741.92/9–2645

The Department of State to the British Embassy

Aide-Mémoire

In its aide-mémoire of September 19 commenting on the revised Text of Heads of Agreement with Military Annex presented to the Department of State on September 10, the Department stated that it [Page 1337] hoped to communicate within a few days its views on Section C relating to measures for postwar strategic cooperation.

This Government has considered carefully the three clauses included in that section and the message clarifying the intent of Clause 1 which was communicated to the Department on September 18.71

This Government has no comment to offer on Clause 2 or Clause 3 of Section C.

It would urge, however, that Clause 1 be substantially modified. It does not consider that acceptance of Clause 1 by the Siamese is necessary in order to make easier the negotiation of a regional scheme of defense in the world organization for the areas specified and it is concerned lest the clause as now stated might later be construed as an advance commitment by the Siamese for measures of a military or strategic nature to which this Government might have serious objection.

Furthermore, Clause 1 does not accord with the statement in Mr. Eden’s letter of November 22, 194472 that the British Government considered it a matter of ordinary prudence to stipulate as a condition to the restoration of Siamese sovereignty and independence that the Siamese “should accept such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary to the functioning of the postwar international system”.

Although this Government has expressed the view that it would not be desirable to make acceptance of such arrangements a condition to the restoration of Siamese sovereignty and independence, in view of the interest of the British Government in the matter and inasmuch as this Government is in accord with the basic objectives stated by Mr Eden, it would not object to the inclusion in the Heads of Agreement of a clause requiring Siamese cooperation in international security arrangements under a United Nations Organization.

It would request, therefore, that the British Government amend Clause 1 to accord with Mr. Eden’s statement so that it may read in substance as follows: “Agree to collaborate fully in all pertinent international security arrangements approved by the United Nations Organization or its Security Council and especially such international [Page 1338] security arrangements as may relate to the countries of southeastern Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific areas”.

This Government believes that by consultation and by scrupulous respect for the position and interest of the other with relation to Siam a reconciliation of British and American views with regard to that country has been nearly achieved. It hopes that this cooperative approach will be continued so that there may be complete Anglo-American community of views in relation to Siam.

It would appear that there are only two points in relation to the Heads of Agreement in which the United States and British Governments are not yet fully in accord:

(1)
Clause 1 of Section C. The United States Government believes that that clause should be amended so as to provide expressly for Siamese collaboration in pertinent international security arrangements within the international security framework.
(2)
Clause 4 of Section D. In its present form this Government believes that that clause might be construed to limit legitimate Siamese restrictions relating to Siamese economy and trade and so infringe on Siamese sovereignty and independence contrary to the American position and to the assurances given this Government by the British Government.

With regard to the Military Annex there are only five points on which a community of views has not been achieved:

(1)
Clause 4 relating to payment by Siam of compensation for losses or damage sustained by Allied property. The United States believes that the requirement should not exceed that upon which both the British and American Governments are agreed, the question of additional compensation, if any, being left for separate negotiation by the countries involved.
(2)
Clause 13 relating to a military mission to Siam. The United States would not wish to have provision for such a military mission included in an Allied military agreement and it would prefer to see the clause omitted from the Military Annex and treated as a matter for Siamese initiative.
(3)
Clause 14 for temporary Allied economic controls. The United States believes that the provisions of this clause should be limited to the same duration and understanding as the proposed temporary military controls specified in Clause 11.
(4)
Clauses 15 and 16(b) relating to Combined Board controls and the production and export of Siamese rice. The United States believes that these clauses should be amended so that they may conform more accurately to the principles of the tripartite agreement proposed by the United States which, in principle, the British Government has approved.
(5)
Clause 16(a) providing for a levy on Siamese rice. The United States strongly disapproves such a levy, but considers that if the British insist thereon, such a levy should be a matter for separate British-Siamese agreement with no reference to the Allies or implication [Page 1339] that the Allies as such are concerned therewith, and that such a levy should not interfere with procurement in accordance with Combined Board allocations of Siamese rice, whether stocks on hand or future production, by the United States and other countries not concerned with such a levy.

  1. On this date, Mr. Everson made the following statement in a telephone call to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs: “The object of the clause is to render it easier to negotiate a regional scheme of defense in the world organization by warning the Siamese that they will in the future be expected to play their part in defense schemes for the areas specified.” This statement was made part of a memorandum of September 19 by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs to Raymond E. Cox of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, not printed (Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot 52–M45, Series 5).
  2. See airgram A–1404, November 24, 1944, from London, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, p. 1319.