Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot 52–M45

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 30

[Extract]
SWNCC 5/2

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Conclusions

13.
The British contention that security reasons in the post-war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.
14.
In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.
15.
Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U. S. forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of U. S. forces, the extent of participation by the U. S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U. S. commander to the Joint [Page 1249] Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.
16.
The United States is opposed to the use of United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC31 area as a basis for prejudging in any way the solution of post-war problems, or to the use of such operations as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.
17.
The United States is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery in Thailand designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

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  1. Approved on February 9 by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee which directed referral of this paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff “for such action as they might deem appropriate”. On March 11, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was advised that the Joint Chiefs had taken note of SWNCC 5/2. The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that the JCS action also included forwarding a copy of the paper to General Sultan for his information on the same date.
  2. Southeast Asia Command. For account of its operations, see Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, Smith-East Asia, 1943–1945 (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951).