856E.00/12–645
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
| Participants: | Lieutenant Colonel K. K. Kennedy, M.I.S.30 |
| Mr. Holden Furber, BC; | |
| Mr. Emerson, FE/R;31 | |
| Mr. Abbott Low Moffat, SEA; | |
| Mr. John F. Cady, SEA. |
Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy visited Batavia on two occasions during the months of September and October. He was aboard the British vessel, the Cumberland, carrying an advance group to Batavia. Mr. van der Plas was among the passengers. The confident prediction of van der Plas that the Javanese would welcome back the Dutch was proved incorrect. After spending one day on shore, he was obliged to return for safety to the Cumberland. For approximately a week the British and Americans were treated with great cordiality by the Indonesians. Eventually independence placards in English appeared in profusion quoting from historic American sources. British orders had not anticipated the situation, and no clear course was open to them.
Colonel Kennedy himself made the original contact with Soekarno and associates and learned that they would cooperate with the Allied forces if: (1) no political interference was contemplated within Indonesia, (2) prompt attention was given to disarming the Japanese and evacuating prisoners of war and internees, and (3) the landing of Dutch representatives or armed forces was prohibited. Colonel Kennedy reported his conversation to General Christison, who subsequently talked with Soekarno. The upshot of these conferences was the original British declaration which limited British objectives in accordance with Indonesian demands. With the arrival of Dr. van Mook and General van Oyen, the situation began to deteriorate. The Dutch leaders appeared to have had no clear idea what policy to pursue. When van Mook undertook to inform the Indonesian leaders concerning the postwar plans which the Dutch had in mind, his action was emphatically repudiated by The Hague. The subsequent shooting incident in front of van Oyen’s residence aggravated the situation.
Soekarno indicated to Colonel Kennedy that, while Indonesians thought that they were already prepared for self-government, his followers would be prepared to accept tutelage under United Nations direction looking toward eventual self-government. Under no circumstances, [Page 1179] however, would Soekarno accept a proposal of a period of tutelage under Dutch direction. Colonel Kennedy expressed his opinion that although the village farmer might prefer to be left alone to cultivate his paddy land in peace, the feeling of nationalism had become sufficiently widespread throughout the Javanese population that the people as a whole could be aroused to resist Dutch rule and that none would support the Dutch. Peasants who were selling produce for Japanese currency would later suffer most heavily if the Dutch repudiated this currency.
Soekarno’s power to control all elements of the Indonesian nationalist movement declined rapidly after the British began to abandon General Christison’s original declaration of policy in favor of restoring Dutch control. Youthful extremists in many areas eventually got completely out of hand; no authority in Java at the moment is capable of controlling them. Colonel Kennedy expressed the belief that considerable concessions to meet the political demands of the Indonesians would have to be made before order could be restored. He felt that a fully equipped Dutch division could probably penetrate Java and proceed wherever it wished to go, but that immediately after the army had passed a given point the revolution would close in behind it. He confirmed previous information that the morale and physical condition of Dutch soldiers now in military training at Saigon and Singapore were exceedingly low. The men individually wished to return to their families in Java, but they had no desire to undertake to fight their way in.
Anti-Dutch feeling in important sections of Sumatra was rapidly rising according to information available at Singapore. Up to the end of October not a single Japanese soldier had been disarmed in Java or Sumatra.
Japanese troops have conducted themselves with technical correctness in practically every situation, although they did abandon large concentrations of arms and munitions in mountainous central Java which the Indonesians took over. At Soerabaja considerable Japanese equipment fell into the hands of the Indonesians after an unaccompanied Dutch officer accepted the Japanese surrender, only to have Indonesian extremist forces immediately seize the equipment turned over by the Japanese.
Colonel Kennedy said that all prisoners of war in Java had been brought out by the middle of October. The internees, mostly women and children confined in some 30 internment camps, were being fed and protected by the Japanese under reasonably satisfactory conditions when the British arrived. The RAPWI merely substituted British guards for the Japanese and required that all requisitions for food formerly furnished internees by the Japanese should go through [Page 1180] RAPWI hands. At the time of Colonel Kennedy’s visits to Java, no effort was being made to evacuate the internees, although the latter were facing increasing danger as the anti-Dutch feeling among the Indonesians rose. Internees appeared to be in reasonably good health and averaged perhaps only ten pounds under their normal weight. The Indonesians seemed to harbor no hatred of the Dutch as individuals but were very bitter toward the Eurasian population. Few, if any, of the Dutch were willing to face the fact that Japanese occupation had developed nationalistic feeling among the people which could not be dissipated by the killing of a few score people as had been done in the riots of 1926. The Dutch with whom he had talked refused to recognize the existence of changed conditions.