Records of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, Lot 57–F103. 800 Korea: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson)92
Tfgcg 109. Various messages from this Headquarters have referred to two generally opposing political elements in Seoul, Radical or Communist, and Conservative or Democratic. There is evidence that the former group receives support and direction from the Soviet Union (perhaps from Koreans formerly resident in Siberia). In any event it is the most aggressive party; its newspaper has compared American methods of occupation in a manner that may be interpreted as unfavorable to United States. This comparison makes particular reference to wholesale evictions of Japanese and confiscation of their property north of 38. One of the leaders of the group was quoted in the paper as saying that although he had great respect for the “Provisional Government” at Chungking he did not feel that that organization had any more claim to Korean loyalty than did a number of others. He mentioned particularly a Communistic Korean Independence Group at Yenan China and stated that he had been in contact with it during the past several years. It is the Communist or Radical Group in Seoul which has organized a “Korean Peoples Republic” and poses as a Korean Govt. So far no serious disturbances of the peace have been reported, but that is no guarantee for the future. Groups of Korean ruffians, suspected of being affiliated with the Communists, have forced Japanese in the city out of their homes and businesses and have demanded and received additional bonuses from Japanese employers. The Occupation Forces, widely dispersed, are unable to put a complete stop to such activities. The Conservative Group, which is much less aggressive but which is believed to represent the thought of the majority of thinking Koreans, are willing to cooperate with Mil Govt. Many of them have stated that they realize that their country must pass through a period of tutelage, and that they would prefer to be under American rather than Soviet guidance. Reports of Soviet activities north of 38 have thoroughly frightened them. These are the people who for the most part express loyalty to the “Provisional Government” and who would like to see Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo and Kim Kiu Sic return. Under the circumstances, especially as even the Communists have not completely disavowed the Chungking organization (probably because of its high prestige from the standpoint of patriotism), this Headquarters has recommended that the three persons mentioned above be permitted to return to Korea in their individual [Page 1071] capacities. It is not intended to give them any more recognition than is accorded to other prominent Koreans. They must be prepared to work with Mil Govt and sit on the Advisory Board on the same terms as the present Council members. See our Tfgcg 108. It is requested that Syngman Rhee and the others will be made aware of these conditions before they are permitted to come to Korea. As the news that these people are coming to Korea will probably cause considerable public comment and may even be used by unscrupulous means elements for their own political purposes, it is hoped that the necessary publicity in Seoul, the United States and Chungking will be so timed and correlated that there will be no doubt as to the reasons for their coming. In view of the fact that demands may be made for the return of Koreans from Yenan or elsewhere, it is suggested that any public release include a statement that Korean leaders are all welcome, but that until the situation clears up and normal transportation facilities become available the Mil Govt finds it necessary for the time being to limit the number of Koreans who can return. The above discussion of the political situation in Seoul has been prepared without reference to the problem posed by the division of the country at 38 parallel. Efforts here to get together with the Soviets to the North are still devoid of results, and the plans and recommendations of this Hq must necessarily be made on a day to day basis without knowledge of the reactions of Moscow or of the progress of negotiations between Washington and Moscow.
- Not sent to the Department.↩