740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–2145: Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 44
[Received November 21—4:25 p.m.]
Tfgbi 20. Reference SWNCC 79/1 and 101/4 of October 20 and 24 respectively. After one month’s observation in liberated Korea and with background of earlier service in Korea, I am unable to fit trusteeship to actual conditions here or to be persuaded of its suitability from [Page 1131] moral and practical standpoints, and, therefore, believe we should drop it. It is thought wrong because the Korean people have always been a distinct nation except for 35 years of Jap rule and have high literacy, cultural and living standards judged by Asiatic and Middle Eastern standards. It is thought unpractical because it certainly will not be accepted by the Koreans and perhaps will have to be maintained by force. Unaware of Allied plans for Korea, Korean groups after the Jap surrender hastily and joyously formed self-styled government, republics, etc., to take over from the Japs and in the capacity of hosts welcomed our forces. Military Government, therefore, came as a surprise and disappointment. However, all classes of Koreans look upon us as deliverers and for that reason and because they have abiding trust in United States very [work]44a amicably with MG. Out [But] the Department’s recent press release concerning trusteeship for Korea, connoting that Koreans would continue to be somebody’s wards after MG, agitate all literate elements beyond anything since the surrender. The fact seems to be that all Koreans want their country to themselves in their life time and will not have any form of foreign tutelage to attain an alien standard of nationhood. In the Korean people are certain bad traits that cannot be overcome except by actual experience of their evil consequences: Division, obsequiousness, inordinate self seeking, strong sectional rivalries and intolerance of opposition. The Japs did not give the Koreans the opportunities to work these faults out of their system. A trusteeship would also have to repress these faults in order to function. True at the end of the trusteeship the natural process of self improvement would still lie before the Korean people as it does now. For the foregoing reasons I favor another plan instead of trusteeship.
In the light of actual conditions in Korea our policy of abstaining from any action which might interfere with the freedom of a liberated people to choose their own form of government seems inappropriate. Nearly three-fourths of the people live in our zone but are not seriously planning a government because it would obviously be to no purpose, we being the government. Thus, the situation will remain static unless we take a hand in it. Our caution over becoming associated with the so-called Provisional Government in Chungking seems unwarranted now as Kim Koo’s group has no rival for first government of liberated Korea, being regarded as quasi-legitimate by all elements and parties. Jubilance prevails over its impending return and widespread arrangements are being made for a triumphant welcome. The high esteem enjoyed by Kim Koo offers United States an opportunity for attempting a constructive Korean policy that [Page 1132] can hardly be resented or traduced. In broad outline this policy might be as follows:
- (1)
- The Commanding General directs Kim Koo to form a council in MG representative of the several political groups to study and prepare the form of government of Korea and to organize a Governing Commission; MG provides facilities, advice and working funds for such commission.
- (2)
- The Governing Commission is integrated with MG (presently rapidly being built up as an all Korean organization).
- (3)
- The Governing Commission succeeds MG as interim government, with Commanding General retaining power of veto and of appointing such American supervisors and advisors as he deems necessary.
- (4)
- Three other powers concerned are requested to supply some supervisors and advisors in Governing Commission in place of American.
- (5)
- Governing Commission hold selection of head of state.
- (6)
- Government formed by elected head of state recognized, treaties made with and missions accredited to it, and Korea admitted to UNO. Note: Somewhere in the transition, perhaps between (4) and (5), negotiations to be signed with Russia for mutual withdrawal of troops and extension to Russian zone of Governing Commission’s authority. Russia should be informed in advance of above plan and invited to further it by allowing persons in Russian zone nominated to Governing Commission by council to proceed to Seoul, but if Russian participation is not forthcoming plan should be carried out for Korea south of 38th parallel.
The old native regime internally was feudal and corrupt but the record shows that it was the best disposed toward foreign interests of the three Far Eastern nations, protecting foreign lives and property and enterprises and respecting treaties and franchises. I am sure that we may count on at least as much from a native government evolved as above, although we may be justified in expecting much more considering the progress of the people and country since and the leavening there will be of foreign supervisors. Another stabilizing factor would be the probable presence of an International Commission to service the national debt—Korea will have to borrow foreign exchange initially for reconstruction purposes, currency reserve, etc. As for the quarter of the population in the Northern Zone, I believe the Korean people too homogeneous to be so estranged by political and social innovations to the point where they would not welcome a national government.
The steps in this plan of course are contingent on a number of things, but if the plan has merit it is important that the first step be taken while the people still have enthusiasm for Kim Koo and general political fervor. Foregoing was prepared before receipt Deptel quoting to us passage in Moscow 3827, November 12, Deptel giving an estimate of Russian policy toward Korea. This estimate [Page 1133] would seem to add to the weight of my recommendations for scrapping trusteeship idea and working on plan of our own for an independent Korea. Mention may be made here of MG ordinance 28 of November 13, creating office of Director of National Defence and Bureau of Armed Forces therein which has as aim, organizing, training and equipping armed Korean military and naval forces.