740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–2145: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon)

12. The Department is giving careful consideration to the suggestions contained in your unnumbered, undated telegram received on November 2149 concerning possible abandonment of an international trusteeship for Korea. Your points raised against trusteeship were considered in the Department in its discussions concerning the best method by which Korea can become independent as soon as possible.

The decision to follow the trusteeship principle was reached prior to the occupation of Korea, and the adoption of this principle may still be necessary to secure the elimination of the barrier of the 38° parallel and zonal developments which are now taking place. As you know, the Soviet Government has on two separate occasions agreed orally with this Government to the establishment of a four-power trusteeship. It has been our thought that such an arrangement [Page 1138] would serve best to train Koreans adequately to assume the responsibilities of full independence and at the same time to assure the emergence of a united, independent Korea with a minimum of continued foreign interference in Korean affairs. However, if adequate specific guarantees for the unification and independence of Korea can be obtained from the Soviet Union, it is possible that we might not wish to continue to advocate trusteeship.

As you are aware, this Government has approached the USSR regarding the solution of problems arising from the 38° barrier. (Deptel 82, Nov 3 to Atcheson50). Moreover, it is contemplated that discussions will be started in the near future regarding the status of Korea prior to its complete independence. In regard to these latter conversations the Department is considering taking up with the Soviet Government the question of the future government of Korea.

Present thinking in the Department is that it would be safer, in the interest of Korean unity and early independence, to negotiate with the USSR before attempting to introduce a new idea such as a governing commission concerning which the USSR has made no commitments.

We note from reports in the New York Times under Seoul dateline of November 26 that Kim Koo has already taken steps toward party unity and that “with the provisional basis for a coalition already a reality, informed sources here tonight expressed confidence that a coalition to form a Provisional Government was only a matter of days and then Mr. Kim will be able to pronounce his readiness to form a government.”

The Department is aware of the difficult position which present conditions impose upon General Hodge and hopes that he will continue to use qualified Koreans to the maximum. The Department feels that the formation and support of a “Provisional Government” or even a “Governing Commission” may carry with it implications that such a body has, or might at least claim in the near future, jurisdiction over all of Korea. The Department believes that the USSR would react unfavorably to the creation by us of such a body, and if consulted would not agree thereto. Consequently, its premature establishment might prejudice negotiations with the U.S.S.R. With regard to support accorded Kim Koo and his group, therefore, it would seem desirable that no deviation be made from paragraphs 9c and g of SWNCC 176/8.51

Byrnes
  1. Ante, p. 1130.
  2. See footnote 14, p. 1106.
  3. Ante, p. 1073.