Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

856D.00/10–845

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

[Washington,] October 8, 1945.

The following summary of the current situation in the Netherlands Indies is based on telegrams from our representatives at Lord Mountbatten’s² headquarters in Kandy, Ceylon, the Embassy at The Hague and OSS³ reports from Batavia. Walter Foote⁴ arrived at Melbourne on September 29 and reported that he was arranging to proceed by air to Brisbane and hoped to reach Batavia some time during the first week of October. To date no further report has been received from Foote.

Prior to the Japanese surrender the attitude of the Netherlands authorities with regard to the probable reaction of the Indonesian population to the return of the Dutch was most optimistic. Typical of this attitude is a reported statement by Lieutenant General van Oyen, Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Indies Army, who stated that the people of the NEI⁵ except for a few dissidents would generally support the former NEI Government and that it was the general impression that Japanese propaganda in the NEI had influenced about one tenth of 1% of the population. Developments since the surrender, however, have highly disturbed the Dutch. On August 19, 1945, Dr. Soekarno, Indonesian Nationalist leader, whom the Dutch had imprisoned on various occasions and who has been a conspicuous collaborator with the Japanese since the occupation, proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia with himself as President and one Mohammed Hatta as Vice President. Mohammed Hatta has been Soekarno’s principal supporter in anti-Dutch activities before the occupation and like him collaborated with the Japanese. The leaders of the “Republic” have disavowed all connection with the Japanese and declared that they would not oppose Allied entry into Java, have also declared themselves unwilling to deal with the Dutch alone and ready to negotiate with regard to the future status of the Netherlands Indies only with representatives of the principal Allied powers.

Up to the present the Dutch have been unable to land any significant force in the Netherlands Indies. About September 9, Dr. Charles O. van der Plas, head of the Civil Administration in the “Council of Department Heads”, which had been set up by the Dutch at Brisbane, Australia, as a provisional government of the Netherlands Indies, arrived in Batavia on board a British cruiser. Dr. van der Plas, who has adopted the Mohammedan religion and has long been known as an advocate of greater autonomy for the Netherlands Indies, apparently considered the situation so serious as to necessitate a visit to Admiral Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander for South East Asia, at Singapore. According to a report received on the 29th of September from Charles Yost⁶ at Kandy, Ceylon, Mountbatten in an interview on September 28 urged van der Plas immediately to confer in Batavia with the Indonesian leaders and to send a message to van Mook⁷ and the Dutch Government recommending an immediate pronouncement for “some degree of independence” for the NEI. Mountbatten further informed van der Plas that British forces could not be permitted to become involved in NEI internal politics and that British forces were in Java only to secure key areas such as Batavia and Surabaya, to control local Japanese headquarters, to undertake the disarming of the Japanese and to recover POW’s. Van der Plas is said to have informed Mountbatten that this attitude was contrary to Dutch expectations that the British would assume responsibility for law and order throughout the NEI pending arrival of Netherlands forces.

Mountbatten’s views were cabled by van der Plas to van Mook at Brisbane and to the Netherlands Government at the Hague. Van der Plas is reported to have recommended that (1) he should be authorized to commence discussions with all Indonesians of influence (2) that he should announce that fact at the time of the arrival of the first Netherlands occupation troops in Batavia and (3) that Acting Governor General van Mook should proceed immediately to Java by air. Van der Plas is said to have stated that in view of the urgency of the situation he would proceed with the foregoing unless instructed to the contrary. Press reports indicate that van der Plas on his return to Batavia did in fact announce his willingness to confer with Indonesian leaders. The Indonesian leaders, however, were reported to have repeated their determination not to confer with the Dutch alone.

The recommendations of van der Plas were apparently not welcomed either by van Mook or the Netherlands Government. A further telegram from Kandy reports that van Mook declared that he could not understand Mountbatten’s position as he assumed from the Anglo-Dutch civil affairs agreement that Mountbatten was responsible for the maintenance of law and order throughout the NEI until the Dutch were in a position to take over. On October 1, Netherlands Admiral Helfrich is reported to have telegraphed Mountbatten protesting the reported intention of the British Commander in the NEI to hold conferences with the “so-called Indonesian government of Soekarno”. Mountbatten is reported to have replied that the British Commander would not confer personally but merely would facilitate arrangement for van der Plas to meet various Indonesian leaders. Mountbatten cited the success of British negotiations with the leaders of the Burmese independence movement as evidence of the value of such contacts.

On October 1, the Netherlands Government at the Hague issued the following official statement to the press:

“The Allied Supreme Command has decided that the occupation of Java remains confined for the time being to the towns of Batavia and Soerabaja. This leaves open the question who is to exercise authority in the remaining part of the island. It is, of course, impossible to turn over such authority to the Japanese, who will have to be disarmed and made prisoners of war. The Dutch are not yet able to take over the authority, the reason being, as is well known, that the European part of the Netherland Kingdom has been liberated so recently and that the formation and transport of the new military units has continually been slowed up by the war needs and demobilization claims of the major allies.

The difficulties that have arisen as a consequence probably explain the tendency which, according to press reports, exists in certain British circles to recognize the so-called Soekarno Government as the de facto government and to persuade us to have discussions with them.

The Netherlands Government cannot do this. Soekarno has allowed himself to be the tool and puppet of the Japanese for which he has received a high Japanese imperial decoration. This man, with his fascist tendencies, has systematically preached hatred against the Allies (one of his slogans was: “America mau di strika, Inggris mau di linggis” which means “America we shall iron out, England we shall break open with a crowbar”). The representatives of the lawful authority cannot sit at the conference table with this man who may have certain demagogic gifts but who has proved to be a mere opportunist in choosing the means to attain his end.

All that has been said and done during the last few days in connection with the development of events in the Netherlands East Indies will not dissuade the Netherlands Government from following their well-considered policy as laid down inter alia in the well-known address of Her Majesty the Queen of December 7[6], 1942.⁸ In this address Her Majesty announced complete partnership of the Netherlands Indies within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and freedom of conduct regarding their internal affairs. This was the policy and that remains the policy. The government has nothing to add to this.”

On October 1, according to a report from Kandy, the British Chiefs of Staff telegraphed Mountbatten reporting strong adverse Dutch reaction to his statement to van der Plas that British forces would not assist in the re-establishment of Dutch authority in the event of civil disorder. The Chiefs of Staff asked Mountbatten to report (1) the extent to which he considered he could ensure law and order outside Batavia and Surabaya with the forces he planned to place in Java (2) what additional forces would be necessary if strong Indonesian resistance should develop. Our representative at Kandy observes that while no policy is laid down in this telegram it is clear that the British Chiefs of Staff are giving consideration to modification of Mountbatten’s policy in the direction of further assistance to the Dutch.

The presently available forces, according to a telegram from Yost at Kandy on September 29, are:

1. British

A. One battalion at Batavia on September 29, one brigade at Batavia by October 2.

B. One brigade less a battalion at Padang by October 10.

C. One brigade at Surabaya, October 14.

D. One battalion at Medan, October 14.

2. Dutch

A. Three companies on September 29 and four additional companies at Batavia about October 4 from Australia and Borneo.

B. Sometime shortly after October 20 four Dutch battalions from Europe to Batavia and at some indeterminate date thirteen additional battalions.

According to the State Department’s information there are at present only about 2,000 Dutch troops available in Australia to be sent to the NEI. There are in this country at Quantico 5,000 Netherlands marines whom the American Joint Chiefs propose to ship out of this country about November 15. There are also known to be about 2,000 Netherlands marine recruits awaiting transportation at Antwerp. According to Sidney Browne, First Secretary at The Hague, who has just arrived in the Department en route to take up a post in the Consulate General at Batavia, the recruiting of forces for the NEI has met with very limited success in spite of vigorous propaganda. Dutch reports claim that some 45,000 persons have been recruited for service in the NEI but these reports make no distinction between military and administrative personnel and in view of the short time elapsed since the liberation of the Netherlands it is probable that their training is not very far advanced.

The situation has been further complicated for the Dutch by friction with the Australians. The Dutch have been very suspicious of Australian designs on the NEI and Australian cooperation with the Dutch seems to have been rather grudging. The Dutch endeavored to make arrangements to have 30,000 troops trained in Australia but as a result of a series of misunderstandings these efforts had little practical result. On September 24 Australian longshoremen in Melbourne and Sydney refused to load a number of Dutch vessels in sympathetic support of a strike by Indonesian seamen who contended that the ships were carrying materials to the Indies “for the suppression of the newly elected people’s government”. According to press reports, the Australian Minister of Supply and Shipping assured the Netherlands authorities that all Dutch ships in Australian ports would be loaded in due course but in so doing he is reported to have added that there will be no difficulties “providing there were no arms or munitions on the ships.”

On the basis of the scant reports so far received, it is difficult to evaluate the strength of Indonesian resistance to Dutch reoccupation of the Indies. Up to the present anti-Dutch sentiment in the Indies has been notable chiefly amongst Indonesian intellectuals. The mass of the population consists of uneducated, illiterate and passive peasants who have so far shown little interest in anything outside their local village. There is also on the other hand, a considerable group of moderate Indonesian intellectuals who while in favor of Indonesian autonomy seek this greater independence only within the framework of the Netherlands Commonwealth. This group is made up largely of members of the native aristocracy, government employees, Eurasians and Chinese.

The movement led by Soekarno disclaims any connection with the Japanese and the Japanese are reported to have arrested a few of the nationalists who actually indulged in violence. On the other hand, the pattern of the “uprising”, if it may be so called, follows that in other areas of Japanese occupation and presumably is not in any way displeasing to the Japanese. To the extent nationalists are armed it is assumed that they must have obtained these arms from the Japanese.

The Queen’s 1942 declaration to which reference is made in the Netherlands Government communiqué of October 1 provided that an Empire Round Table Conference shall be convoked as soon as possible. According to the Netherlands Government press service reports, it is the intention of the Netherlands authorities to reconvene as soon as possible after their return to the NEI a temporary Netherlands Indian Volksraad with a “fair majority of Indonesians” as members. This Volksraad would “of necessity” be a temporary chamber named by Acting Governor General van Mook. This temporary Volksraad would in turn appoint the NEI delegates to the Empire Round Table Conference. It is obvious that under this procedure the Indonesian representatives to the Conference would be hand picked by the Netherlands authorities.

H[ugh] S. C[umming]

2. Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander for South East Asia.
3. Office of Strategic Services.
4. Consul General at Batavia.
5. Netherlands East Indies.
6. United States Political Adviser to the Commanding General of the India–Burma Theater.
7. Hubertus J. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies.
8. For substance of radio address delivered December 6, 1942, see the New York Times, December 7, 1942, p. 11.