740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–345: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)14
2278. Commanding General, U.S. Forces in Korea (Hodge), has reported that, while he has been accorded full authority to negotiate with Soviet forces on a local, military level regarding problems arising from establishment of two zones in Korea, he has found the Soviet Commander unauthorized to negotiate on such problems. Consequently, the 38 degree parallel has become in reality a closed border with result that Korean national life has been greatly disrupted. Unless agreement is reached in near future on many vital issues, execution of commitments of this Government and U.S.S.R. that all Korea shall be independent in due course will be seriously jeopardized. [Page 1107] Hodge has asked through MacArthur that negotiations be started immediately with Soviet Gov to bring about agreement on points enumerated under (1) to (6) immediately below. This Government believes that, even prior to discussion of a trusteeship arrangement, all possible steps should be taken to abolish restrictions on Korean life resulting from division of Korea into separate zones and to permit normal development of country and preservation of its political, social and economic unity.
Consequently, you are instructed to approach Soviet government with a view to obtaining its agreement in principle to following:
- (1)
- assurances of adequate, regular delivery to American zone from Soviet zone of coal and electric power;
- (2)
- resumption of railroad traffic and other means of communication between two areas;
- (3)
- adoption of uniform fiscal policies throughout Korea;
- (4)
- resumption of coast-wise shipping;
- (5)
- orderly settlement of displaced persons including repatriation of Japanese to Japan;
- (6)
- resumption of normal trade in minimum commodities needed in both areas.
Hodge has been authorized to settle details covering above points, but has informed us that in recent interchanges with Soviet Commander no agreements could be reached as result of professed lack of authority on part of Soviet Commander to act. Hodge has submitted following specific requirements which it is considered Soviets should be pressed to agree to under general terms outlined from (1) through (6) above.
- (1)
- delivery of minimum of 240,000 tons of coal per quarter to Southern area;
- (2)
- assurances of continued production and delivery to Southern area of electric power;
- (3)
- resumption of railroad traffic across 38 degree boundary and provision for interchange of rolling stock, maintenance and repair of equipment, crew and engine changing and checking stations;
- (4)
- adoption of uniform fiscal policies in respect to methods of handling financial institutions; restrictions and rates of foreign exchange, inter-area deposit transfers and trading in credits, exchange and commodities; standard currency for entire country;
- (5)
- adjustment of present 38 degree line to conform to administrative local sub-divisions, permitting reestablishment of normal governmental activities in rural areas. (All of Kyonggi-do should be in U.S. zone and all Hwanghae-do should be in Soviet zone. In addition, if Soviets will not relinquish Northern Kangwon-do, line should follow by local agreement, established political sub-divisions nearest 38th parallel.);
- (6)
- provision for uninterrupted exchange of telephone, telegraph and postal services with mutual acceptance of postage and reciprocal collections and apportionment of fees;
- (7)
- resumption of coast-wise shipping, which will necessitate agreement on port control, navigation, and other regulations;
- (8)
- assurances that such Japanese as are to be repatriated in Soviet zone will be sent direct to Japan without transit through U.S. zone;
- (9)
- permission for free movement of Korean refugees and displaced persons, and those engaged in normal business activities;
- (10)
- delivery of following commodities urgently needed in U.S. zone
for first quarter 1946:
Soy beans 1,076,946 bushels, wheat 1,310,206 bushels, barley 19,852 bushels, metric tons as follows of salt 37,500, steel 1,050, pig iron 1,400, aluminum 80, ferro molybdenum 15, ferro tungsten 60, special fertilizer 4,500, super phosphate 2,980, ammonium sulphate 200,000, calcium cyanide 3,000, apatite ore 37,000, pyrite ore 25,000, borax 50, copper sulphate 300, caustic soda 1,250, liquid chlorine 250, nitrate acid 625, hydrochloric acid 500, ammonia 5,500, sulphuric acid 8,500, rails 75 lb. weight 300, railroad coupling parts 50, coal tar 3,000.
Foregoing are to be considered as maximum estimated requirements which it is hoped will be obtained through your negotiations. They are set forth in detail for bargaining purposes. It is considered essential however that we receive Soviet minimum concurrence on items (1) through (4) in addition to salt and liquid chlorine listed in paragraph (10).
Should agreement be reached on any or all of the above points, assurances should be received that instructions will be issued Soviet Commander in Korea empowering him to act under terms of agreement. Provision should also be included in his instructions directing him to implement details of delivery by mutual agreement with Hodge on the spot.
On his part, Hodge is prepared to carry out reciprocal arrangements for a basic unification of Korea by making available to Soviet zone substantial amounts of commodities from South. For your information and possible use in negotiations, Hodge has estimated following items and amounts for first quarter 1946 may be available;
4 to 5,000,000 bushels of rice, metric tons as follows of molybdenum concentrates 80% 125, amorphous graphite mineral 3,750, asbestos mineral 500, zinc metallic 750, lead metallic 375, copper metallic 375, fluorite mineral 5,000, manganese ore 50% 2,550. Manufactures such as mining machinery and other capital goods normally produced in South will be available to North depending on supplies of raw materials such as coal and metals listed in (10) above.
Figures in this telegram are based on information available in U.S. zone and, except for coal and electricity needs, should be considered as tentative estimates of requirements and of supplies available.
For your information and background in approaching Soviet Gov, reference is made to copies of directives issued Hodge which have [Page 1109] been forwarded to Military Mission in Moscow. As you are aware, this gov favors termination of military government Korea as soon as possible and establishment of an international trusteeship pending complete independence. U.S.S.R. has agreed to future Korean independence by adherence to Potsdam Declaration. Stalin has also stated on several occasions that U.S.S.R. favored an international trusteeship for Korea with U.S., U.S.S.R., China and Great Britain as trustees. Dept assumes that such a trusteeship will be within framework of UNO.15 Dept is now in process of drafting an agreement for such a trusteeship. Latest draft is being sent you by airgram for your information. It is anticipated that separate negotiations will be undertaken soon with interested govts on trusteeship arrangements, and you will receive later instructions on this matter.
In view of immediate importance of problems facing occupation authorities in Korea it is felt negotiations on these matters should be undertaken immediately with Soviet govt prior to negotiations on trusteeship. You will have noted that present untenable situation in Korea resulting from division of country and occupation by two forces without liaison is creating growing unfavorable press and public comments here.
It may be useful to you in these negotiations to know that a Soviet Consul General and a considerable staff under him have been permitted by our Military authorities to continue to function in U.S. zone. You may in your discretion point this out to Soviets either in these negotiations or in connection with request that Clubb be permitted to proceed to Manchuria. (ReDeptel 2252, Oct 31).16
Should you deem it advisable, Benninghoff, FSO, Political Adviser attached to Hodge and now in Washington for consultation, could be temporarily detailed to Moscow to assist you in negotiations before his return to Korea.
Although these Korean matters are urgent Dept leaves to your discretion time and manner of presenting them to Soviets in order not to complicate prompt action on proposals you have already presented regarding Allied organizations for Japan.17