740.00116 PW/9–145
The United States Commissioner, United Nations
War Grimes Commission (Hodgson), to the Secretary of
State
No. 217
London, September 1,
1945.
[Received September 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit the
following document for the information of the Department:
Document C.145 (1), 29th August, 1945.
Summary Recommendations Concerning
Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities.
Reference is made to Commissioner’s Despatch 196 and Embassy’s
cable 8298 of August 16 and Department’s cable 7493 of August
31.10
Document SFEC I, which is the draft basis of discussion, was
considered preliminarily by a Special Committee appointed for
that purpose on August 13th. H. E. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo was
elected chairman of the Committee. The committee adjourned its
consideration of the document until August 16th, with the view
of finally adopting proposals and presenting them to the
Commission for adoption at [Page 912] a special meeting of the Commission to be
held on August 17th. At my request this plan was abandoned and
the committee’s meeting was postponed until August 21st.
Thereafter, I again proposed postponement of action and the
committee’s meeting fixed for August 21st was cancelled. When I
was informed that a meeting of the committee would be held on
August 27th, I opposed this action upon the ground that the
committee should wait until the final surrender terms were made
known and the Commission could act with knowledge of such terms.
Furthermore, that most of the recommendations in the draft basis
of discussion had already been incorporated into general
recommendations, such as documents C–52(1) and C–122, which were
as applicable to the Far East and Pacific as to Europe. However,
Lord Wright and his assistant Mr. Oldham insisted that the
document be considered at a meeting to be held on August 27th
and the former called the meeting and placed the subject on the
agenda. Both appeared to fear criticism unless the Commission
acted and the latter intimated that he was acting at the
instance of his Government. In the absence of instructions from
the Department, I did not feel justified in formally moving for
a postponement at the meeting of the committee held on August
27th or of the Commission held on August 29th. After revising
the draft it was adopted by the Committee. It was reported to
the Commission on August 29th by H. E. Wellington Koo who moved
its adoption.
Paragraphs I to III of the enclosed document concern general
policy, while the balance of the document relates to the
mechanics of placing the policy recommendations into
execution.
The first three paragraphs are an adaptation of the principles
stated in the Moscow declaration of November 1st, 1943. These
principles have been followed by the Commission throughout its
existence, and were formally adopted in document C–52 (1).
Paragraph IV is generally the same as document C–122. There are
certain amplifications and changes, the noteworthy ones being
incorporated into subparagraphs d, e, f
and h.
Paragraph V was substantially modified by the committee. The last
two sentences of the draft were deleted upon my motion so that
the ten Governments mentioned in the draft will not be entitled
to appoint prosecutors should the recommendation be favorably
considered by the Governments.
Likewise, paragraph VI was radically revised by deleting most of
the details concerning the proposed International Tribunal.
These details, at my insistence, were left to the discretion of
the Supreme Commander to be taken care of by rules.
It will be noted that the recommendation contained in paragraph
VI gives no proportion for the representation on the tribunal.
Thus, [Page 913] its members may
be appointed in any proportion which the Supreme Commander
believes advisable. Inasmuch as the recommendation provides for
a five member court and ten Governments are named, in my opinion
the Supreme Commander may select them from the forces of the
mentioned Governments in any proportion.
It will also be noted that in subparagraph (b) or Paragraph VI it is recommended that the law to
be applied should be “generally” the law in respect to crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity defined in the Inter
Allied Agreement.11 This wording was
suggested by Ambassador Koo.
The note of the Secretary-General otherwise explains the
document.
Respectfully,
Joseph V. Hodgson
Lt. Col., JAGD, AUS
[Enclosure]
United Nations War Crimes Commission
Document
C. 145 (1)
[London,] 29 August,
1945.
Summary Recommendations Concerning
Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities
Note by the Secretary General
In circulating the attached Recommendations the Secretary
General, on instructions from the Commission, begs to call
attention to the explanations and observations made by His
Excellency Dr. Wellington Koo in his oral report to the
Commission on 29th August. This report was in the following
terms:
“The Special Far Eastern and Pacific Committee has
completed its examination of the document which I
mentioned in my oral report to the Commission on
15th August. It has drawn up the recommendations
circulated in Document C.145, which as Chairman of
the Committee I now submit for the Commission’s
approval.
These recommendations are expressed in summary form.
This is partly because the authorities to whom they
are addressed must obviously be responsible for the
details of their application. It is also due to the
fact that the recommendations do not contain
entirely new proposals. They embody with appropriate
changes proposals made by the War Crimes Commission
for the European theatre of war, measures taken by
the military authorities in that theatre and
provisions contained in the Inter-Allied Agreement
of 8th August 1945, for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis.
The Committee submits the recommendations with the
proviso that having been drawn up without knowledge
of the terms of surrender [Page 914] to be imposed on Japan, they may
require reconsideration by the Commission if those
terms should be found to be in any way inconsistent
with them.”
[Subenclosure]
Summary Recommendations Concerning
Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities
Adopted by the Commission on 29th August,
1945
The Governments of the United Nations have repeatedly
protested against and denounced the monstrous crimes and
atrocities of which the Japanese are guilty, and have
declared that those responsible shall not escape
retribution.
The United Kingdom, the United States and China in the
ultimatum issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945,12
stated:
“… stern justice will be meted out
to all war criminals, including those who have
visited cruelties on our prisoners.”
These crimes and atrocities consist not alone of individual
outrages. They are crimes and brutalities deliberately
planned and systematically perpetrated throughout the Far
East and Pacific areas. In consummation of their evil plan,
the Japanese treacherously launched wars of aggression
without ultimatum or declaration. They openly and flagrantly
violated the solemn obligations which States, including
their own, had undertaken by treaty or custom. They refused
the ordinary protection of the law to the inhabitants of the
countries they invaded. They did not respect family honour,
the lives of persons, as well as religious convictions and
practices. Inhabitants of countries which they overran have
been ruthlessly tortured, murdered and massacred in cold
blood; rape, torture, pillage, and other barbarities have
occurred where their forces have operated; and cities have
been wantonly destroyed and entire countrysides devastated
for no military purpose. Despite the laws and customs of war
and their own assurances, prisoners-of-war and other
nationals of the United Nations have been systematically
subjected to brutal treatment and horrible outrages
calculated to exterminate them. These barbarities include
massacre, murder, torture, starvation and other ruthless
oppressions.
Having in view the foregoing, and in order to effect the
practical measures to bring to justice the persons
responsible, the Commission recommends:
[Page 915]
I
That those Japanese who have been responsible for the plans
or policies which resulted in these abominable crimes and
atrocities should be surrendered to or apprehended by the
United Nations for trial before an international military
tribunal. These individuals and officials should include
those in authority in the Government, in the military and
police establishments, in the secret societies and other
criminal associations, and in the financial and economic
affairs of Japan who by all civilised standards are provable
to be war criminals. The case against these major criminals
is that they have devised, set in motion and carried out the
criminal plans and enterprises which incited or resulted in
the aggressions, cruelties and brutalities which have
outraged the civilised world. All of these barbarities are
flagrant violations of international law, including the laws
and customs of land and naval warfare. The persons to be
charged should be determined by the rule that all who
participate in the formulation or execution of a criminal
plan involving multiple crimes are liable for each of the
offences committed and responsible for the acts of each
other.
II
That those Japanese holding key-positions in the civil,
military or economic life of Japan who, perhaps, did not
devise or set in motion plans which resulted in these crimes
and barbarities, but nevertheless directed the carrying out
of such plans within Japan or in the territories of more
than one of the United Nations, should be surrendered to or
apprehended by the United Nations for trial before an
international military tribunal. This category of criminals
includes those individuals and officials, usually in
key-positions in the Government, who have willingly planned
the details of and put into execution the monstrous schemes
of the Japanese leaders. It also includes those brutal and
ruthless criminals who, both inside and outside Japan, have
been guilty of mass criminality towards the nationals of
many of the United Nations. Among such persons were those in
charge of certain prisoner-of-war and civilian internment
camps where the people of many nations have been starved,
tortured, murdered or otherwise atrociously maltreated.
III
That those Japanese who have been responsible for, or have
taken a consenting part in the crimes or atrocities
committed in, or against the nationals of, a United Nation
should be apprehended and sent back to the countries in
which their abominable deeds were done or against whose
nationals crimes and atrocities were perpetrated in [Page 916] order that they
may be judged in the courts of those countries and
punished.
IV
That a Central War Crimes Agency be established and
maintained in Japan by the military authority and adequately
staffed with investigators, detectives, lawyers and other
technicians selected from the United Nations, to perform the
following duties:
- (a)
- To investigate all war crimes planned, directed or
perpetrated inside Japanese territory;
- (b)
- To gather all evidence inside Japanese territory
relating to Japanese war crimes and atrocities
wherever committed;
- (c)
- To transmit to the United Nations War Crimes
Commission or its Sub-Commissions evidence of war
crimes detected by it, evidence of war crimes
committed by persons whose names are not yet on the
lists of the Commission or its Sub-Commissions, or
evidence of crimes which point to the existence of a
general enterprise or pattern;
- (d)
- To establish and maintain a register of all
Japanese war criminals wanted or apprehended by it
or any United Nation, or tried by any United Nation
or the International Military Tribunal. Each United
Nation should promptly notify the Agency of all war
criminals wanted, apprehended or tried by it, and
the Agency should circulate to each Government and
the United Nations War Crimes Commission and its
Sub-Commissions lists of such criminals. The
register should be similar to that maintained by the
Central Recording Office of War Criminals and
Security Suspects in the European Theatre of
Operations;
- (e)
- To establish and maintain a Central War Crimes
Evidence Centre to which should be sent all evidence
of war crimes secured by any Government or Agency.
The evidence should be indexed and be open to the
examination of the representatives of any interested
United Nation Government. These representatives
should be given free access to the records and
should be permitted to make certified copies of such
papers as they may require;
- (f)
- To arrange for the apprehension and detention of
all Japanese war criminals in Japan whose names or
identifying data are discovered by it or are
furnished by the United Nations War Crimes
Commission and its Sub-Commissions or any United
Nation Government;
- (g)
- To notify the United Nations War Crimes Commission
and its Sub-Commissions and the Governments of all
war criminals so apprehended;
- (h)
- To arrange for the surrender to the interested
Governments any of the Japanese war criminals
mentioned under III above, who [Page 917] are apprehended in Japan
and whose surrender is requested by a United Nation
Government. In ease a war criminal is wanted by two
or more Governments, the Agency should decide the
terms of surrender;
- (i)
- To co-operate with the United Nations War Crimes
Commission and its Sub-Commissions, the Central War
Crimes Prosecution Office and the interested United
Nation Governments in all matters regarding Japanese
war crimes;
- (j)
- To maintain branch offices throughout the Far East
and Pacific areas to receive evidence and other
information concerning war crimes and war criminals,
and to co-ordinate its work with that of the
National War Crimes Offices.
Representatives from each of the National Offices concerned,
acting as liaison officers, should, if desired, be attached
to the Central War Crimes Agency or to any branch. They
would be invited to take charge, and, in conjunction with
the Central War Crimes Agency, to investigate war crimes
committed in or against the nationals of their own
countries.
All of the military forces and other agencies of the
Governments should co-operate with and assist the Central
War Crimes Agency in the discharge of its duties.
V
That a Central War Crimes Prosecution Office should be
established and maintained in Japan, adequately staffed to
prepare and file the charges, to collect, analyse and sift
the evidence, and to present to an International Military
Tribunal the cases of the war criminals mentioned under I
and II above.
VI
- (a)
- That the Supreme Commander of the United Nations
military forces or any Control Council or other
Authority in Japan should appoint one or more
International Military Tribunals for the trial of the
war criminals mentioned under I and II above, each of
which Tribunals should be composed of five members. The
members should be selected and appointed on each
Tribunal, after designation by their respective
Governments, from the military forces of Australia,
Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom and United States. The Appointing
Authority should adopt rules for its procedure.
- (b)
- The Tribunal should have jurisdiction to try any of
the war criminals mentioned under I and II above, who
are charged with any of the crimes and atrocities which
the Japanese have perpetrated. [Page 918] The law to be applied by the
Tribunal should be the laws and customs of war, and
generally the law in respect to crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity defined in the Inter-Allied
Agreement of August 8th, 1945, applicable to the major
war criminals of the European Axis.
VII
That the war criminals mentioned under III above, upon
apprehension, should be promptly surrendered to the
countries in which or against whose nationals they committed
their crimes unless they are wanted as accused or witnesses
in any trial before an International Military Tribunal. In
the latter event, their surrender should be deferred until
the conclusion of such trial or immediately effected upon
such terms as may be agreed upon.
VIII
That His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs in the United Kingdom13 be requested to convene as soon as
possible a conference to carry out such of the foregoing
recommendations as may require implementation.