C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: Memos of Conversation
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)
| Present: | Secretary Byrnes; |
| Mr. de Gasperi, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy; | |
| Count Carandini, Italian Ambassador to London; | |
| Mr. Dunn |
After the usual greetings, Mr. de Gasperi asked whether the Secretary expected to pursue to the end his proposal for a plebiscite in the Venezia Giulia area. The Secretary stated that he was in favor of a plebiscite for the area between the Soviet and the American lines, but not for a plebiscite over the whole of Venezia Giulia. He explained that the Council of Foreign Ministers in London had adopted the ethnic principle in the main as the basis for drawing the new [Page 257] Yugoslav-Italian boundary and that the only area where a plebiscite would be justified would be in the disputed area between the Soviet and United States lines.
Mr. de Gasperi stated that the question of Trieste and the Italian population in the western area of the Istrian Peninsula, including Pola, was very close to the hearts of all Italians, and that it would be impossible for any government other than a Communist government in Italy to agree to the transfer of Trieste to Yugoslavia. He felt there was no need to go into any of the background situation as that had been thoroughly and correctly recorded in the report of the Commission of inquiry which had recently visited that area. Mr. de Gasperi went on to say that they were in the midst of an electoral campaign with their first national election coming on the second of June next, and that from a domestic political standpoint the moderates in Italy could not possibly agree to giving up Trieste. He said that, as was well known, it might be possible for a government to deal with matters of this kind rather more understandingly in periods other than election times and that if the question were postponed, it might be possible to give it consideration later on.
The Foreign Minister stated, however, that if no agreement could be reached by the Ministers here to a solution which would not actually injure Italy, it would be much better to postpone the discussion of the peace treaty, give Italy the revised terms of armistice now and then hope for a better atmosphere and possibility of agreement with respect to the peace treaty at some later period.
Count Carandini stated that one of the main reasons why the Soviet Government were interested in Trieste in addition to backing up Tito’s31 claim for territory was to obtain the splendid and efficient ship-building yards in Trieste. He said the Cosulich and other shipbuilding yards in the city were capable of building ships of all types and of any tonnage, and he said that the Soviet Government, with their great interest in building a Navy, no doubt had these ship yards, with the equipment and the skilled workmanship available there, in mind for their purpose.
The Secretary asked the Prime Minister whether he was more interested in the question of Trieste than in the Italian Colonies. The Prime Minister replied that they were, of course, interested in all questions affecting Italy, but that the Trieste question at this particular time certainly was the one in which they were most interested. He said that he made this statement not only from the point of view of [Page 258] the Italian Government but from the deep and intimate interest of the whole Italian people in this question.
The Secretary said that we would probably be willing to consider a line somewhere between the British and French lines in Southern Istria as that would provide for a better balance between the Yugoslavs and Italians than our own line. Mr. de Gasperi pointed out that such a new line would transfer the Italian city of Pola and several other Italian cities in Southern Istria to Yugoslavia and that would be a great blow to Italy. The Secretary said, however, that there would undoubtedly have to be some territory, and probably a considerable part of the Istrian Peninsula transferred to Yugoslavia and the question was whether the Italians could not accept some adjustment of that kind for the sake of saving Trieste and its surrounding area in the north.
The Prime Minister said that he realized that was a reasonable way of putting the matter, but that they would still have difficulty in agreeing to the transfer of Italian population at this particular time during their electoral period and again made a plea for a modus vivendi now which would provide for the revision of the armistice terms, give them more liberty of action in commercial and political authority, and leave to a later period the further discussion of the peace treaty.
[In a conversation with the Secretary of State in Paris on May 6, 1946, the Greek Ambassador to the United States, Cimon P. Diamantopolous, raised the question of Greek territorial claims against Albania, Bulgaria, and Italy as well as the question of Greece’s desire for reparations from Italy. For the record of this conversation, see Volume VII, page 156.]
- Josip Broz-Tito, Yugoslav Prime Minister.↩