741.93/9–2545
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
Mr. Everson called to say that the Embassy had received a telegram from Dening reviewing his conversation with Yost on the British Heads of Agreement to be presented to the Siamese and stating that Dening had understood Yost to claim that the Anglo-American discussions [Page 1335] had been transferred to Kandy. I stated that I thought this was entirely a misunderstanding as obviously the consultations were continuing between the Department and the Embassy and that it may have arisen from the explanation of the American views which Yost desired to give Dening in support of his request that Dening delay concluding the agreement.
Mr. Everson then said, speaking without instructions, that he thought it would be unfortunate if the United States injected itself as a third party into a British-Siamese discussion by authorizing Yost to tell the Siamese the United States views on the agreement. I stated that Yost had been authorized to do so because we had been brought into the picture by Dening’s statement to the Siamese that the text of the proposed agreement had been furnished us and because, with the long record of Anglo-American Allied action and cooperation in Southeast Asia, our silence thereon could be construed by the Siamese only as approval of the agreement. I explained that at no time had we ever said anything to the Siamese about any of the proposed agreements, military or political, or about the Anglo-American discussions.
I remarked that for months we had been endeavoring to secure unity of Anglo-American policies toward Siam and to reconcile conflicting views and that in the middle of our discussions on the proposed military agreement a 48-hour ultimatum had unilaterally been presented to the Siamese without even the terms being shown our military representative although they were Allied terms. I said that that situation was straightened out; but just when a reconciliation of views seemed very imminent we have been confronted again with hasty unilateral British action and as we were implicated in this agreement by the British themselves, we have had to act to protect our position. It seemed immaterial to me that Siamese acceptance of the Heads of Agreement would be followed by a formal agreement in which modifications to meet United States views might be made, because we had no assurance that our views would so be met and because acceptance by the Siamese of the Heads of Agreement might militate against such modifications.
I also pointed out that we were not concerned with the purely British-Siamese aspects of the settlement of the state of war; and after stating our views on those aspects, we had indicated our non-concern therewith; but that we had a deep interest in the long-range economic and security aspects of the proposed agreement and were concerned therewith.