C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Seventh Informal Meeting, Paris, May 15, 1946, 11 a.m.
Present
| U.K. | ||
| Mr. Bevin, Chairman | ||
| Sir Oliver Harvey | ||
| Mr. Hall-Patch | ||
| Sir William Strang (Interpreter) | ||
| U.S. | France | |
| Mr. Byrnes | M. Bidault | |
| Senator Connally | M. Couve de Murville | |
| Senator Vandenberg | M. Hervé Alphand | |
| General Clay | M. Courcel (Interpreter) | |
| Mr. Bohlen | ||
| U.S.S.R. | ||
| M. Molotov | ||
| M. Vyshinsky | ||
| (Two Interpreters) |
Mr. Bevin was in the Chair and asked M. Bidault if he would care to present the French position in regard to the German question.
M. Bidault said that during 150 years Germany had seven times invaded France and there was hardly a French adult who did not remember the last two. Each of these invasions had been worse than its predecessor. This last time, in spite of French efforts and to their sorrow, their participation had been shorter and less effective than before. In each succeeding case the loss and damage had been greater. That is why the question of security continues to be the chief preoccupation of the French Government and people. This quest for security is not a timid and passive policy. In French eyes security is based on three elements: (1) Concrete guarantees against a recrudescence of German aggression; (2) Solid friendships with other countries; and (3) The Organization of the United Nations.
He said France had made its views known on the German question, particularly the western frontier of Germany, to all his colleagues and had pursued these desires with consistency. For France the German question was primarily a security and political problem. The French do not ignore the economic problems and consequences of a political decision, but he said he wished to emphasize that the essential principles and the impulses behind the French proposals have been and are political.
As to economics, it was probable that the Austrian-Hungarian Empire had been the best economic organization of the Danube Basin before the last war, but for political reasons, it had to be brought up [broken up] and that this had been a good thing. By like analogy, it is possible that from a purely economic point of view “Grosse Deutschland” was desirable since it produced a balance in central and northwestern Europe between agriculture and industry. The Allied Armies had broken up this economic marvel and had done well. He said he did not deny that political security was the chief motivation of the proposals, but this did not mean that these proposals were not economically feasible. He said that France had circulated documents beginning last September and as late as April setting forth its suggestions.45 He would, therefore, be as brief as possible and give only supplementary explanations.
The French proposals in regard to Germany could be divided into three parts: (1) The Ruhr, (2) The Rhineland, and (3) The Saar. As to the Ruhr, it was an immense factory and a chief coal center of Europe. The Rhineland was an agricultural, thinly populated area which had served as a corridor for the invasions of France. The Saar [Page 395] was a small territory which had been taken from France after the first invasion, but the coal mines in that area had been given back to France after the first world war.
The Ruhr, because of its resources and power, could easily serve as a new source of German aggression. It was in order to guarantee against the riches of the Ruhr being used by German military aggression that the French proposed political separation under international control. This international control would be both political and economic in character and all interested countries would take part in its organization. The chief role, of course, would be assigned to the countries most interested. This internationalization should be guaranteed by international force. The coal mines and certain industrial enterprises would be placed under international control for the good of all. The local inhabitants would be granted wide powers of self-government. He said that the French do not believe that without political separation it would be possible to assure that the economic power and resources of this area would not be used for aggressive purposes if political sovereignty was left to Germany. The French proposal meant the exploitation of the Ruhr for the good of the European countries. The Ruhr arsenal had supplied Germany with three-fourths of its coal, steel, pig iron and rolling metals. Only non-German political control would prevent its being used for German rearmament which we all wished permanently to prevent. He said it would be possible to make arrangements so that part of its surplus would be available to Germany in order to pay for essential imports.
As to the Rhineland, M. Bidault continued, there should be permanent military forces stationed on the left bank of the Rhine. France would provide the forces for that area which lies along the French border. For the north, Belgium and Holland, and Great Britain if the latter desired, could take on the task. Provided the left bank of the Rhine was not returned to Germany, France was ready to accept a political regime based on that province alone, or combined with other German provinces. Provided the local population accepted demilitarization and Allied occupation, they could be given full self-government.
With regard to the Saar, M. Bidault said that on the 18th of February the French Government had informed the other three Governments of its attitude on this question.46 France did not wish annexation, but merely a solution that would be in accord with security [Page 396] and common sense. After the first world war the mines had become the property of France and they should be returned and should be brought within the French customs and monetary systems. The public services of the Saar should be detached from the Reich and France should have political and military control over the area, but leaving civil administration to the local population. Some might think that France had advanced these proposals with some obstinacy, but he wished to emphasize that they were more than important, even vital, for France. He thought if these concrete considerations could be satisfied on the basis of the French reasonable proposals that a great step forward in the peace of the world would be achieved.
M. Molotov said that the British Government was closer to the Ruhr and could perhaps inform them what was going on there and what plans are being drawn up for the future.
Mr. Bevin said that the British position was that the German problem as a whole should be discussed. He said he could not discuss only their zone. Their ideas on the Ruhr question were not so far from those of the French except on the question of political separation. The real question was what is to be the future of Germany. Is it, as was stated at Potsdam, to be under a centralized government, or is it to be federative and is there to be further detachments as was done in the East in regard to the line of the Oder and Silesia? The present level of German industry as set at Potsdam has made the Ruhr a liability of England. He said they could not discuss merely one aspect of the question, but they must know the policy as a whole and the policy in regard to the other zones.
Mr. Bevin said the British had a completely open mind on the subject of Germany, including the Ruhr. As to the Ruhr he saw two aspects, one relating to security and the other to the proper organization of its industries and resources in order to afford the greatest help to the raising of the European standard of living. The question was, then, could the resources of the Ruhr be used for this latter purpose without endangering the security. That was indeed a troublesome question. Like France, England had had two wars which stemmed in large part from the power of the Ruhr. If they could decide what was to be the attitude of all of us towards the future of Germany, then it would be possible to settle the economic questions and at the same time provide security. He wished to know the views of his colleagues in regard to this question and he would then give them the most careful study. England would then be in a position to give a positive statement of its position. He felt that the question of Germany was the most difficult one that was before the Foreign Ministers and on their decisions hinged the possibility of one hundred [Page 397] years of peace or the threat of another war. He said that they would discuss all and any aspects of the German question, but he did not feel that it would be a good basis for peace to leave a large mass of people in the center of Europe with sub-standard living conditions. He said the political, military and economic life of other countries, such as Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg would be affected by our decisions and their interest must be borne in mind. He said economically many of these countries lived by what is called finishing industries on products coming from the heavy industries of the Ruhr. He said he would ask his colleagues to consider one vital point, namely, whether it was wise to keep the level of production so low in the Ruhr, or whether it would be best to raise it if it could be done without danger to security.
M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation would like to hear what the other delegations better acquainted with the situation had to say. He wished to know what developments, both political and economic, had occurred there since the end of the war and what useful conclusions could be drawn not only for the future of the Ruhr but for the future of all Germany.
Mr. Bevin said he could not be drawn into making a report on the Ruhr alone. That would be singling out one zone for special treatment when it is all Germany that is at issue. He said M. Bidault’s proposal related to the future of the Ruhr, but he would like to know what is to be the future of Germany. If common ground could be found for Germany as a whole, it would be possible to decide what would be the role of the Ruhr, whether within or without Germany.
M. Bidault replied that France had good reason for being interested in the future of Germany and, in fact, the issue is what is to be the composition and size of Germany; what is to be its extent? Is it to approach the doorstep of France, or is it to be reduced?
Mr. Byrnes said as he understood it, M. Bidault wished early consideration of his proposal and Mr. Bevin wished consideration of Germany as a whole. He agreed with both points of view. He said at Potsdam there had been an agreement which undertook to regard Germany as an economic whole. He thought the time had come to see what goal we were working towards in regard to Germany. It had two aspects, the long range and the short range.
Mr. Byrnes then read and distributed the American Delegation’s proposal concerning the appointment of special deputies to study the German question, with a view to having prepared the draft settlement for submission to a conference to be called on November 12, 1946 (copy attached).47 Mr. Byrnes said that under the present arrangements [Page 398] whereby certain of the Potsdam decisions were being carried out, but not on the basis of treating Germany as a whole, it would have cost the United States two hundred million dollars by July 1, 1946 for essential food imports into our zone, and it was estimated that for the coming fiscal year another two hundred million would be required. He said he thought it was essential to begin to work on the long term policy towards Germany in order to make possible the execution of the Potsdam economic clause and particularly reparations.
Mr. Byrnes then read his statement containing the five questions which he felt the special deputies should be asked to report on at the June 15 meeting of the Foreign Ministers since answers to these questions were essential if the reparations program was to be carried out. (Copy of five questions attached.)48
M. Bidault said that the US proposal deserved study. He said he thought it would be useful to take a decision in principle along the lines of the French proposal in regard to the Saar and then let these special deputies work out the details.
M. Molotov said the US proposal should be studied closely. He said that they were all studying the German question but as he understood the French proposal, they were primarily interested in the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar, and, in his opinion, this was understandable since the Ruhr was not one of the problems relating to Germany, but a German war potential and therefore a special question. He said he did not wish to object to Mr. Bevin’s statement concerning the importance of separating the Ruhr question from the entire German question. He said he thought, however, that Potsdam provided a basis for Allied policy in regard to Germany during the occupation period and he assumed that all desired to adhere to the Potsdam decisions. He took note, however, of the position of France and said he wished to study her proposals. He recalled that at Potsdam the Soviet Delegation had taken the initiative to discuss the Ruhr, but had been told it was impossible without participation of France. The matter was then postponed because of this attitude of the British and US Delegations, but now France was present. He said the Soviet Government would still like to know what was going on in the Ruhr. He said they had heard that the British were taking some measures to control the coal and heavy industry in the Ruhr. Last December the Soviet Delegation had asked for information and on January 21 the British Government had replied that the information had already been given to the Coordinating Committee of the Control Council. He said the Soviet Government was receiving its information from unofficial sources in [Page 399] regard to plans for the future administration of the Ruhr as well as the role of certain German corporations. He said they would like to have more definite information on what was going on. The Ruhr is the center of German heavy industry and if not four-fifths at least three-fourths of the military potential of Germany. Not only the Soviet Union but all the peoples of Europe who had been victims of German aggression would like to know what plans the British authorities had in regard to this area. He said, in conclusion, that he agreed that the future of Germany as a whole must be studied without delay, but he repeated the Soviet Delegation’s desires to know what was the present situation in the Ruhr and whether developments there were taking the proper course. He said they were interested in what was going on and did not think we should get our feet off the ground and ignore reality. He said this question deserved most careful attention.
Mr. Bevin said that the British Government would supply to the Control Council any information that was desired but he could not continue to entertain complaints in regard to the British zone alone. He said they would like information as to what is going on in Saxony and Thuringia. He objected to the British zone being singled out for propaganda purposes.
M. Molotov objected to the word “propaganda” and
Mr. Bevin withdrew it and explained that he felt it was being constantly implied that Great Britain was doing something wrong.
It was agreed that the Ministers should meet at 5 p.m. that afternoon to discuss Mr. Byrnes’ proposal concerning the fixing of a date for a peace conference and adjournment of the Council until June 15. It was also agreed they would reassemble in restricted session to discuss Germany at 11 a.m. the next morning.
Before breaking up, however, Mr. Byrnes raised the question of the participation of China as a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He said the matter had been raised by M. Bidault at their last meeting but no decision was taken. The US was of the opinion that China, as a member of the Council, had a right to participate in the discussion of the German question, but he recognized that since the Chinese Foreign Minister was not in Paris it would not be possible to invite him.
M. Molotov said that there were countries more directly interested than China, for example Belgium, Holland, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which should be invited equally with China.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that interested countries could be invited to participate but that, although interested, they were not regular members, of the Council of Foreign Ministers as was China.
[Page 400]- Reference here is to the French memorandum on the control and administration of Germany, C.F.M.(45) 17, September 13, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 177 and the French memorandum on Germany, C.F.M. (46) 1, April 25, 1946, p. 109.↩
- The substance of the French Ambassador’s aide-mémoire of February 18, 1946, to the Secretary of State is set forth in the memorandum of February 28, 1946, from H. Freeman Matthews to the Secretary of State, vol. v, p. 507. The text of a note of February 12, 1946, to the United States, British, and Soviet Ambassadors, which is virtually identical with the French Ambassador’s aide-mémoire of February 18, is printed in Documents Français relatifs à L’Allemagne (août 1945–février 1947) (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), p. 17.↩
- Annex 1, p. 400.↩
- Annex 2, p. 400.↩