Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Eighteenth Meeting, Paris, May 15, 1946, 5 p.m.⁴⁹

Paris, May 15, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Report of the Committee on Italian Reparation

M. Bidault opened the meeting and called on the Chairman of the Committee on Italian Reparation to present the Committee’s report.

M. Dekanosov reported that the Committee on Reparation had met on May 14 and 15 to discuss the question of sources from which reparation could be paid by Italy to the Soviet Union. The Committee had not arrived at a unanimous conclusion and was therefore forced, as on the occasion of its previous report,⁵⁰ to submit statements of the different views of its members.⁵¹ The main difference which had arisen concerned the possible sources of reparation payments to the Soviet Union. Some delegations had maintained that certain sources could not be included among those under discussion for this purpose. The United States representative, for example, had held that there could be only four sources of reparation payments, namely (1) Italian assets in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary; (2) the Italian passenger vessels “Vulcania” and “Saturnia” which are at present being operated by the American authorities; (3) factory and tool equipment designed for the manufacture of war implements which is not required for the permitted military establishments and is not readily susceptible of conversion to civilian purposes; (4) that part of the Italian Navy which will be alloted to the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative had considered that it was not possible to include item 4 above as a source or reparations to the Soviet Union because in his view the Italian fleet was war booty. The United States and United Kingdom representatives believed that it was possible to consider these naval vessels as reparation, the French representative had not stated a view on the point and the Soviet representative had not agreed to the view held by his American and British colleagues. Furthermore, the Soviet representative held the view that among the principal sources of reparation to the Soviet Union should be included Italian current production. While the United States and United Kingdom representatives had not agreed to this view, the French representative had favored it although making the reservation that his Government’s view must be considered as stated in the French memorandum CFM(46)20.⁵² In the course of the discussion the United States representative said that, according to estimates made by American experts, if the Italian Navy should be used as a source of reparation it would not be necessary to consider reparations from current production; one hundred million dollars would be provided from sources other than current production.

M. Dekanosov continued his exposition of the discussion which had taken place in the Committee. In regard to the Italian assets in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, the Soviet representative had valued them at $22,000,000. The United States representative had placed their value at $75,000,000. Both representatives made the reservation that their estimates were of a rough nature. The United States representative had said that he considered the figures which he gave as not exact, particularly where they related to Hungary. In regard to the two merchant vessels which the American representative suggested be turned over to the Soviet Union as reparation, he stated their value to be $25,000,000. The Soviet representative had said that he could not accept that valuation as binding. He said that the Soviet Government should be given the opportunity to satisfy itself concerning the condition of the two ships and to find out whether it actually needed them. It should also be able to make its own estimate of their actual value. Without that, it was impossible to include the value stated by the United States representative in the amount of reparation to be paid by Italy to the Soviet Union. With respect to the use of plant equipment and machine tools of Italian war industries for reparation, an exchange of views in the Committee had resulted in the general view that these goods could be used as a source of reparation. The Soviet representative had stated that they could be considered as a supplementary source of reparation but not as one of the principal sources.

M. Dekanosov concluded that it was understandable that the Committee had not been able to accomplish the task which had been set for it by the Council, namely, to define the source of reparation from which $100,000,000 in commodities could be paid to the Soviet Union. There had been differences of view in the Committee concerning what should be the main source of reparation. These differences of view appeared in the separate statements made by the various delegations which appear in the report.

M. Molotov suggested that the Council refer the report of the Committee to the Deputies for consideration, since it was obvious that agreement had not been reached.

All delegations agreed.

Proposal for Adjournment of the Council and for the Convocation of a Peace Conference

Mr. Bevin said that the next item to be discussed was the question of procedure raised by the proposal which Mr. Byrnes had made on the previous day. This proposal contained four points, which might be taken up in order.⁵³

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had no objection to paragraph one of the United States proposal.

All delegations agreed to paragraph one.

With respect to paragraph two, M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation was ready to agree either to July 1 or July 15 as the date for the Peace Conference, under the reservation which had been made by the Soviet Delegation to paragraph b of Mr. Byrnes’ original proposal.⁵⁴

Mr. Bevin asked whether it was clear what the Council was discussing.

M. Molotov stated that Mr. Byrnes’ original proposal had consisted of two paragraphs designated as “a” and “b”. The Soviet Delegation had made a reservation with respect to paragraph b, a reservation to the effect that it should be borne in mind that agreement should be reached on the draft peace treaties. The Soviet Delegation was pressing for this amendment since it followed from the decision adopted by the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December.

Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to reiterate, in as few words as he could, his interest in having the Council agree at this time to call the Peace Conference and to fix the date. When the matter had been discussed on a former occasion he had suggested to M. Molotov that he would agree to the language the latter had proposed in his amendment provided that it was agreed to insert the words “as far as possible” after the phrase “it being understood that the proposed treaties will be agreed upon.” M. Molotov had stated that this was understood, that such a limitation was always present in human affairs He (Mr. Byrnes) now wished to ask M. Molotov again whether, if that thought was understood, he would consent to the inclusion of those words in the paragraph. He recalled that at Moscow the three Foreign Ministers had discussed this matter one evening with Generalissimo Stalin.⁵⁵ The next day M. Molotov had advised him (Mr. Byrnes) that the Soviet Government would agree to the holding of a peace conference.⁵⁶ It was then provided that the Peace Conference should be held not later than May 1. He submitted that the Council should not recess its present session without making a positive statement that the Conference would be held simply because it was insisted that the treaties must be entirely agreed upon before the Conference met. He was sure that it would create a very bad impression throughout the world. It must be remembered that not long ago the four governments represented at the table, with freedom hanging in the balance and with soldiers dying on the battle fields, had not hesitated to call on those twenty-one governments to give aid. They had given their men and their wealth. He did not think that the four governments should hesitate now to call on those other governments and invite them to a conference to give their views. Then in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference the Council of Foreign Ministers would write the final texts of the treaties.

Mr. Byrnes said that he knew that the argument was made that if the four powers could not agree there was no chance for twenty-one governments to make helpful recommendations. He disagreed with that argument. He thought that that might be very helpful. He knew that the governments of the world would feel much better if they were invited to a conference where there were a few matters in disagreement and were not merely called upon to give formal approval to treaties already fully agreed. They wanted to contribute to the discussion and to make their views known before final agreements were reached. He therefore hoped that M. Molotov could agree to accept the words “as far as possible”, and then with the holding of the Peace Conference assured, the Council of Foreign Ministers would work out agreement on every possible item.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had not objected to the fixing of a time for the Peace Conference. With respect to the inclusion of the words “as far as possible”, however, that would be in conflict with the decision taken at the Moscow Conference. There was no such reservation included in the Moscow decisions, which stated clearly that the draft treaties should be completed prior to the convocation of the Conference. The Soviet Delegation, of course, attached great importance to the recommendations which might be adopted by the Conference. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the reply made by Mr. Byrnes to the inquiry of the French Government gave a clear answer to that question. That letter served as the basis of the Soviet view on that point.

Mr. Byrnes wished to ask M. Molotov a specific question. The latter had said that he had no objection to fixing the date of the Peace Conference. Why could they not then agree on July 1st? If by July 1st there had not been complete agreement on the part of the four governments represented here, what, in M. Molotov’s view, would then become of the Peace Conference?

M. Molotov thought that the reply to Mr. Byrnes’ question was obvious. There would be sufficient time and possibilities, through the work of the Deputies before June 15 and the completion of that work by the Foreign Ministers at their next session, to complete preparation of the drafts and to hold the Peace Conference. In any case, the Council could take stock of the results reached by the Deputies and by the Ministers and would then be able to decide what was to be done about the Peace Conference and about the treaties.

M. Molotov wished, for his part, to ask Mr. Byrnes a question which he had previously asked the other day. What would happen at the Peace Conference if the necessary preparation was not done by the four powers and if the latter presented several drafts of each treaty? Would some of the delegations at the Peace Conference sign one set of treaties and other delegations sign others? Would it not create the impression that instead of holding one conference they were holding two conferences?

Mr. Byrnes said that his position in the matter of submitting draft treaties to the Peace Conference was that under no circumstances would there be more than one draft submitted for each treaty of peace. If, for example, the Council had not reached agreement on the question of the Franco-Italian frontier, they would merely include in the draft treaty with Italy to be submitted to the Conference the simple statement: “Franco-Italian frontier, not decided.” Then the Peace Conference might or might not make a recommendation to the Council on that question. Whether or not it did make a recommendation, the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet again after the adjournment of the Conference and would draft the final treaty with Italy. At that time the Council would decide the treaty clause to be included on the question of the Franco-Italian frontier.

Mr. Byrnes said that there would be no real difficulty in working out draft treaties to be submitted to the Peace Conference if, working together as partners, he and his colleagues could get together and use to good advantage the time remaining. It should be possible to agree on draft treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland before the date of the opening of the Peace Conference. He hoped that that date could be fixed now and that the Council would then make every effort to agree on everything possible before then.

M. Molotov said that he would like to add that he agreed there might be questions on which complete agreed texts had not been prepared. Those points should be mentioned in the draft treaties with a notation to the effect that they remained open and would be subsequently submitted to the Conference. The Council had already decided to leave open the question of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. That question could either be referred to the Council for further consideration or submitted to the Peace Conference. There might be other similar questions. Also there was one peace treaty on which no disagreements remained, namely the treaty with Finland. On the other hand, in other peace treaties fundamental questions were still outstanding. It was difficult to imagine the submission of these treaties with major questions remaining unsettled. For example, the question of reparation from Italy for Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, and the Soviet Union had not yet been decided. It did not seem possible to present a draft peace treaty with notes to the effect that questions such as that remained in disagreement. According to what Mr. Byrnes had said, such draft treaties would not even contain statements of the views of the different delegations on those questions. Such drafts would show that the Council had not completed its work. It was really necessary to reach agreement on these points. M. Molotov did not consider that there were any insurmountable obstacles in the way of such agreement.

Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to have a clear understanding concerning one statement which M. Molotov had made. The latter had said that he was willing to have a date fixed for the Peace Conference. Then let that date be fixed for July 1 or July 15, and invitations could be sent to the twenty-one governments to come to the Conference on that date. Which date would M. Molotov prefer to fix?

M. Molotov had no objection to July 1 or July 15, but at the previous meeting he had made a proposal contained in paragraph (c) of his proposed amendment to the American proposal. That paragraph says that it will be the task of the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers to approve the text of the invitations as well as the procedure for the Peace Conference. That would have to be done on June 15 when the Council met again.

Mr. Bevin said that the Council seemed to have about three different proposals on this point before it. He suggested that they leave item 2 of the American proposal for the moment and come back to it later.

M. Molotov asked why they should not finish the matter under discussion before taking up the next one.

Mr. Bevin said that he had made his suggestion because there seemed to be no agreement on the second point of the American proposal. He thought that if they went through the four points, leaving this one outstanding for the moment, they might be able to get agreement on it later.

M. Molotov had no objection to this procedure if the Chairman thought it more convenient.

Mr. Bevin said that he thought it might be convenient and might open the way to arrange a compromise.

Revised Armistice Terms with Italy

Mr. Bevin asked whether there were any objections to the American proposal.

M. Molotov addressed a question to Mr. Byrnes, as author of the draft before them (CFM(46)84).⁵⁷ He wished to call attention to paragraph C of section III, at the end of which it was stated that: “Allied Military Government shall be continued under the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, in Venezia Giulia and so long as military necessity may require in the province of Udine.” He wished to know by what necessity this was dictated. It was not clear what military necessity was meant.

Mr. Byrnes replied that, in the first place, part of the province of Udine was in dispute, and that pending the coming into force of the peace treaty with Italy it was deemed desirable to maintain military government there. In the second place this area was on the line of communication to Austria.

M. Molotov suggested that the reference to military government could remain but that the words “so long as military necessity may require” could be deleted.

Mr. Byrnes had no objection to that change.

M. Molotov then said he had one more remark. In a letter which the Soviet Government had transmitted to the American Ambassador in Moscow on April 19 the subject of the Allied control bodies in the former German satellite states had been broached. The first paragraph of that letter read as follows: “The Soviet Government agrees to the proposed abolition of the Allied Commission in Italy, and the Soviet Government at the same time believes that corresponding changes will be made in the case of other countries which were formerly Allies of Germany in Europe.”⁵⁸ He assumed that, as this statement of the Soviet Government did not evoke any observations on the part of the United States Government, notice was taken of it and that there was no objection. Paragraph two of that same letter, which referred to the Italian merchant fleet, had been accepted by the United States Government. In view of those considerations, the Soviet Government was ready to agree to the revised armistice terms as now proposed.

Mr. Byrnes said that the United States was willing to agree in principle to M. Molotov’s suggestion regarding the revision of the armistice terms in other enemy countries. If a proposal was submitted in writing, he would be very happy to consider it. He did not see why they should not be able to get agreement on it.

Mr. Bevin asked what the state of the discussion was.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government had no objection to the present draft and that he did not know about the attitude of other delegations.

Mr. Bevin said that he had only one point to raise. In paragraph B of Section III he desired to have the following text substituted for the present wording: “The employment and disposition of the Italian Navy should remain as at present under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander.” That would keep the machinery running as at present and would be more convenient. In his view it would be better to make that provision than to place the Italian Navy under the special section mentioned in the United States draft.

Mr. Byrnes said that the special section would be under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, and that accordingly he did not think it made any difference which text was used. He had no objection to the change proposed by Mr. Bevin if it was agreeable to the other delegations.

M. Molotov said that he had no objection to that change. He wished again to take the opportunity to make it plain, with reference to paragraph one of the Soviet Government’s letter of April 19th which he had mentioned before, that the Soviet suggestions did not refer to a revision of the armistice terms with the former German satellites but to the status of the Allied Control Commissions in those countries. The Soviet Government assumed that, as soon as the question of the Allied Commission in Italy was settled, corresponding decisions would be taken with respect to the former German satellites.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that the revised armistice terms with Italy now before the Council contained a provision for machinery to take the place of the Allied Commission. He assumed that in any proposal to abolish the Allied Control Commissions in the countries referred to, the Soviet Government would submit proposals for new machinery to carry on the work now being performed by those Allied Control Commissions.

M. Molotov said that, on the analogy with what would be done for Italy, he had no doubt that arrangements would be made for the other countries. In other words, the Allied Control Commissions would be abolished and the only machinery which would exist would be sections of the Soviet High Command.

Mr. Byrnes said that in his view that would be all right.

Mr. Bevin then asked if the Council had agreed to accept the revised armistice terms for Italy as amended at the present meeting. Mr. Byrnes and M. Molotov said that they agreed.

M. Bidault said that he had views on two or three minor points in the text but that he agreed to it in principle.

Treaty with Austria

Mr. Bevin said that the next item before the Council was point 4 of the American proposal, which stated “that there be placed on the agenda for the June 15 session the drafting of a treaty with Austria, the Deputies being instructed to prepare in the meantime draft proposals for the consideration of the Council.”

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation held the view that it was inadvisable to include on the agenda of the Council’s next session the question of a treaty with Austria. In the view of the Soviet Delegation it was necessary first to finish the preparation of the five peace treaties now before the Council which had not yet been completed. After that had been done the Council could undertake to discuss Austria. Should they try to do that now, they would hinder their present work and over-burden the agenda of the next session. Time was getting very short.

Mr. Bevin said that the United Kingdom Government had considered the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes on the previous day and was of the opinion that the order of procedure for the session of June 15 should be for the Council to take up first the subjects which were still undecided and then to undertake the preparation of a treaty with Austria. In the meantime, before they met again on June 15, the Foreign Ministers should circulate to each other draft treaties with Austria, in order that they might come to that session prepared to discuss them. The view of his government was that if they did not do that much, there would be misunderstanding and suspicion. It would not be understood why the Council of Foreign Ministers declined to discuss this one point on the Danubian Basin.

Mr. Bevin said that the difference between his proposal and that of Mr. Byrnes was that the latter wished the Deputies to prepare the treaties, whereas he proposed that the Foreign Ministers exchange drafts during the period prior to June 15 and then come to their next session prepared to discuss the question. He had the feeling that if this was done it would create a spirit of confidence and of concerted effort which would help with many other problems and would speed up the work for the restoration of peace generally. The United Kingdom Government appreciated Mr. Byrnes’ desire for speed and action on the Austrian question, and regretted that the Soviet Government refused to place it on the agenda. He had been instructed to appeal to his colleagues to accept the compromise he had just put forward with a view to having the whole problem discussed at the meeting of June 15.

M. Bidault said that the French Delegation considered this a compromise which could be accepted by all. He was willing to support it.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had no objection to any particular procedure. The reason he had suggested referring the matter to the Deputies was that three weeks ago the United States Delegation had presented its draft. If the British, French and Soviet Governments had ideas on the subject, and if they too put in their drafts for consideration by the Deputies, there would be a chance to get ahead with the work. These drafts must necessarily be similar in some respects to the drafts of the peace treaties. After all, the same men would be considering the Austrian treaty as the other treaties. The Deputies might be able to make some progress in reconciling some of their differences on the Austrian drafts. However, he had no objection to the procedure suggested by Mr. Bevin.

M. Molotov said that he was afraid that the Soviet Delegation would not be ready to discuss a sixth peace treaty in addition to the other five which were not yet completed. He pointed out that not only the Soviet Delegation would not be ready; other delegations did not have drafts and apparently were not ready either. The Soviet Delegation needed time to prepare to discuss this question. When it was ready, it would inform the other delegations.

Mr. Bevin said that before Mr. Byrnes replied to M. Molotov’s remarks he wished to ask M. Molotov if he could not agree to the British compromise proposal. It had been a real effort on the part of the British Government to meet the Soviet position. M. Molotov had objected to the question being referred to the Deputies as the latter would be busy with the other five treaties. Under the British proposal, the four governments would merely circulate drafts and be ready to discuss the question on June 15. That left a month for preparation. He did not think that the world would accept the refusal of the Council to prepare a treaty with Austria.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had only wanted to tell M. Molotov that the United States Delegation agreed to the British compromise proposal. As he understood that proposal, Austria would not be discussed until the other treaties had been acted upon by the Council. Thus, at the June 15 session the question of Austria would not interfere with the consideration of the other five treaties, which would have priority.

Mr. Bevin said that he did not know what Mr. Byrnes meant by “acted upon”. Under the British proposal the order of procedure would be for the Council to go through all the outstanding points of the five peace treaties before taking up Austria.

M. Molotov reiterated that none of the Delegations had presented a draft, not only the Soviet Delegation but others as well. The United States Delegation had only submitted observations on the question. For its part, the Soviet Delegation would take steps to intensify and expedite its preparation for discussion of the question of a treaty with Austria, but it could not agree to the placing of that question on the agenda of the next session.

Mr. Bevin remarked that he would be questioned very closely on this point by his government. He appreciated what M. Molotov had said to the effect that the question would be given intense study at once by the Soviet Government. He had no doubt of that. But could the British Government be given any indication of when the matter could be discussed?

M. Molotov said that they could reach agreement on this point through diplomatic channels. At the present time no draft peace treaty had been presented.

Mr. Bevin said that he had called the attention of his government to that point after M. Molotov had mentioned it a few days before. His government had reminded him that no one at Potsdam had had ready a draft treaty for any of the other countries, although it was in Potsdam the decision was taken to prepare those treaties. It was then decided to refer those treaties to the Council of Foreign Ministers for preparation. That decision having been made, the Council proceeded to discuss the points at issue and to prepare the drafts. All that he was suggesting now for Austria was that the same procedure be adopted as at Potsdam. The Council should decide that there would be a treaty with Austria and should put it on the agenda for the next session. Before that time the four governments should exchange drafts. The British Government thought that the procedure adopted at Potsdam for the other treaties should be followed in the case of Austria.

M. Molotov stated that it would be wrong to undertake a sixth treaty without having completed the five treaties which were already under consideration. Each government should separately intensify its own work on the subject of an Austrian treaty.

Mr. Bevin asked whether M. Molotov, having suggested that the matter be taken up through diplomatic channels, would be willing to leave the question open, since the other three delegations were of the opinion that it should be placed on the agenda of the next session. Only the Soviet Delegation held the view that it could not be placed on the agenda. Thus, there was a deadlock.

M. Molotov replied that there was no deadlock. The four governments could devote themselves to the preparation of drafts. Then at a later date they would know how to proceed with the question.

Mr. Bevin asked when they could decide how to proceed?

M. Molotov said that that would be done as soon as possible. Each delegation would carry on with its own work. For the time-being no delegation had a draft treaty.

Mr. Bevin said that he must make a reservation on the part of the United Kingdom Delegation to the effect that it would press, in whatever way was open to it, to have the question of Austria considered at the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Byrnes wished to ask whether M. Molotov would submit to the other three governments his draft of a treaty with Austria.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Government was at present engaged in studying this question, but that the work had not been completed. At the moment it was difficult to say when it would be ready. Probably the other delegations were having similar difficulties since none of them had presented a draft.

Mr. Byrnes stated that, in view of what M. Molotov had said, it should be possible to reach agreement. All delegations could agree to exchange drafts before June 15. The United States Delegation agreed to that.

M. Molotov said that all would be glad to have their work facilitated in dealing with this complex problem, but if he undertook to fix a date now he would propose to adhere to it. In view of the uncertainty and the burden of work on the other peace treaties the Soviet Delegation felt that it could not fix a date. M. Molotov said, “May God help us to complete the work on the treaties which are now before us.”

Mr. Byrnes said that he hoped that God would help them.

Convocation of Peace Conference

Mr. Bevin suggested that the Council turn its attention to the second point of the United States proposal concerning the calling of the Peace Conference. Mr. Byrnes had proposed that they call the Peace Conference for July 1 or July 15, and if this was not agreed to, to leave until the next session the fixing of the date. As Mr. Bevin understood it, all delegations agreed to call the Peace Conference for either July 1 or July 15. The point in dispute was, whether or not the fundamental points of the treaties must be agreed to before the invitations were issued. He wished to make a preliminary suggestion, not a proposal, that they accept the second part of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal and leave to the next session of the Council the fixing of the date of the Peace Conference; and that they accept also the last sentence of paragraph (c) of the Soviet amendment to the American proposal, to the effect that at its next session the Council would approve draft procedure for the Peace Conference and the invitations to be sent to the states which would take part. It should be possible to agree now to call the Conference on July 1 or July 15 and to leave the actual arrangements regarding its convocation to the Council’s later session on June 15. Mr. Bevin then suggested that the Council recess for ten minutes in order to consider this proposal.

M. Molotov said he had no objection to a ten minute recess but that he had already expressed the view of the Soviet Delegation.

The Council then recessed for twenty minutes.

Mr. Bevin said that from the discussions which had taken place it was quite clear that the Soviet Delegation would not accept the fixing of a date for the Peace Conference except under conditions which were not acceptable to other delegations. The Soviet Delegation insisted that the treaties must be completed, in their fundamentals, before the Conference met. Therefore, it seemed to him that they had no alternative to taking the second part of point two of Mr. Byrnes’ proposal and leave to the next session of the Council a decision on the date of the Peace Conference.

M. Molotov said that it was not possible for him to agree to the statement made by Mr. Bevin that the Soviet Delegation was putting forward special conditions with respect to the fixing of a date for the Peace Conference. The Soviet Delegation did not object to fixing a date for the Conference. The only thing for which the Soviet Delegation was pressing was that the decision taken at the Moscow Conference be observed. That decision provided that prior to the convocation of the Peace Conference the preparation of draft peace treaties should be completed. The Soviet Delegation insisted only on the point that the preparation of the treaties should be completed prior to the Conference. If the other delegations were in agreement with the Moscow decision, they also should abide by it and take the same view as that taken by the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. Byrnes said that if M. Molotov was willing to fix a date he would ask him to name a date and to agree that invitations might be sent out by the Secretariat of the Council for the convening of the Conference on the date fixed.

M. Bidault remarked that he had not said much at this meeting. He recalled that he had made a proposal at an earlier meeting and wished to add a few remarks on that subject now. He found his proposal reproduced in the second part of point two of the proposal of the United States Delegation. It consisted in leaving to the next session of the Council the fixing of the date of the Peace Conference. As he had said before, the French Delegation felt that there should be a peace conference and also that it was highly desirable that the four governments come to the Peace Conference already in agreement on the fundamental points. He felt that they should have confidence both in the value of a delay and in their own efforts at their next session. Since the attempts at the present time to reach agreement on a date for the Peace Conference had resulted in long controversies and had led to no conclusion, he thought that it would be wise to adopt a simple solution which would represent wisdom for the present and hope for the future.

Mr. Bevin said that the proposal before the meeting was that they leave to the next session of the Council the question of the date of the Peace Conference. Then the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet again on June 15. The outstanding points in the draft peace treaties would be dealt with by the Deputies in the meantime. The Deputies would make their report to the Council and at its next session the Council would fix the date of the Peace Conference. (All delegations agreed.)

Next Meeting of the Council

Mr. Byrnes asked where the Council would meet on June 15.

Mr. Bevin said that they should first decide the question of where the Deputies would work. They seemed to like it in Paris and might stay there. Since the Deputies had been working during the present sessions, had their staffs and material here, and since only a month remained, he would make the suggestion that they should continue their work in Paris.

Mr. Byrnes said that if M. Bidault would invite them he thought the Council should meet in Paris on June 15 and that the Deputies should continue to work in Paris in the meantime.

M. Bidault thanked his colleagues for their friendly feelings toward the French capital. If they liked Paris, Paris liked them even more. He thanked the other delegations for this token of sympathy on the part of his country and of his city.

It was then agreed that the Council should meet again on June 15 in Paris and that the Deputies should continue to work in Paris until that meeting.

Revised Terms of Armistice for Italy

Mr. Byrnes thought that the secretaries of the delegations should be directed to prepare a text of the revised armistice terms for Italy in the three languages, in order that it might be signed the next day.

M. Bidault pointed out that the text itself said that the terms would be signed by the Supreme Allied Commander. Article 12 read as follows: “The present agreement shall enter into force upon signature thereof by the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy and by the Supreme Allied Commander in Italy, and shall remain in force until superseded by other arrangements or until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy.”

M. Bidault reminded his colleagues that France had not signed the original armistice terms with Italy.

Mr. Byrnes said that nevertheless the text must be approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers before it could be signed.

Mr. Bevin considered that M. Bidault was legally right. What they could do tomorrow was to initial the document.

Mr. Byrnes said that it was true that the terms were prepared for signature by the Supreme Allied Commander, but that unless the four governments agreed to it in the three languages, it might encounter many handicaps.

Mr. Bevin said that he quite agreed. He suggested that the text be drawn up in three languages, that it contain the provision for signature by the Supreme Allied Commander, and that the Foreign Ministers of the four governments initial it here in Paris. They had agreed to approve it.

M. Molotov said that he could suggest a simpler course of action. They could adopt a decision on the part of the Council of Foreign Ministers stating their agreement with this text; they could sign this decision the next day and attach to it the text of the revised armistice terms, which would later be signed in Italy as provided in the terms themselves. It seemed to him that a copy should also be made in the Italian language.

Mr. Byrnes said that M. Molotov’s suggestion was satisfactory to him and that the secretaries or the Drafting Committee should be instructed to prepare the necessary documents in accordance with M. Molotov’s suggestion. (All delegations agreed.)

Mr. Bevin returned to the question of the Council’s next meeting. He wished it to appear quite clearly in the record that they had agreed to meet on June 15 in Paris and that the Deputies would go on working in Paris in the meantime. (The other delegations agreed that this was what they had decided.) Mr. Bevin then thanked M. Bidault for the invitation to meet in Paris.

Greek Claims to Northern Epirus

Mr. Bevin said he would like to call attention to one more item which he had been asked to raise. It was the question of Northern Epirus, which affected Greece and Albania. The Greeks had asked that they be allowed to be heard by the Council on this frontier question.⁵⁹ He wished to know if there was any objection to hearing the Greek claims. This matter, of course, would have to be dealt with separately from the peace treaties. It was, however, an outstanding problem. It was a matter for the Council of Foreign Ministers to decide whether both parties might be heard. Mr. Bevin said that he raised this question under section II, paragraph 3 (iii) of the Potsdam Agreement which says that “Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the member governments.”⁶⁰

M. Molotov said that this question affected Albania as well as Greece. Albania should also be heard.

Mr. Bevin reminded M. Molotov that he had said that both parties should be heard.

M. Molotov said that the Council also had a request from the Czechoslovak Government regarding the Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier.⁶¹ Perhaps some of those questions might be referred to the Deputies.

Mr. Byrnes said that they might be referred to the Deputies for consideration after the peace treaty with Austria was considered.

Mr. Bevin said that he was quite agreeable to having the matter referred to the Deputies so long as both parties got a hearing.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was quite serious in mentioning Austria in this connection. If the Deputies did not have time to consider the treaty with Austria, then they did not have time to consider other questions which were not so urgent.

M. Molotov agreed that that was the case.

Mr. Byrnes said that he agreed that immediately after the consideration of the treaty with Austria these other matters might be taken up.

Mr. Bevin agreed.

M. Molotov pointed out that the Council was not going to discuss any treaty between Albania and Greece. There was no such question. How then could they discuss relations between those two countries.

Mr. Bevin said that such a case was provided for under the paragraph of the Potsdam Agreement which he had quoted. All he asked was that at some time they be given a hearing. This was certainly an outstanding territorial question within the meaning of the Potsdam Agreement.

M. Molotov said that the Council could not possibly undertake the task of discussing all outstanding territorial questions. There were many such questions. Why should the Council undertake to consider questions which had not been discussed and which had not been on the agenda?

M. Molotov remarked that certain Greek circles had unlimited appetites.

Mr. Bevin thought that they might keep an open mind on the question until the meeting of June 15. He would bring it up again then.

Procedure of the Council

M. Bidault asked whether there was anything else before the Council.

Mr. Byrnes thought that the Council should meet at 11:00 A. M. the next day to sign the revised terms of the Italian armistice.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that there were still some records of former meetings which needed to be approved. He thought that there might be another formal meeting the next day to wind up the affairs of the session in an orderly way. He suggested having an informal meeting on Germany at 11:00 A. M. and a plenary meeting in the afternoon. The Council would presumably have to approve some sort of final communiqué since world opinion was interested in their activities. He assumed that any protocol would be left for the session of June 15. In any case the Council should, in politeness to the French Government which had been so cordial, wind up its affairs in the most decorous manner possible despite the disagreements.

Mr. Byrnes was willing to have a formal meeting the next day if there were anything important to be done, but he did not wish to meet merely to approve records of meetings. On the question of a communiqué or protocol, which had been raised by the Chairman, he said that he had not thought anything was necessary at this time since the Council was merely recessing until June 15. If they were to have a communiqué issued, his experience with communiqués led him to believe that it would take a long time to draft it and agree on it. He submitted that it would create the impression of the termination of the session instead of that of a recess to a date 30 days hence. Therefore, he doubted the wisdom of a communiqué. As a practical objection he did not know what in the world would be put into such a communiqué.

It was then agreed that the Ministers would meet at 11:00 A. M. the next day to discuss the German question and then to initial the revised terms of the Italian armistice if they were ready.

M. Bidault said that he would like to state quite frankly that there was no possibility of concluding the Council’s discussion of the German question in one meeting the next morning, even if it were only a preliminary discussion.

Mr. Byrnes said that if that were true he was entirely willing to stay and to meet in the future as long as there was a discussion of that character before them. He thought that that could be determined at the meeting the next morning. The point which he had tried to make was that he did not wish to come back to a formal meeting merely for the purpose of approving the records of meetings.

M. Bidault said that he had made his remark in order not to take any of his colleagues by surprise the next day in prolonging the discussion of the German question beyond their expectation.

The meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m.

49. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
50. Reference to C.F.M. (46) 53, May 7, 1946, p. 286.
51. Reference to C.F.M. (46) 87, May 15, 1946, p. 422.
52. The text of C.F.M. (46) 20, May 2, 1946 is included as Section IV of the Report by the Committee on Reparations, C.F.M. (46) 53, May 7, 1946, p. 286.
53. The United States Delegation’s proposal concerning the further work of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the convening of the Peace Conference are set forth in the United States Delegation Record of the 17th Meeting of the Council May 14, 1946, 4 p.m. and in the Record of Decisions of that meeting, pp. 382 and 392, respectively.
54. The “original” United States proposal referred to here presumably is C.F.M (46) 62, May 8, 1946, p. 310. The Soviet amendments to that proposal were set forth in C.F.M. (46) 63, May 9, 1946, p. 321.
55. Reference here presumably is to Secretary Byrnes’ meeting with Molotov and Generalissimo Stalin at the Kremlin on the evening of December 19, 1945; for the memorandum of conversation covering that meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 680. Bevin met separately with Molotov and Stalin that same evening; the British record of that meeting is printed ibid., p. 688.
56. Agreement on the holding of a peace conference was reached at the Informal meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, December 21, 1945, 2:30 p.m.; the United States Delegation minutes of that meeting are printed ibid., p. 710.
57. C.F.M. (46) 84, May 14, 1946, is not printed. The Revision of the Armistice with Italy as finally approved by the Council of Ministers on May 16 was circulated as document C.F.M. (46) 95, May 16, 1946, p. 436. Differences between C.F.M. (46) 84 and C.F.M. (46) 95 are indicated in footnotes to the latter document.
58. For the full text of the April 19 Molotov letter quoted here, see telegram 1268, April 20, 1940, from Moscow, vol. v, p. 840.
59. For the request of the Greek Government that the Council of Foreign Ministers consider Greek territorial claims to North Epirus, see telegram 4357, April 19, from London, p. 80.
60. Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1479.
61. Under cover of a letter dated April 10, 1946, circulated in the Council of Foreign Ministers as document C.F.M. (D) (B) (46) 14, April 11, 1946, not printed, the Czechoslovak Minister in London forwarded to the Secretary General of the Council a memorandum containing proposals and observations of the Czechoslovak Government with respect to the peace treaty with Hungary. The Czechoslovak Minister also forwarded several maps pertaining to the Czechoslovak territorial claim against Hungary in the Bratislava bridgehead area. It was the proposal of the Czechoslovak Government that Hungary should cede to Czechoslovakia five villages, covering an area of 14,671 hectares and having a population of 7,523. This territorial claim was subsequently formally presented to the Paris Peace Conference as an amendment to article 1 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary; for the text of the amendment and the accompanying argument, see document CP. (Gen) Doc.1.Q.3., vol. iv, p. 726.