Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Eleventh Meeting, Paris, May 7, 1946, 11 a.m.³²

Paris, May 7, 1946, 11 a.m.

secret

M. Molotov declared the meeting open.

M. Couve de Murville apologized for M. Bidault’s absence, the latter being at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the French Government.

The record of the fifth meeting was approved.

Report of the Deputies

M. Molotov then called upon M. Couve de Murville to present the report of the Deputies.

M. Couve de Murville said that the Deputies had met on the previous day in the afternoon and had prepared a list of items concerning the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland for consideration by the Foreign Ministers. These questions were as follows:

1. Peace Treaty with Rumania

(a) Transylvania

(b) Frontiers other than the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier

(c) The international control of the Danube

(d) Dissolution of Fascist organizations

(e) War criminals

2. Peace Treaty with Bulgaria

(a) Bulgarian frontiers

(b) Withdrawal of Allied troops

(c) Reparations

3. Peace Treaty with Hungary

(a) Cancellation of the Vienna Award³³

(b) Frontier problems other than the problem of the frontier between Hungary and Rumania

(c) Reparations

4. Peace Treaty with Finland

No questions were submitted to the Council.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had no objections to consideration of any of the items on the list submitted by the Deputies but that he wanted it understood that the discussion should not be confined to those items since there were others to which he would wish to refer.

M. Molotov said he had no objection.

The report of the Deputies was then approved.

Rumanian-Hungarian Frontier

M. Molotov asked whether any of the Delegations had any proposals to make on the subject of Transylvania. Two points remained in dispute. The Soviet draft article contained a sentence to the effect that the whole of Transylvania should be included in Rumania, and the other Delegations had proposed the deletion of that sentence.³⁴

Mr. Byrnes said that the U.S. Delegation had suggested an addition, which appears in brackets in the text, reading as follows:

“Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers would be prepared to recognize any rectification of the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier that may subsequently be mutually agreed between the parties directly concerned and which would substantially reduce the number of persons living under alien rule.”

M. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes had anticipated him, as he was going to refer to that point next.

Mr. Byrnes said he wanted to suggest, if the Soviet Delegation would withdraw the words in the first bracket, that the U.S. Delegation would withdraw the words in the second bracket. He thought that the article would be improved as a result.

M. Molotov considered that proposal acceptable.

Mr. Bevin agreed.

M. Molotov said that the article on Transylvania was then agreed and that this decision showed that the Council had made a good beginning in its day’s work.

Other Frontiers of Rumania

M. Molotov thought it possible to adopt a decision which would satisfy all the Delegations. He would agree to have in the treaty a reference to the other frontiers of Rumania similar to those for the frontiers which were in dispute. The Soviet Delegation had seen no reason for making such a reference to the other frontiers, since they were not to be changed. However, the Soviet Delegation was prepared to accept such a provision if it was considered necessary by the other Delegations.

Mr. Bevin did not quite understand M. Molotov’s suggestion.

M. Molotov said that in London the Deputies had disagreed on the question of Rumania’s frontiers. The Soviet Deputy had proposed that reference be made in the treaty only to the frontier which was in dispute, that with Hungary. He did not think it necessary to refer in the same terms to the other frontiers of Rumania since they were not in dispute, but now, since the other Delegations insisted that not only disputed boundaries but also other boundaries should be mentioned in the treaty, the Soviet Delegation had no objection. He asked whether any other Delegation objected.

M. Molotov’s suggestion was accepted.

Mr. Bevin asked what clauses would be included in the treaty.

M. Molotov proposed that the Council instruct the Deputies to examine that matter.

All Delegations agreed.

The Danube

M. Molotov said that he had no suggestions to make on the next item on the list, the Danube River.

Mr. Bevin remarked that he had raised this question several times. The United Kingdom wished to re-establish the position with respect to the Commission of the Danube which existed in 1939. Obviously he was not proposing that the Soviet Union be excluded from the regime of the Danube as it had been in 1939. He had made that quite clear in London. What Great Britain wished to see re-established was the regime which would provide for freedom of trade on the river, shipping rights, and the maintenance of trade interests. Mr. Bevin believed that the only legal arrangement which had been made since 1939 was the Soviet-German Agreement of 1940. The U.K. Delegation was anxious to know what legal situation would be established now and what rights interested nations would have in the arrangements to be made following the present war.

M. Molotov wished to explain the Soviet position. The Soviet Delegation felt that this question should not be dealt with in the peace treaty with Rumania. It was a question affecting not only Rumania but also Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary and Germany. It should not be dealt with in an isolated fashion in the Rumanian peace treaty. It called for a settlement which would be wider than the peace settlement with Rumania. The Soviet Delegation felt that the matter of establishing a regime to regulate shipping should be dealt with after the conclusion of the peace treaties and with the participation of the Danubian states. It would be incorrect to examine the question without them because they were the states primarily affected. It was obvious that as soon as the peace treaties were concluded the question of shipping on the Danube should be given a permanent settlement. But now what was necessary was to deal with the specific questions arising in the transition period following the Armistice Agreements.

The Soviet Delegation, M. Molotov continued, felt that the interests of the Allied countries on the Danube, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, should first be taken into account. He also recalled the fact that after the conclusion of the peace treaties Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria could not be excluded from the settlement of the Danubian question. It was obvious that this settlement should be made with the participation of all riparian countries. None of those countries was represented here. It would be unjust to try to settle the question without them. The matter of the present regime was quite different. That was a matter for the occupation forces in the ex-enemy states bordering on the Danube. But the establishment of the permanent regime after the conclusion of the peace treaties was a matter for settlement with the participation of those countries themselves.

Mr. Bevin said he accepted what M. Molotov had said to the effect that the riparian states must be consulted in the final settlement. He would be prepared to accept the following solution. There could be a recorded decision of the present meeting to the effect that a conference of those riparian states with the Council of Foreign Ministers would be called within a period of six months from the signature of the treaty for the purpose of discussing and settling the regime of the Danube. The only point necessary for inclusion in the treaty would be that Rumania would agree to accept the decisions of that conference. Thus, Rumania would have the right to attend the conference and to take part in it, but there ought to be some reference in the treaty obliging Rumania, an ex-enemy state, to accept the decisions made at that conference.

Mr. Byrnes thought that the Council ought to be able to reach agreement on this question. He was sure that all his colleagues were in favor of the principle which he was about to suggest. Whether or not there should be a conference he thought all ought to be able to agree to include in the treaty the following language:

“Navigation on the Danube River, its navigable tributaries and connecting canals, shall be free and open on terms of complete equality to the nationals, merchant vessels and goods of all states.”

As a former enemy state, Rumania should be asked to agree to this principle, which is essential for all states using the Danube River. Then, after the treaty had been signed, arrangements could be made for a conference such as Mr. Bevin had suggested, to which all the interested states, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, could be invited, but it would at least be certain that former enemy states such as Rumania could not defeat the purpose, expressed in the principle quoted above, which all the Allied Nations had in mind.

M. Molotov thought that it would be unjust to require Rumania to agree to any decision that might be adopted in the future. It was not yet known what sort of a decision it would be. To take a decision that Rumania must agree in advance to any arrangement on this question would be contrary to Rumanian sovereignty which would be restored by the conclusion of a treaty of peace. M. Molotov wished also to call attention to another aspect of the question. Besides Rumania there were other states not represented here which are interested in the regime to be established for the Danube. At least two of these states were Allies, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Would it be possible to require them to accept in advance any future agreement, an agreement which did not exist now and for which there was not even a posposal? This would be in conflict with the sovereignty of those states. Only one Danubian state was present here, the Soviet Union. There were at least six other Danubian countries. Unless they were consulted, the Soviet Union would be placed in a very difficult position in examining the specific aspects of the question. M. Molotov believed that the question should be taken up with them through diplomatic channels to find out what views they had on the subject. It would be inadvisable to adopt a decision in the absence of a majority of the Danubian states. Such a decision would not be adequately considered and could not be justified. It might give rise to certain misunderstandings and discriminations. There were a number of states involved which had no opportunity to be heard here.

Mr. Byrnes wished to say that the proposal he had made did not call for specific action but would only require Rumania to agree to a general principle with which he believed the Soviet Government to be in accord. He thought that principle, which was agreed to by the Allied States, should be put into the treaty in order to insure that former enemy states such as Rumania could not prevent the Allied States from enjoying the right of free navigation on the Danube.

Mr. Bevin said that they were all anxious to conclude these peace treaties and had discussed these points for a long time. If it would help in reaching agreement he would be willing to accept Mr. Byrnes’ proposal, placing on Rumania no more binding obligation than to accept the general principle. He would accept it, however, only on condition that the Council could agree here to call a conference of interested states, within a certain period after the signature of the peace treaties, with a view to settling the question of the regime of the Danube.

M. Molotov said that, not to mention the defeated states which were to become fully sovereign when the peace treaties were signed and the admission of which to the United Nations Organization they had undertaken to support, the Council had also to consider the Allied States such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Without consulting them it would be unjust to adopt any such proposal. That was why the Soviet Delegation considered it necessary to study the question and to find out the views of the interested Allied States. To this end diplomatic channels could be used.

Mr. Byrnes felt that on this question of the general principle, if all Delegations here agreed to the principle, it would not be unfair to ask that Rumania be required by the treaty also to agree to it. He agreed with M. Molotov that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia should be consulted. They would be consulted. The task of the Council of Foreign Ministers was to draft a peace treaty and to submit it to a peace conference at which Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would be represented. They would then have an opportunity to express their views. If they objected to clauses on the Danube contained in the draft treaties, those objections could be taken into consideration when the draft treaties came back to the Council after the peace conference.

Mr. Bevin said that if they put nothing into the treaty on the Danube the United Kingdom would have made peace with an enemy country and would have excluded itself from rights which it had before Rumania went to war. Great Britain would have excluded itself from trade with Southeastern Europe. That was what it would amount to. The British Delegation could not agree to do that. It could not agree, after going through this war, to place its trade and its rights in a worse position than they were in before the war.

Mr. Bevin said that in the treaties at the end of the last war certain rights had been established. He thought they ought to be re-established after this war. He was willing to consider any suggestion which would avoid another deadlock on this question, but unless the British position was met in some way in questions of this kind he was placed in a very difficult position.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation felt that the question of the Danube could not be dealt with without the participation of the Danubian countries and without their views being known. As for those proposals which had already been made and those which might be made, they could be studied through diplomatic channels, and a solution could be found. As for the decisions adopted after the last war, the Soviet Union was then excluded from participation both in the International Commission of the Danube and the European Commission of the Danube. It did not wish this situation to be repeated, and apparently no other Delegation desired that.

Mr. Bevin said he thought it had been quite wrong to exclude the Soviet Union.

As no decision could be reached, the subject was deferred.

Dissolution of Fascist Organizations

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had suggested at the Deputies’ meetings in London that the language used in the Armistice be adopted for the treaty. Nevertheless, if the other Delegations thought it necessary that this wording be modified, the Soviet Delegation had no objection and suggested language as follows:

“Rumania, which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, has taken measures for dissolving all organizations of a Fascist type on Rumanian territory, whether political, military or para-military, as well as other organizations conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or to any of the other United Nations, undertakes not to permit in future the existence and activities of organizations which have as their aim denial to the people of their democratic rights.”³⁵

He thought that that wording was the same as had been proposed by the U.S. Delegation.

Mr. Byrnes said that after reading the paragraph he had come to the conclusion that there was no difference in the two versions. He said M. Molotov could have it either way he liked. Both were satisfactory to the U.S. Delegation. It had seemed a little more restricted in the original Soviet version. That was why the later suggestion, just made by M. Molotov, seemed better even from the Soviet point of view.

M. Molotov said that of course the Soviet Delegation would agree to leave the language as it was in the earlier Soviet proposal. He asked whether the Council was ready to adopt the language worked out by the Deputies, removing the brackets around the words “of that nature”.

Mr. Byrnes said that the U.S. Delegation agreed.

Mr. Bevin made no objection.

War Criminals

M. Molotov asked for suggestions on the last item to be considered in connection with the Rumanian treaty, War Criminals. He felt that it was possible to put in the treaty the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation which laid down in brief terms a principle which seemed satisfactory to all Delegations. This was the principle that Rumania should cooperate with the Allies in the apprehension and trial of war criminals. Measures were already being taken in Rumania against war criminals. The principal war criminals were now on trial in Bucharest. None of the Allied Governments had had any misunderstandings with the Rumanian Government on this question.

Mr. Byrnes was of the opinion that what he had said on this subject in connection with the Italian treaty, namely that a committee should be appointed to see that the terms of the treaty respecting war criminals were carried out, applied also to the Rumanian treaty. It was useless to repeat all the arguments. The U.S. Delegation had the same position in both cases.

Mr. Bevin thought that the situation was exactly the same. They had adopted it after many hours in connection with the Italian treaty. What was decided for one would apply to the other.

M. Molotov then suggested deferring the question and passing to the next item.

All Delegations agreed.

Equality of Economic Opportunity

Mr. Byrnes said he would like to bring up an additional question at this point. At the meeting of the Council in September 1945 he had suggested that the treaties with the former Axis satellites include a provision implementing the American proposal, accepted in principle in Article 20 of the Berlin Protocol,³⁶ guaranteeing to Allied nationals equal access to trade, raw materials, and industry. There were also to be similar provisions for equality of access to ports, waterways, and aviation facilities. Those provisions might be limited to a period of three years.

In the Atlantic Charter,³⁷ Mr. Byrnes continued, the states represented here agreed:

“4. They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”

At the Berlin Conference, there was agreement in principle to the proposal presented by the United States, which was known as Annex 2 of the Berlin Protocol.³⁸ Among the various provisions in Annex 2 was one which read as follows:

“We deem it essential that the Axis satellite states not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals equal access to their trade, raw materials or industry, and that they appropriately modify any existing arrangements to that effect.”

Mr. Byrnes therefore asked the Council to direct the Deputies to draft language for the Rumanian treaty in accordance with the proposal which he had submitted to the Council last September and which had then been referred to the Deputies.

M. Molotov asked whether this proposal for the Rumanian treaty was intended as punishment of Rumania for its participation in the war or whether there was some other objective. Was it intended that Rumania, as a defeated country, and other countries should derive mutual benefit from this provision?

Mr. Byrnes said he could not answer for Generalissimo Stalin, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, who had agreed to the language at Potsdam. It was his guess that the purpose was not to punish anybody but to guarantee equal access to trade, raw materials, and industry. There was no question of punishment.

M. Molotov said that it was well known that at the Berlin Conference no published decision on this question was adopted. He did not remember it and wished to check up on it.

Mr. Byrnes said that the article of the Protocol was No. 20 and read as follows:

“The proposal presented by the U.S. Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.”

This was not a new proposal. It was in the paper which the U.S. Delegation presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers in the previous September.

M. Molotov said that the decision adopted at Berlin had been to approve the U.S. proposal in principle. The recommendation was that it be worked out through diplomatic channels. He thought that that was the proper course to adopt. They should abide by the decision.

Mr. Byrnes said that there was no doubt that the Heads of the three Governments had agreed on this matter in principle. They were in accord. This was a principle which they wanted to establish. It was not worked out through diplomatic channels, and there was now an opportunity here to do what the three Heads of Governments wished done. All agreed that the Heads of Governments had gone as far as they could with the question. They recommended that the details be worked out. They could not be worked out for inclusion in the Berlin Protocol, but there was an opportunity here to carry the decisions into effect and thus take a step forward by inserting appropriate clauses in the peace treaties.

M. Molotov pointed out that the Heads of Governments had agreed on this question but not in connection with the peace treaty with Rumania. They had approved a principle, bearing in mind that the matter would be pursued through diplomatic channels. If that decision was to be respected, no one should object to going ahead and dealing with the matter through diplomatic channels.

Mr. Byrnes thought that all three Governments wished to carry out the Berlin Agreement. If they could do it, they should not quarrel about the method. That agreement had been made in July 1945. In September, the first opportunity thereafter, the U.S. Delegation had presented a paper seeking to have the decision carried into effect by the Foreign Ministers, who were generally assumed to have charge of diplomatic channels. The Heads of Governments had gone as far as they could; they left it to the Foreign Ministers for implementation. It had been on the doorstep of the Foreign Ministers since then. Mr. Byrnes thought they ought to take the opportunity now to apply this principle in a way which would benefit all the nations of the world.

M. Molotov had no objection to the question being examined, as the Berlin Decision provided, through diplomatic channels.

Mr. Byrnes wished to say that the Heads of Government had not said that the Foreign Ministers were to examine the question. They had said that they agreed to it in principle. The only thing left was to draft an agreement. That was what the Foreign Ministers were doing now.

M. Molotov said that a number of decisions had been adopted by the Heads of Governments at Berlin. Some had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers for consideration; others were to be taken up through diplomatic channels. This particular question had not been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers but had been left to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. That decision should be observed.

Mr. Byrnes wished to repeat that the previous September the Council had referred this question to the Deputies. If the Deputies could not be considered as diplomatic channels, he did not know where they could submit it for drafting. The Heads of Governments had referred it to the Foreign Ministers to draft an agreement. The Ministers had referred it to the Deputies. The Deputies had sent it back to the Foreign Ministers. There was no use in sending it to the Deputies again. What was the sense of continuing this ring-around-a-rosy? If the principle agreed to was really going to be carried into effect, the Council must put it into the treaties. Mr. Byrnes hoped that they could agree to instruct the Deputies to draft language putting into effect the agreed decision made in Berlin last July.

M. Molotov said that what was decided at Berlin remained in effect, but Mr. Byrnes was now making a new proposal not provided for by the Berlin Agreement. There were many other proposals in connection with the peace treaties which had been made in September and which were not yet agreed. The Council had, of course, to decide those questions. So far as the Berlin decision was concerned, it remained in effect, and it had provided that the matter be pursued through diplomatic channels. With regard to point 4 of the Atlantic Charter, it related not only to defeated states but also to the victors, not only to the great but also to the small. It was not intended by the wording of the Atlantic Charter to burden in advance defeated countries with obligations which they would have to accept without knowing their terms.

Mr. Byrnes could not agree, in view of the history he had just recited, that the U.S. proposal was a new one. He was willing, however, to limit his proposal to the inclusion in the treaty of the words agreed upon by Generalissimo Stalin, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee as follows:

“We deem it essential that the Axis satellite states not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals equal access to their trade, raw materials or industry, and that they appropriately modify any existing arrangements to that effect.”

M. Molotov said that the decision in question contained no provision for insertion of any clauses in a peace treaty with Rumania or in those with other defeated states. Practical questions arising from that decision could be dealt with whenever necessary, but by diplomatic channels rather than by insertion of clauses in the peace treaties.

M. Molotov remarked that the British and French Delegations seemed not to be interested in this question since they were not participating in the discussion.

Mr. Bevin said that the U.K. Delegation was certainly interested hut that he had been interested in listening to the Soviet and American Delegations debate the question so forcefully. He had drawn his deductions from the previous discussion on the Danube and realized what the fate of this proposal would be. Mr. Bevin said there was one matter which he thought ought to be settled. There was a large number of economic clauses which had been referred to the Deputies. He understood that the Deputies had been unable to get very far with them. Before the completion of consideration of the draft treaties the Council should have a report on those clauses. It was essential from the point of view of the United Kingdom that it know where it stood with these countries economically. Mr. Bevin was afraid that he did not know now. He suggested, therefore, that the Council should have a report promptly from the Deputies or from the Economic Committee on those items which had been referred to them.

M. Molotov asked whether Mr. Bevin had Rumania in mind.

Mr. Bevin replied in the affirmative, but said that his remarks applied also to Bulgaria and to all the other treaties including the treaty with Italy.

M. Molotov said that perhaps they could give consideration to these problems in connection with their discussion of the same questions for the Italian treaty.

Mr. Bevin did not mind so long as the Council could get to these questions soon.

The meeting adjourned at 1:25 p.m.

32. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
33. The reference here is to the arbitral award by an Italian-German Commission regarding the cession of Transylvanian territories by Rumania to Hungary, made at Vienna, August 30, 1940; for documentation on this award, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 501–503 and Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. x, pp. 581–584.
34. At their final meetings in London on the Balkan peace treaties, April 18 and 19, the Deputies had prepared reports to the Council of Foreign Ministers with respect to the draft Rumanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian treaties. These reports, none of which are printed, set forth the texts of those articles which had been agreed or nearly agreed. In the report on the Rumanian treaty, C.F.M. (D) (B) (46) 37, not printed, the article on Transylvania read as follows:

    “The decision of the Vienna Award of August 30th, 1940, is declared null and void. The frontier between Roumania and Hungary existing on January 1st, 1938, is hereby restored, [the whole of Transylvania being thus included in the territory of Roumania]. [Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers would be prepared to recognize any rectification of the Roumanian-Hungarian frontier that may subsequently be mutually agreed between the parties directly concerned and which would substantially reduce the number of persons living under alien rule.]”

    The brackets indicated here are in the source text. They identify unagreed language in the article.

35. In their deliberations regarding a draft peace treaty with Rumania, the Deputies had worked on the basis of a draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Delegation and designated C.F.M. (D) (B) (46) 1, March 12, 1946, not printed. In that original Soviet proposal, the article here quoted read as follows:

    “Roumania, which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures for dissolving all organisations of a fascist type on Roumanian territory: political, military, para-military, as well as other organisations conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations, in particular, to the Soviet Union, undertakes not to permit in future the existence and activities of organisations of that nature.” (C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: Documents—Balkan Questions)

    In their report to the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the status of the drafting of the Rumanian Peace Treaty, C.F.M. (D) (B) (46) 37, not printed, the article in question read as follows:

    “Rumania, which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures for dissolving all organizations of a Fascist type on Roumanian territory whether political, military or para-military, as well as other organizations conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or to any of the other United Nations, undertakes not to permit in future the existence and activities of organizations [of that nature,] which have as their aim denial to the people of their democratic rights.” (C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: Documents—Balkan Questions)

    The brackets indicated here are in the source text. They identify unagreed language in the article.

36. The American proposals referred to here were set forth in the United States Suggested Directives to the Deputies on the drafting of treaties of peace with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, respectively C.F.M. (45) 35, September 19, 1945, article VIII, C.F.M. (45) 36. September 19, 1945, article VII, and C.F.M. (45) 40. September 21. 1945. article VI. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 263, 266 and 311. For article XX of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin, 1945, (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, p. 1497.
37. For the text of the Atlantic Charter, the Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
38. Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1498.