895.50/12–2745: Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 28.]
Tfgbi 87. Developments here since submission original estimates of commodities required from and exportable to Soviet-occupied Korea have necessitated certain revisions which we believe should be transmitted to Embassy Moscow for use if present negotiations there include Korean problems.
We still need coal and other commodities from the north in substantially the same quantities as those originally requested. With regard to metals and minerals which can be shipped to the north, substitute concentrates for metallic zinc, lead and copper. Moreover, delivery of all these products cannot now be made until second quarter 1946, time of delivery depending considerably on receipt of coal from north for industrial use.
Our original estimate included possibility our shipping to Soviet Zone 4 to 5,000,000 bushels rice first quarter 1946. There are now no [Page 1152] immediate prospects of any rice being available, although the crop of 1945 has been good. This condition caused by following factors:
- a.
- For first time in many years Koreans can eat all the rice with a corresponding decrease in consumption secondary cereals which in any event largely came from north and are not now available (preference is of course for rice over other cereals).
- c.
- [sic] Farmers are reluctant to sell
rice because:
- 1.
- With scarcity of consumer goods money has little value.
- 2.
- They have been misled to believe that much of their rice will be shipped to Japan although Mil Gov’t’s fundamental policy is Korean products for Korean people.
- 3.
- Many are withholding rice in the hope of increased prices later.
- d.
- Refugees from Japan and Soviet occupied areas are rapidly increasing the population of our area of Korea.
- e.
- The shortage of trucks, rolling stock and coal for the railways has created a serious transportation problem.
Mil Gov’t is devising measures designed to correct the conditions described above, and when a surplus of rice is on hand it will be made available to northern Korea on conditions to be determined at the time. In meantime Embassy Moscow should know that according to present indications the Soviets will probably be interested in obtaining rice from US as they have requisitioned large amounts for their troops in northern Korea, which are living off the country, thereby presumably creating a food shortage in that area.