Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control (Korea)/12–1945

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ⁶⁰

Tokyo, 16 December, 1945.

CA 56096. I invite attention to the following report made by the Commanding General USAFIK. This message embodies the reiteration of certain facts and recommendations which have been previously submitted. The situation demands positive action as nothing could be worse than to allow it to drift to an ultimate crisis.

[“]Subject: Conditions in Korea.

After 3 months in occupation of south Korea I have reached the following definite conclusions. These are considered a further crystallization of previous reports.

A. The dual occupation of Korea with Russia north and US south of the 38th degree parallel imposes an impossible condition upon our occupation missions of establishing sound economy and preparing Korea for future independence. In South Korea the US [is] blamed for the partition and [there] is growing resentment against all Americans in the area including passive resistance to constructive efforts we make here. No explanation can reach through to the people since it is counteracted by the existing facts. Every day of drifting under this situation makes our position in Korea more untenable and decreases our waning popularity and our effectiveness to be of service. The word pro-American is being added to pro-Jap, national traitor, and Jap collaborator. The only advantage of the Russian presence is to absorb a portion of the people’s resentment against the partition of Korea. Every Korean knows full well that under the dual occupation any talk of real freedom and independence is purely academic. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, ever to accomplish unity spirit in the Koreans until they see the present 38th parallel barrier removed. Every day of delay fosters further and permanent division of the people.

B. The Koreans want their independence more than any one thing and want it now. This stems from the Allied promise of freedom and independence which is well known by every Korean without the qualifying phrase “in due course”. I am told there are no Korean words expressing “in due course”. The general uncertainty and thwarted hopes of Korean masses after the initial occupation are growing toward certainty and hopelessness that the Allied powers were not sincere in their promise. By occidental standards Koreans are not ready for independence, but it grows daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government will not greatly improve with time under current conditions.

C. The situation in the South Korea makes extremely fertile ground for establishment of Communism. In my opinion Koreans do not want Communism, but the unsettled conditions, the lack of clear cut policies for the future and lack of hope for early national sovereignty by the peoples may easily push those in US zone to radical leftism, if not raw Communism. There is currently a flow of Manchurian and Chinese trained Korean Communists to south of 38th degree who are giving active assistance to Communistic elements already present. Cho Man Sik, a great Korean democratic leader operating north of the 38th degrees, assures me through intermediaries that Communism will be no problem there—that the people are cured by Russian occupation. He warns, however, that we must be careful south of 38th degrees if we do not want to encourage it. The approximate international influences and our occupation policies of insuring all freedom and maintaining property rights and order among liberated oriental people favor Communistic activities. Under these policies conservative groups tend to obey laws and ordinances while the radicals do not. The latter operate largely underground using terroristic or coercive measures, and their activities are almost impossible to stem with the untrained civil police and the small occupational force available with its extremely low effectiveness due to current disintegration through the discharge system now in effect.

D. The Koreans are the most politically minded people I have ever seen. Every move, every word, every act is interpreted and evaluated politically. A letter recently intercepted by censors seems to crystallize Korean psychology. A Korean north of 38th degrees told of typically reported Russian actions there but concluded that conditions are not too bad because the Russians in area didn’t interfere with his politics. There is little hope of any real coalition of political parties here until the 38th degree barrier is broken physically and politically and plans for final clear policies can be announced to the people in simple terms, including times and dates, and without a lot of contingencies.

E. Early establishment of firm and far-reaching policy of reparations and final disposal of former Japanese property is absolutely essential. Our inability to give more than vague evasive answers to all questions pertaining thereto is operating against our success in the occupation and is fostering radicalism, Communism, and direct action to get something for nothing on the part of [Korean radicals. With introduction of?] definite policies it is believed there will be a definite improvement of political and economic conditions as well as great decrease in agitation.

F. In the minds of all Koreans, “Trusteeship” hangs over them as a sword of Damocles. If it is imposed now or at any future time it is believed possible that the Korean people will actually and physically revolt.

G. The Russian methods of occupation north of the 38th degree are not understandable to Americans. There is evidence that they have constructed and maintain an effective field works system of defense against invasion just north of 38 degree. It is certain that they have constructed and constantly man with armed guards a line of road blocks facing south with weapons emplaced to fire south exactly across the line they interpret from their maps as the 38th degree parallel. Actually parts of this line are 1,000 to 1,200 yards south of the line shown by US maps. Although outwardly friendly relations between troops of the two nations exist, persistent reports come from the north that Russians repeatedly speak of war with US. There are also rumors south of 38 degree that US and Russia are preparing for war. Under current conditions, border incidents of a dangerous character could easily occur. Russian Consulate is maintained in Seoul with large staff with no legitimate reasons. The Consul General and ranking members of his staff are making increasingly frequent trips across the occupational boundary and are conferring with local Koreans. Despite the Russian border control, there is a daily flow southward of 5,000 to 6,000 destitute refugees, both Japs and Koreans, giving strong indication that the control valve is open for southward movement of undesirables. Koreans well know that the Russians have a force locally of about 4 to 1 to Americans and with the usual oriental slant are willing to do homage and are doing homage to the man with the largest weapon. On the part of the masses there is an increasing tendency to look to Russia for the future.

H. In summary, the U.S. occupation of Korea under present condition and policies is surely drifting to the edge of a political-economic abyss from which it can never be retrieved with any credit to United States prestige in the Far East. Positive action on the international level or the seizure of complete initiative in South Korea by the U.S. in the very near future is absolutely essential to stop this drift. Specifically and urgently needed are:

(1) Clarification and removal of 38th degree barrier so as to unify Korea.

(2) Clear-cut statement abandoning “Trusteeship”.

(3) Positive statement of policy regarding status of former Japanese property in Korea and reparations as applied to any such property.

(4) Reiteration of Allied promise of Korean independence accompanying foregoing acts.

(5) Establish complete separation of Korea from Japan in the minds of the press, the public, the State and War Depts and Allied Nations.

Under present conditions with no corrective action forthcoming I would go so far as to recommend we give serious consideration to an agreement with Russia that both the U.S. and Russia withdraw forces from Korea simultaneously and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self purification.

This report is being supplemented by a report from Langdon.”⁶¹

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MacArthur

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60. Copy transmitted on December 19 to Acting Secretary of State Acheson by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson with this comment: “I share the concern expressed by both General MacArthur and General Hodge and feel that urgent action is required. As you know, General Hodge has made every effort to establish liaison with the local Soviet Commander on matters within his province, but to no avail. Therefore, it would appear that the required action concerning the matters raised in the enclosed message must be taken on a governmental level. It appears that the question of Korea should be taken up with the Russians immediately in order to resolve the points raised in the enclosed message or at least to clarify the Russians’ intentions in order that our course of action may be determined.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/12–1945)

    Another copy was transmitted on December 19 to the Secretary of State by James Clement Dunn, Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, who stated: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with the enclosed message and view with grave concern the present situation in Korea. The Chiefs of Staff find themselves unable to issue adequate directives to their commanders in the field under the circumstances. The early advice of the State Department is requested.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/12–1945)

61. Supra. In telegram 2601, December 20, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union for the Secretary of State in Moscow, the Acting Secretary of State described the views of the Secretary of War and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, after alluding to telegrams CA 56096, December 16, and Tfgcg 189, December 14, recommended the following: “Should communiqué on Korea be contemplated for release in Moscow we suggest that in light of reports on undesirable reaction in Korea to trusteeship, statement might, in order to make it more acceptable to Koreans, stress interim arrangement for administering authority with suggestion that it may be expected to have the backing of UNO.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/12–2045)