841.51/12–345: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 3—10 p.m.]
12668. Personal for Secretary Byrnes and Assistant Secretary Clayton. At 7 p.m. London time Prime Minister Attlee asked me to meet with him at No. 10 Downing Street. When I arrived there he told me he wanted to discuss with me the loan and trade agreements being negotiated in Washington.
[Page 189]He wanted to discuss specifically the cancellation for Great Britain, in the last US draft of the financial arrangements, of what he referred to as the main safeguards of the Bretton Woods Agreements. He explained to me that he felt that without these safeguards Parliament would not accept the Bretton Woods Agreement. Other questions under negotiation, he told me, had been agreed upon. Timing, he said, was important as the Parliament adjourns on December 19. The debate in the House on these measures, he said, would occupy at least 2 days and, if passed, the Lords would require additional time and at least a day’s debate.
It was not easy for me to meet his arguments, as I have not been currently informed on the financial negotiations and have seen no recent copies of the US proposals. I did tell him, however, that in my opinion he could not expect the Congress to approve the loan agreement if the British Parliament rejected Bretton Woods. I also asked him if he would give me a note on the points in the US draft to which he objected. He then sent for Mr. Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who came accompanied by Sir Stafford Cripps.
After a brief interchange the following statement was given to me:
“The three essential points in which the financial agreement runs counter to the Bretton Woods Agreement are first, we are deprived of the benefit of the 5-year transitional period provided at Bretton Woods, which, for us, alone among all the signatories, is cut down to 15 months; second, we are deprived, alone of all the other signatories, of the benefit of the scarce currencies clause; third, we are deprived, alone of all the other signatories, of the right to resign membership of the fund and regain freedom of action in all matters regulated by the Bretton Woods Agreement. This third freedom, moreover, is withdrawn from us for more than half a century, i.e. during the currency of the loan agreement.”
All three men agreed (1) that they could not “recommend with conscience” the Bretton Woods Agreement with these restrictions; (2) that if they did recommend it, it would be voted down in the Commons, (3) that the Govt could not afford a serious defeat on a measure of this importance. All three with great earnestness assured me that they wanted to get agreement on the loan, that they believed that the trade agreement, which they heartily approved, was of world importance, and that they wanted Bretton Woods and were certain that Parliament would accept it as it was agreed to at Bretton Woods.