740.00116 PW/10–845
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan
(Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
No. 3
Tokyo, October 8,
1945.
[Received October 22.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit copy
of a memorandum of this date to the Supreme Allied Commander
recommending the arrest of Prince Higashi-Kuni, recently
premier,40 who is
listed by the American Government as a suspected war
criminal.
While as mentioned in our telegram No. 3 of September 27,
1945,41 it is considered advisable to proceed
with some caution in such matters, I do not perceive reason to
wait longer in this instance as Higashi-Kuni is now without
office and has served the primary purpose for which he was
placed in office. It has been apparent for some time that a
number of Government officials have felt handicapped by the
possibility that they might be at any time arrested for
prosecution as war criminals. For this and various obvious
reasons, now that the occupation and demobilization program in
Japan is practically accomplished, the sooner the arrests of
high officials is completed the better it will be for Japan as
well as for the interests of the United States and the other
United Nations.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Acting Political Adviser
in Japan (Atcheson)
Memorandum for: Supreme Commander and
Chief of Staff.42
- 1.
- Now that Higashi-Kuni has left office and (it is
understood) the American occupation and Japanese
demobilization in Japan are practically complete, we
suggest that consideration be given to the question of
arresting him as a suspected war criminal after the new
cabinet begins to function.
- 2.
- While the arrest of Higashi-Kuni may be a shock to the
Japanese people because of his blood relationship, the
people have so far without serious adverse reaction
absorbed a number of what may be regarded as very heavy
shocks to Japanese psychology: the subjugation of the
Emperor’s authority to the authority of the Supreme
Allied Commander;
[Page 942]
the arrest of former premier
Tojo;43 the Emperor’s recent call on General
MacArthur; the more recent directive to the Japanese
Government in regard to freedom of speech including
discussion of the Emperor.44
- 3.
- A strong advantage to be gained from the early arrest
of former high officials such as
Higashi-Kuni is that the sooner such arrests are
completed, the more quickly will other high officials
and personages who are worried about their own status in
connection with war crimes attain a peace of mind to
enable them to devote their abilities, such as they may
be, to the task of reforming and rehabilitating the
government in this country. The advisability of
proceeding cautiously is, of course, still obvious; but
it is believed it would be feasible to work out a
definite program of arrests of high officials listed as suspects for
completion in a short period with sufficient time in
between the arrests to observe the reaction to each with
a view to accelerating or retarding the program as
circumstances might dictate. The arrest of Higashi-Kuni
as the most highly placed in office under the Emperor
since the surrender, would also pave the way for the
arrest of other persons of importance in the Japanese
hierarchy. Upon completion of such program it might be
advisable to give public indication that the task of
taking into custody high officials under suspicion was
“in general” accomplished, thus allaying the fears of
the others and leaving them no real excuse for not
getting down to business in earnest.
