Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

741.92/9–2445: Telegram

The Political Adviser in the India–Burma Theater (Yost) to the Secretary of State

Kandy, 24 September, 1945—11:16 a.m.
[Received 24 September.]

558. [For Moffat:] General Timberman⁶³ and I met with Dening this morning. He states that he has explicit instructions from Foreign Office to present to Thai delegation immediately upon their arrival this afternoon (24 Sept local time) the draft agreement with military annex in form submitted to Dept by British Sept 10. He will then give Thais 24 hours to study draft. If they object to certain points he will submit these objections to London by cable for approval or disapproval. He expects London would reply to cable within day or so and that Thais would then be asked to sign agreement as finally cleared by London.

2. Dening stated he had absolutely no authority from London to negotiate with U.S. concerning terms of agreement and therefore was unable even to discuss with me points raised in Dept’s No. 105 September 21 to Colombo.⁶⁴ He said he understood Anglo-American conversations on the subject are still proceeding in Washington and that if British accept any of U.S. points before agreement is signed appropriate changes could be made in draft. He emphasized, however, that he is under strict instructions to proceed with immediate negotiation and conclusion of agreement with Thais without reference to course of Anglo-American conversations.

3. I stated it seemed to me that a serious misunderstanding had occurred between London and Washington since we had believed we had received assurances from British Gov at time of signature of Interim Military Agreement that no further agreement would be signed with Thais until Anglo-American views had been reconciled between State Dept and Foreign Office. (See Dept’s 96 Sept 8 to Colombo.⁶⁵) I added that the whole point of the negotiations which had been proceeding between Dept and British Embassy in Washington would seem to be negated by apparent British decision to proceed with conclusion of agreement with the Thais within the next few days without regard to course of Anglo-American conversations.

4. Dening stated that the assurances to which I referred related only to agreement with the Thais by SACSEA in the name of the Allies and did not cover agreements negotiated between HMG and Thais. He said he understood Dept had stated it had no intention of questioning right of HMG to conclude separate agreement with Siam.

5. I replied that this is of course the case but that basis of the misunderstanding seemed to me to be British assumption that since such agreement was removed from sphere of SACSEA there was no longer an American interest involved. I pointed out that, regardless of the machinery employed, U.S. had definite interest in (1) settlements arising out of a war in which we had played a major role and (2) maintenance of sovereignty of Siam whose position as only independent nation in SEA gave it a unique importance throughout area. I added that our failure to declare war on Siam could hardly be taken as a basis for assuming that we had no interest in an overall settlement with Siam of the character contemplated by HMG.

6. In conclusion I referred to fact that British had informed Thais that the draft agreement had been transmitted to U.S. Gov and expressed view that, if we remain silent, the Thais may well believe, especially in view of long Anglo-American association in SEAC, that draft has our approval. I said that, if HMG proceeded to the conclusion of the agreement without further reference to U.S. views, I personally felt that we would be obliged in our own interest to state to Thais facts of case, that is, that while we found most of the draft reasonable and satisfactory there are several points with which we do not agree and which we are discussing with the British. Dening replied that HMG would be displeased with such a step as it would retard their negotiations.

7. The conversation was friendly but could lead to no result in view of Dening’s binding instructions from London. It appears to me that our only alternatives are either (1) to abandon our objectives and let the agreement be signed as is or (2) to ask London urgently to instruct Dening not to conclude the negotiations until Anglo-Amercan views have been reconciled. I should recommend the latter course. In the meantime I should greatly appreciate receiving instructions as to (1) whether there is any further step which the Dept desires me to take here with the British and (2) whether I am authorized, in case the British proceed to the immediate conclusion of the agreement as it stands, to make to the Thais a statement of the U.S. position along the lines suggested in para 7 [6?] above. I am keeping in close touch with Dening and also shall be in contact with the Thai delegation.

8. I hope to obtain shortly the necessary information to reply Dept’s 104 Sept 21 to Colombo.⁶⁶

[

Yost

]

63. Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, Head of the Liaison Staff of the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the India–Burma Theater.
64. Not printed. This telegram was sent to London, Chungking, New Delhi, and Colombo with a summary of the British Embassy aide-mémoire of September 8, the texts of the Heads of Agreement and Military Annex handed by the British Embassy to the Department on September 10, and the Department’s aide-mémoire of September 19, pp. 1309, 1316, 1319, 1323, respectively.
65. Not printed.
66. See footnote 59, p. 1331.