C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Seventeenth Meeting, Paris, May 14, 1946, 4 p.m.34

secret

Agenda of the Meeting

M. Bidault opened the meeting and referred to the decision taken on the previous day to resume at this meeting the important questions which were still undecided. In his view these questions were:

1.
Reparation from Italy.
2.
The Italian colonies.
3.
Italo-Yugoslav frontier.
4.
The Dodecanese.

In addition the Council now had before it a proposal of the Austrian Government concerning the Austro-Italian frontier.35 This proposal had been submitted following the communication which the Council had sent to the Austrian Government in which the possibility of minor rectifications in the frontier had been mentioned.36

M. Bidault asked whether his colleagues had any preference as to the order in which the above questions might be examined, and whether they had any new questions to bring up. With respect to the subject of reparation he believed that the matter had been sent back once again to the Committee on Reparation which was to meet at 5:00 that afternoon to examine, on the basis indicated by the Council yesterday, the problem of the assets available to make up the $100 million claimed by the Soviet Union. M. Bidault posed the question whether the Council should leave the matter entirely to the Committee or discuss it and attempt to make some progress before it should be taken up by the Committee.

Mr. Byrnes said that this question had been discussed at great length on Saturday37 and that the United States Delegation had nothing to add to what had been said then. He proposed that the matter be left to the Deputies or to the Committee on Reparation, to whichever body it had been referred.

It was agreed to leave the matter of reparation in the hands of the Committee on Reparation on the terms in which it had been referred to them.

[Page 383]

Austro-Italian Frontier

M. Bidault said that the Council might now take up the Austro-Italian frontier, the Italian colonies or the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. He had no preference regarding the order in which they were discussed.

Mr. Bevin said that at a previous meeting it had been proposed that Austria should be heard on the subject of claims for minor rectifications in the Austro-Italian frontier. He thought it would be a good thing if the Deputies heard both the Austrians and the Italians. In addition the Council had never decided what it would regard as a minor rectification. That phrase had been used without its meaning being defined. He did not suppose that the Foreign Ministers could define it at the conference table at the present moment. In any case the Council should not close the door to hearing the Austrian and Italian Governments present their respective views. He suggested that the Deputies hear their representatives. Then later the Foreign Ministers could meet to discuss the matter and decide whether there should be a minor rectification in the frontier, and if so what it should be.

M. Bidault said that Mr. Bevin had proposed referring the question to the Deputies and instructing the latter to hear Austrian and Italian representatives on the subject. He asked for the views of other Delegations on this proposal.

M. Molotov asked whether the revision of the frontier suggested by the Austrian Government in its recent communication could be regarded as a minor rectification, especially if the decision made in London was borne in mind. That decision read as follows:

“The frontier with Austria will not be changed, subject to the decision to be reached by the Council on any case Austria might present for minor rectifications in her favor.”38

M. Molotov wondered whether the Austrian Government’s proposals could be regarded as of the type contemplated by the London decision. He had doubts on that score.

M. Bidault proposed that, since it appeared doubtful to a member of the Council that the term “minor rectification” could be applied to the claim made by the Austrian Government, the matter should be examined by the Deputies with a view to seeing whether such a rectification should be considered minor or not, whether it was acceptable or not, and whether it could be modified or not.

Mr. Byrnes had no objection to Mr. Bevin’s proposal that the Deputies hear representatives of Austria and Italy. He did not think [Page 384] that the Council should take too technical a view on whether the proposed rectification was “minor” or not. The real question was whether justice would be promoted by such a rectification.

Mr. Bevin said that at the moment he personally would not like to commit himself to anything. One thing which always struck him when he looked at the map was the way in which the railway cut across the northeastern corner of South Tyrol, somewhat like the situation on the Franco-Italian frontier which they had previously discussed. Without pronouncing on the merits of the question he thought that it would be a good thing not to close the door to hearing the Austrian Government and to allow an Austrian representative to present the Austrian views concerning that corner of South Tyrol. He was quite willing to have the matter go to the Deputies for further examination.

M. Molotov said that he had already expressed the Soviet Delegation’s views on the subject but had no objection to having the Deputies examine it more fully.

M. Bidault said that all appeared to be in agreement that the Deputies should study the question. He asked whether it was also agreed that representatives of the Austrian and Italian Governments, after the problem had first been examined by the Deputies, should be allowed to present their views.

All Delegations agreed.

Italian Colonies

M. Bidault said that the Council could now turn its attention to the question of the disposition of Italian colonies or to the question of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. Both had been touched upon at the meeting on the previous day and it was possible that further reflection might have brought the possibility of a greater degree of agreement. He asked whether the other Delegations had any particular views on where to begin the discussion.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had nothing to add to what he had said yesterday on the subject of Italian colonies.

Mr. Bevin wondered if it would not be a good idea to have the question of Italian colonies again examined by the Deputies. There had been a great many proposals, which now apparently were narrowed down to three. He had received some telegrams from his Government on this subject in the last few days. On reflection he thought it wise not to be too hasty in this question, especially if there was some possibility that the interests of the people inhabiting these colonies might be ignored. He saw an advantage in having the Deputies review all the various proposals (e.g. the American, British and French proposals) and see what could be made of them. The Deputies could then present an ordered report. The lapse of time would allow the [Page 385] Ethiopian Government to be heard on the question of a Eritrea, and there would be no immediate adoption of a solution which would result only in the reopening of the whole problem at the Peace Conference. It seemed better to have the Deputies examine it and try to find a satisfactory solution.

M. Molotov said that it was generally known that a few days ago several Delegations seemed to accept the position that the former Italian colonies should be placed under the trusteeship of Italy, as the French and Soviet Delegations had proposed. The American Delegation had also agreed to this. He thought that the discussion on the territorial questions concerning Italy had shown that the proposed solutions of these territorial questions tended to be at the expense of Italy. On the question of colonies, he thought that more consideration should be shown to the interests of Italy. He thought therefore that the proposal to place the colonies under Italian trusteeship was an important proposal calling for the close attention of the Council.

With reference to the remarks which the United Kingdom Delegation had made concerning commitments to the Senussi, M. Molotov had requested an opportunity to become familiar with those matters. The British Government had kindly made information available to him. After becoming acquainted with the pledges made by the British Government he felt that it was obvious that these pledges would not affect the question of placing the colonies under Italian trusteeship. They said only that the colonies should not be turned back to Italy. That was a point on which all four Delegations had agreed.

M. Molotov thought that the new American proposal39 was quite complex and called for much elucidation. It would, however, admit that the former Italian colonies might be placed, either in whole or in part, under the trusteeship of Italy if only for one year. Could this proposal be interpreted to mean that the trusteeship would be given to Italy on the understanding that the final disposal of the territories, i.e. whether they would be placed under individual or under collective trusteeship, must be made within a year?

Mr. Bevin said that, although he did not like to say it, he could not accept M. Molotov’s interpretation of the British pledges to the Senussi. It was quite clear in peoples’ minds that the British Government could not put the Senussi back under Italian control, direct or indirect. That was quite clear and had been explained in the information which had been given to M. Molotov. Mr. Bevin said that he could not sign any treaty which put the Senussi back under Italian [Page 386] control. The British pledges were clear and explicit. On this point he could only say what he had said before. The British Government had given this pledge in 1940 when a good many had thought that Great Britain was down and out. The British were fighting the Nazis alone at that time and the Senussi, having lost their lands, had come to Britain’s aid. Their help had been small but they had given it. Great Britain had made a pledge and would stick to it.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had stated his position yesterday. The United States Delegation had first made a proposal the terms of which were well known to all Delegations. He would not restate it. This proposal had not been accepted. Then the Soviet Delegation had proposed that the territories be placed under Italian trusteeship. He had agreed, provided that there be a ten year limit on the trusteeship, to be followed by the grant of independence, as had been suggested in the original American proposal.40 The Soviet Delegation had agreed but the French Delegation had not. Mr. Bevin had said that he could not agree and felt called upon to make a proposal of his own concerning Cyrenaica and the Senussi.41 That proposal had not been accepted. Yesterday, in the hope of getting agreement, he (Mr. Byrnes) had made another proposal, namely that a clause be included in the treaty providing that Italy cede the former colonies to the four Allied Powers. And the latter would have a year in which to reach agreement on their disposition. He hoped that they could agree on it in a month instead of a year. That proposal had not been accepted. He had then stated that the hope of the United States was that there should be an international trusteeship as proposed in the paper submitted to the Council last September. The United States still maintained the opinion that this would be the best solution. He could only add that inasmuch as the Council had been unable to reach agreement he had no objection to Mr. Bevin’s proposal that the matter be sent to the Deputies in the hope that the latter might make some approach to it which would result in agreement.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had no objection to referring the question to the Deputies.

M. Bidault said that the French Delegation had no objection either. When the French Delegation had made its proposal, it had thought that despite the general opposition it had been a wise one. It had now been accepted by the Soviet Delegation. The United Kingdom [Page 387] Delegation, however, had mentioned the pledges made by the United Kingdom Government, which France of course could not judge.

The French Delegation had already explained why it did not think it appropriate to adopt the ten year period suggested by the United States Delegation. Nevertheless, from four positions they had now come down to three, or perhaps it could be described as two and one-half, which it was hoped the Deputies might reduce to one single solution.

The Council then agreed to ask the Deputies to proceed with a study of the question.

Future Work of the Deputies

M. Bidault asked his colleagues for comments on the Yugoslav-Italian frontier.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had no new remarks to make.

Mr. Byrnes said that the United States Delegation had nothing to add to what it had said heretofore.

M. Bidault and Mr. Bevin likewise had nothing to add.

M. Bidault asked whether this matter might also be referred to the Deputies. In his view the Deputies would remain in contact with their Governments and some progress might be made in reconsidering the various positions. It had been remarked here that exchanges of views took some time but that progress could be made even when the positions of the Delegations were tied to lines on the map. He did not think that they should be too skeptical about the possibility of further progress.

M. Molotov agreed with M. Bidault’s observations.

It was agreed to instruct the Deputies to continue their study of the question of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier.

Proposal for Adjournment of the Present Session of the Council

Mr. Byrnes said that he had a proposal to make and read the following statement:42

“The Council should frankly face the facts which it confronts. There are several minor Treaty problems which requires further study by our Deputies or by special Commissions which have them under inquiry. There is every prospect of agreement when these studies [Page 388] are concluded. But decisions must await this event. There are also a few major Treaty problems upon which the Council is presently divided. Decisions must await further clarification and mutual study in a spirit of good will. In some instances these decisions may be favorably affected by the reports which we await from our Deputies. Our whole purpose is to seek and to find agreement as quickly as possible.[”]

Under these circumstances it is likely to facilitate our work if the present session of the Council recesses until June 15th, permitting each of us to give undivided attention to a reexamination of our positions in the hope of finding means of reconciling them. Such use of our time is calculated to be more fruitful than to extend our present session.

The American Delegation has made it clear that it believes we owe our Allied nations an obligation to fix at this time the date of a Peace Conference. At Moscow we agreed it should be held not later than May first. We did not comply with that promise. The United States now urges that the Conference be called either July 1 or July 15; and that we should then submit our agreements, and our disagreements, if any, to the advice of our war partners. The Soviet Representative has declined so far to agree to this course. Invitations to the Conference cannot be sent except by unanimous agreement. Therefore, the American Delegation believes the time has come to recess the Council until June 15th and if we cannot agree on the date of the Peace Conference now to commit to that session the responsibility for calling a Peace Conference.

Because this means we cannot hope for the ratification of a Peace Treaty with Italy for some months, we should immediately sign the revised armistice with Italy, which was agreed to ten days ago, so as to release her recuperative efforts as far as possible. We would urgently recommend, also, that Austria be put upon the June 15 agenda and that our Deputies be instructed to prepare a draft treaty for consideration of the Council on June 15 and for the consideration of the Peace Conference along with the other treaties. If we can agree to the above, and if we also contemplate the wide area of agreement which we have already reached, we may count our present efforts as well worth while and we may look to the future with confidence that our indispensable unity will be strengthened and preserved.

Therefore the American Delegation recommends:

(1)
That after considering the German question this session recess until June 15th;
(2)
That we now call a Peace Conference for July 1st or July 15th. If this is not agreed to, that we leave to the next session of the Council the decision as to the date of the Peace Conference;
(3)
That we immediately sign the revised armistice terms with Italy;
(4)
That there be placed on the agenda for the June 15th session the drafting of a Treaty with Austria, the Deputies being instructed to prepare in the meantime draft proposals for the consideration of the Council.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation held the view that the Council of Foreign Ministers should discuss the questions it had been agreed would be discussed and that the agenda should not be supplemented by questions on which there had been no agreement that they be discussed. The Soviet Delegation wished to recall that the Council had decided to examine the five draft peace treaties and then the question of calling the Peace Conference. The latter question was inseparately connected with the discussion of the peace treaties. In addition the Council had decided to consider the French proposal on the German problem. It seemed to the Soviet Delegation that the Council should confine itself to those questions which they had decided, as the Council of Foreign Ministers, to take up. The remaining questions could be discussed through regular diplomatic channels.

Mr. Byrnes felt that M. Molotov had misunderstood his statement. He had not proposed at this meeting to add Austria to the agenda for the present session of the Council. He had in earlier meetings urged that it be added to the agenda. M. Molotov had objected to that. Consequently the United States Delegation was not pressing the point now. But he asked that it be placed on the agenda for the next session to begin on June 15.

M. Molotov replied that he thought it would be inadvisable to place the question of Austria on the agenda for the next session because the Council had not yet completed its work on the five peace treaties. If they should add the new and complex question of Austria to the agenda it would be likely to create difficulties and would not facilitate the work of the Council. The Council would be undertaking to draft a sixth treaty without having completed those which it undertook to draft as long ago as July 1945.

Mr. Bevin remarked that the new American proposal was rather long and involved and wondered if it might be desirable to allow a few minutes to study it.

Mr. Byrnes then requested a recess for fifteen minutes, to which the other Delegations agreed. (The Council then recessed for fifteen minutes.)

M. Bidault remarked that the American proposal had now been studied by the Delegations and asked the results of their reflection on it. In his understanding the only point in the recommendations [Page 390] which had given rise to differences of opinion was point No. 4 which concerned the drafting of a treaty with Austria. There was also, however, the fact that point No. 2 contained a choice of alternatives. On this subject the French Delegation had previously made a proposal, which it did not seem necessary to repeat at the present time.

Mr. Bevin said that the United Kingdom Delegation was ready to accept the American proposal subject to the proviso that the revised armistice terms with Italy would be communicated to the other signatories for their information. On the subject of Austria the United Kingdom Delegation took the view that if it could be agreed to put Austria on the agenda for the June 15 session it would facilitate the clearing up of the questions at issue connected with the other treaties, in particular those concerned with the withdrawal of troops and with the question of the Danube.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had expressed its view on one point of the American proposal but would prefer to have the discussion on the proposal as a whole take place the next day.

M. Bidault said that the French Delegation had no objection to postponing discussion until the next day.

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not wish to insist that action be taken at the present meeting if the Soviet Delegation was not ready to discuss the proposal. He wondered if there were any part of it on which agreement could be reached immediately, for example the proposal that after considering the German question the present session of the Council be adjourned until June 15. He did not, however, wish to ask his friend, M. Molotov, to discuss this if he preferred to wait until the next day.

Mr. Bevin had no objection to adjourning the discussion until the next day.

M. Bidault said that, as he saw the situation, there would be a restricted meeting the next morning to begin examination of the German question. There were, however, several other items to be taken up. The Council had asked the Committee on Reparation to submit a report at 11:00 a.m. the next day, and finally there were the questions raised by the proposal which the United States Delegation had just put forward. The Council had to decide on the best means of organizing its work to deal with these various subjects. It seemed reasonable to hold a restricted meeting the next morning on the German question and at the end of that meeting to decide whether, in the meeting to take place in the afternoon, they would discuss the German question further or take up Italian reparations or the new American proposal or all three.

M. Molotov said that he had no objection to the plan proposed by M. Bidault.

[Page 391]

Mr. Bevin said that he did not quite understand the proposal. Was there to be a small meeting in the morning to discuss Germany and then a plenary meeting some time in the afternoon?

M. Bidault said that the second point had not yet been decided.

Mr. Bevin asked whether, at the morning meeting on Germany, he could bring three advisers instead of two. He felt the need of additional advisers and did not like to be limited to only two advisers.

The other Delegations saw no reason why three advisers might not be present.

Mr. Byrnes wondered whether there was any chance of considering the proposal he had just made at the morning meeting before the discussion of the German question. After that the Council could give the German question as much time as it required.

M. Bidault said that the French Delegation had no objection but thought that if the delay in considering the American proposal would be useful in providing time for reflection on it, there might be no advantage in reducing the time before it was to be considered.

Mr. Byrnes then proposed that the American proposal be taken up at the afternoon meeting on the following day.

It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers would meet the next morning, in a smaller meeting, under the chairmanship of Mr. Bevin in the latter’s office at 11:00 a.m., that they would discuss the German question and fix the agenda and the time of the afternoon meeting.

Revised Terms of Armistice for Italy

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the proposal he had circulated at the present meeting referred to the revised terms of armistice for Italy. When he had circulated a draft on this subject the previous week there had been one or two objections to the language on the part of Mr. Bevin. Corresponding changes had been made in the draft. These changes were more or less unimportant but the draft was now being submitted in revised form.43

M. Bidault suggested that it might be possible to have the experts examine the text which Mr. Byrnes was circulating and agree on a final text. M. Molotov said that he would prefer to postpone the question until the next day.

The meeting adjourned at 6:30.

  1. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
  2. Reference here is to the proposals of the Austrian Government set forth in the May 10, 1946 letter from Austrian Representative Bischoff to the Council of Foreign Ministers which was circulated to the Council as C.F.M. (46) 66, May 11, 1946, p. 357.
  3. Reference here is to the communication of May 3, 1946, from the Council of Foreign Ministers to Austrian Representative Bischoff, the text of which was circulated to the Council as C.F.M. (46) 39, May 3, 1946, not printed.
  4. May 11.
  5. The quotation is from the Record of the Third Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, September 14, 1945, 11 a.m., Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 162.
  6. The reference here is presumably to the American proposal set forth in C.F.M. (46) 89, May 15, 1946, p. 423.
  7. The original American proposal for a United Nations trusteeship for the Italian colonies in Africa was included as Section III of the United States memorandum, C.F.M. (45) 16, September 14, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 180.
  8. The British proposals with regard to the disposition of the Italian colonies were set forth in C.F.M. (46) 22, April 30, 1946, p. 194.
  9. The text that follows was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2354, Delsec 505, May 14, from Paris, not printed, accompanied by the instructions by the Secretary to have the text published verbatim. The telegram added that the Secretary had given the text of this statement to the press following this meeting and had authorized its quotation (740.00119 Council/5–1446). This statement was released to the press by the Department of State on May 15 and appears in the Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1946, p. 891.
  10. The revised United States draft proposal for an agreement modifying the Italian Armistice circulated at this meeting, designated C.F.M. (46) 84, May 14, 1946, is not printed. The proposed agreement as finally approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 16 was circulated as C.F.M. (46) 95, May 16, 1946, p. 436. Differences between C.F.M. (46) 84 and C.F.M. (46) 95 are indicated in footnotes to the latter document. The earlier draft which had been presented to the Council by Secretary Byrnes at the 1st Informal Meeting, May 2, 5 p.m. (p. 214) is not printed.