856E.00/10–1845
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)
| Participants: | Mr. F. C. Everson, British Embassy |
| Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA | |
| Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA |
Mr. Everson called and stated that the Embassy had been instructed by London to bring the Department up to date on the situation in the NEI and on British intentions in that area. He handed Mr. Moffat a copy of Mr. Attlee’s replies to two questions in the House of Commons on October 17.15
He then read from a number of telegrams covering the period from October 11 to October 16. Some of them to or from Admiral Mountbatten had already been available to the Department through the War Department.
The general picture furnished by these telegrams is that Admiral Mountbatten, General Christison, Admiral Patterson, Governor van Mook, Deputy Governor van der Plas, and Admiral Helfrich appear to be in complete accord that a meeting of all Indonesian leaders must be held to discuss conditions in Java, to advertise the Queen’s proclamation in 1942, to inform the Indonesians of the changes in the world during their isolation under Japanese control, and to advise them of the British determination to disarm the Japanese and to release the prisoners of war and internees who number approximately 100,000. The text of a statement which it was proposed that General Christison should make at the meeting was included in one of the telegrams. It was moderate in tone and reasonable.
The telegrams disclosed that the Indonesians are in control of Java but that the moderate elements may not for long be able to exercise that control over the extremists. The decision has been made that Mountbatten shall not undertake to maintain law and order throughout Java but only in a few key points where Japanese are located and in the areas immediately surrounding internment camps where such law and order is necessary for the release of Allied prisoners of war and internees. The British intend to work with and hold the Indonesian authorities responsible for law and order but believe they can do this only if they have sufficient forces to back such authorities and that if they have such forces on hand their use will probably not be necessary. British strength will accordingly be increased to two divisions [Page 1166] in Java and one division in Sumatra. Dutch civil affairs officers are to be kept out of sight as much as possible and presently merge with the Dutch and Indonesian civil administration. No further Dutch troops are to be admitted into Java, but they are to be concentrated at some other point in SEAC16 theater for reorganization so that when they enter Java they can enter with as great strength and efficiency as possible.
A telegram from Dening, political adviser to Mountbatten, strongly criticized the Dutch attitude toward Soekarno on the ground that Soekarno is not a great man and that if, along with other Indonesian leaders, he is held responsible for law and order his strength will rapidly dwindle as he proves incompetent for the task. Dening felt that the Dutch Government in singling him out for opposition and exclusion from all discussions was building him up in Indonesian eyes by making a martyr of him and crediting him with unnecessary importance.
The Dutch Government approved the plan for the meeting of Indonesian leaders but specifically excluded Soekarno although an opportunity was afforded to permit Soekarno’s attendance on van Mook’s personal authority. In communicating this Dutch decision to Mountbatten, the latter was advised, unless he felt this “worse than useless”, to follow the Dutch proposal and then to have a separate British meeting with Soekarno. After surveying the situation with van Mook, Mountbatten replied that not only would such a meeting without Soekarno be useless but a meeting under those circumstances would prejudice subsequent efforts to smooth the situation. Accordingly, the British Government is again pressing the Dutch Government to reverse its earlier position and admit Soekarno to the meeting which has not yet been held.
Admiral Mountbatten stated that in his opinion, if Soekarno continued to be excluded by the Dutch from all Indonesian meetings, civil war would result; that under the circumstances he proposed to expedite the bringing in of the maximum number of Dutch troops so as to minimize the loss of life among British troops.
Walsh, formerly a British consul in Texas, is to go very shortly to Batavia as Consul General and will be accompanied by Dening, who expects to be there for a day or two. Dening has suggested that at the proposed meeting with the Indonesian leaders Christison speak on military matters and that he speak on political aspects. In one of his reports Dening stated it was essential to bring pressure on both the Dutch and the Indonesians to see reason as “considerable deflation” was needed by each.
[Page 1167]One of Admiral Mountbatten’s telegrams strongly protested two speeches in the Dutch Parliament construed as derogatory of British efforts, one of which was by Dr. Logemann, Colonial Minister.
On October 15 the Dutch Ambassador17 had a conference with Mr. Attlee in which he queried why, if the British had been ready to mount an offensive against Malaya at the time of the Japanese surrender, they had not been able to bring in an adequate number of troops into the NEI. Mr. Attlee explained the necessity for the diffusion of British forces to cover Malaya, Siam, Indochina, Hongkong and the NEI. Toward the end of the interview, the Ambassador strongly criticized British policy as having left recovery of the NEI to the last and then commencing to demobilize British forces before the islands were recovered. He finally stated that if the British did not give better help to the Dutch, it would adversely affect future British-Netherlands relations. … The Ambassador then stated that his Government was considering appealing to the United States for help. Mr. Attlee replied he did not know what reaction the Dutch would receive from the American Government but suggested that before making such an appeal they follow the proposals already made by the British. (He had already set forth to the Ambassador the same views regarding the Dutch attitude toward Soekarno as Dening had communicated to London.)