895.01/9–2645

The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State

No. 5

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my dispatches No. 1 of 15 September 1945 and No. 4 of today’s date79 on the situation in Korea, and to submit further observations and comments on the same subject with especial reference to difficulties with the Soviet Union created by the arbitrary division of the country at the 38th parallel.

The problems presented to this headquarters caused by the division of the country into two zones are of two general categories: (1) urgent problems concerned with the supply of essential commodities, especially coal, and (2) other problems, equally urgent but more long range in character, such as the negotiation of an arrangement for the military government of Korea based on the principle of the essential economic and social unity of the country. Efforts have been made by Lieutenant General Hodge to establish contact with the Soviet commander to the north, and although a group of officers dispatched by him was received with the usual Russian cordiality and entertainment, nothing of substance resulted. At the present time, over two weeks since the first American landing, this headquarters has not even entered into discussions with the Russians on a number of urgent subjects. The group of officers mentioned above outlined the problems to the Russians but there was no discussion.

Under the circumstances, General Hodge dispatched Brigadier General J. R. Sheetz and me to Tokyo to discuss the situation with General Headquarters there. After some discussions with the appropriate officers, an agreement was reached to the effect that the Japanese Government will be instructed to ship 70,000 tons of Kyushu coal a month to Fusan until such time as coal can be obtained in the normal manner from the north. Simultaneously, we discussed the broad question of our relations with the Soviets with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General S. J. Chamberlin. We handed him a memorandum recommending that the War Department be informed of the situation with a view to taking the matter up with the Soviet Government at the highest level possible. The Deputy Chief of Staff said that an appropriate communication would be radioed to Washington that day, September 24. I do not know whether that message will be brought to the attention of the Department of State.

I earnestly and urgently suggest that the Department associate itself with or initiate steps designed (1) to cause the resumption of a [Page 1060] normal supply of coal and other commodities from the north to the south, and (2) to bring about a rapprochement between the American and Soviet commands in Korea so that arrangements can be made for the control of the country on a unified basis pending negotiation of a trusteeship agreement as originally contemplated. Unless something of this nature is done in the very near future, the welcome, trust and respect accorded the United States by Koreans may well be transformed into a belief that we have no intention of assisting them along the road to democracy and independence. If this should come about, Korea will be at the mercy of agitators desirous of undermining the goodwill and prestige which the United States now enjoy here.

Respectfully,

H. Merrell Benninghoff
  1. No. 4 not printed, but see footnote 73, p. 1054.