751.92/10–1645
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South-east Asian Affairs (Moffat)
Mr. Lacoste called by appointment to give an oral communication from the French Government in response to the oral communication which the Department had made99 suggesting the possibility of a French assurance to the Siamese that they would have opportunity for reexamination of the Siamese-Indochinese border. His communication was in substance as follows:
France realizes that for the peace and security of Southeast Asia it is necessary that the territory wrenched from Indochina by Siam in 1941 with Japanese help should be restored but that this restoration must be accompanied by a policy on the part of France which will give the Siamese people public, moral satisfaction and make impossible in the future propaganda of the type which led to the 1940–1941 events. On the other hand, it is necessary to avoid the danger of falling into [Page 1359] the trap which everybody followed in the late thirties by adopting an appeasement policy as this can lead only to adding more fuel to military and totalitarian propaganda and claims.
It is felt dangerous to give, at the moment that the territories are reacquired by France, a public assurance to Siam that they will have opportunity to reexamine the border. Such assurance would favor militaristic propaganda as it would inevitably be represented as an acknowledgment of the reasonableness of Siamese claims to the territories and would encourage the Siamese to try to obtain satisfaction. Furthermore, such assurance would be construed as a betrayal of French duty as protectors of Laos and Cambodia.
Mr. Lacoste at this point emphasized his own personal view that this was of great importance, pointing out that these countries are different ethnically from Siam, have strong individuality and governmental institutions under royal families, and that such a statement would cause confusion and unrest in the restored areas as it might be interpreted to indicate their later return to Siam. He added that many Cambodians had fled from Battambang to Cochinchina to flee the Siamese and to remain under the French rule.
On the other hand, the French Government, he continued, recognizes the need of making easier the task of the Regent and the Premier in restoring to France the territories taken by Siam. The Government recognizes that both the Regent and the Premier were always pro-Allied and anti-Japanese. Furthermore, it desires to point out that in 1937 when the present Regent was negotiating with France, his only claim was to certain islands in the Mekong River, and the turning over of those islands to Siam might be considered in the realm of future possibility. The President of the Assembly [Phya Manvarej?],1 during the period of Siamese aggression, personally informed the French that he did not approve the Siamese acts and the French are also grateful to him.
France, desiring to approach this situation in the same spirit as the United States, is therefore now considering when and how and under what conditions French assurance can be given to the Regent and the Premier so as to encourage their liberal tendencies. They are seeking a formula to assure the Siamese Government, after the status quo ante has effectively been reestablished and after consultation with as many people in Cambodia and Laos as may be necessary, that they are willing in a good-neighborly spirit to examine all questions of French-Siamese relations. The declaration which they would make must, therefore, of necessity be more general and vague and broader than the assurance which this Government suggested. It would probably [Page 1360] not refer specifically to a border but would imply its inclusion in the questions to be discussed. As to the border, the discussion could of course apply only to matters of local interest and local community and could not include any substantial transfers of territory or Pan-Siamese claims for a Greater Siam (Dai-Pan-Thai). The French Government wished to make it very clear that such a declaration would not be a condition or a counterpart for the restoration of the territories to Indochina.
Mr. Lacoste concluded by stating that in the way suggested the French Government felt it could make it easier for the Siamese Government and at the same time avoid the risk of aiding the military party or agitators.2