposal):

    • [a. There shall be established a ‘Treaty Commission’ which shall consist of Commissioners appointed by the Governments of France, the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. The Italian Government shall appoint a representative with the necessary powers to represent it before the Commission and its agencies.
    • b. The Commission shall perform such functions as are assigned to it by the provisions of the present Treaty and for this purpose shall have both executive and judicial powers. The Commission may set up subsidiary sections with authority to deal with particular subjects such as military matters, reparations, restitution, and war criminals. The Commission shall carry out the tasks assigned to it as soon as possible and in any event shall complete its work within a period of eighteen months after the coming into force of the present Treaty.
    • c. Italy undertakes to provide the Commission and its authorised agencies with all information and facilities necessary to the accomplishment of its task, including the grant of diplomatic immunities. The personal compensation and living expenses of the Commissioners and other persons appointed by each Government to serve with the Commission will be borne by that Government. All other expenses of the Commission will be borne by Italy.
    • (U.K. Delegation propose to add):
    • The Allied Inspectorate established under Article 62 of the present Treaty will be subsidiary section of the Treaty Commission responsible for military matters.]

    (Soviet Delegation propose deletion).

    (French Delegation is in favour of the establishment of a Treaty Commission).”

    C.F.M.(D) (46) 177, Section VIII—Verification Section of Treaty Commission—Article 62, reads as follows:

    “Text proposed by U.K. Delegation:

    • [(1) An Allied Inspectorate composed of representatives of the U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and France will be established to verify the execution of the naval, military and air clauses of the present Treaty.
    • (2) The Italian Authorities will provide the ‘Inspectorate’ with all necessary information and facilities required for the execution of its mission including access to establishments and to any necessary documents, freedom of movement throughout Italy, the grant of diplomatic immunity and provision of suitable accommodation and of such Italian currency as may be required.
    • (3) The ‘Allied Inspectorate’ will represent the Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Italian Government in all matters concerning the execution of the military, naval and air clauses and will be the sole authority to which the Italian Government will refer questions regarding the interpretation and fulfilment of these clauses.
    • (4) The ‘Allied Inspectorate’ will render to the Italian Government such guidance, technical advice and clarification on the military, naval and air clauses as may be necessary to permit rapid and efficient compliance with the spirit and terms of the Treaty.]

    Text proposed by U.S. Delegation:

    [To verify the fulfilment of the naval, military and air articles of this treaty, a Verification Section of the Treaty Commission referred to in Article 76 will be established on the coming into force of this treaty, to be composed of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France, to which Commission the Italian Government undertakes to provide all information and facilities required by it for the execution of its task. The Verification Section will be disbanded when Articles—to—inclusive, have been complied with, or six months after Italy becomes a member of the United Nations, whichever is sooner.

    The Verification Section of the Treaty Commission will be established for the purpose of rendering to the Italian Government such guidance, technical advice and clarification on all naval, military and air articles of this Treaty as may be necessary to permit rapid and efficient compliance with the spirit and terms of the Treaty. The Verification Section of the Treaty Commission shall be the sole authority, during the period for which it is authorized to act, to which the Italian Government will refer questions regarding the fulfilment of the Articles.]

    (Soviet delegation propose deletion of Section VIII.)”

60. The Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, C.F.M.(D) (46) 177, Part V, Withdrawal of Allied Forces, Article 64, reads as follows (brackets appear in the source text and indicate unagreed language):

    1. Proposal by the Soviet Delegation.

    [After conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Italy all Allied Armed Forces shall be withdrawn from Italy in the course of ..... days, and all unused requisitioned currency and property shall be returned to the Italian Government in the course of the same ..... days.]

    2. Proposal by the U.S. Delegation.

    [Upon the coming into force of the Treaty all Allied Armed Forces shall, within a period of ..... days, be withdrawn from Italy. The United Kingdom and the United States are authorized to retain on Italian territory a maximum of ..... military personnel for the maintenance of lines of communication until the Allied Forces in Austria have been withdrawn.]

    3. The U.K. Delegation Agree to this proposal.

    4. The French Delegation is prepared to agree to either proposal.

61. The reference here is to the decision on the withdrawal of Allied forces from Bulgaria, taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers at their First Session (London), 16th Meeting, September 21, 1945, 4 p.m. For the Record of Decisions of that meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol ii, p. 298.
62. For article 21 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania as referred to the Paris Peace Conference, see vol. iv, p. 68.