Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

611.4131/5–146

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States-United Kingdom Combined Top Committee, Held at the State Department, September 11, 1945, at 4 p.m.

September 11, 1945, 4 p.m.

[Participants]: Mr. Clayton (In the Chair)

U.S. Representatives			U.K. Representatives
Mr. Vinson			Lord Halifax
Mr. Wallace			Lord Keynes
Mr. Crowley			Mr. Brand
Mr. Eccles			Sir Henry Self
Mr. McCabe34			Mr. Hall-Patch
Mr. Collado	}	Joint Secretaries
Mr. Early35
Mr. Lee
Mr. Stevens36

1. Opening Statements

Mr. Clayton said that he regretted that the Secretary of State could not be present in person to receive the U.K. representatives, but in Mr. Byrnes’ name he bade them welcome.

The discussions which were about to begin involved issues of importance and complexity, but he did not doubt that if the U.S. and the U.K. representatives approached them with the same spirit of determination and cooperation as had marked the association of the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom in two world wars they would find a solution. On behalf of the U.S. representative[s] he gave an assurance that they would give thoughtful and careful consideration to any problems which the U.K. representatives might wish to bring before them.

Lord Halifax, on behalf of the U.K. representatives, thanked Mr. Clayton for his remarks and said that, like the U.S. representatives, he and his colleagues were entering upon the discussions in a spirit of confident partnership knowing that a wise solution of the problems to be considered would have far-reaching significance for the whole world.

Lord Halifax said that as he saw the position the purposes of the discussions were threefold:

(a) There was first of all the question of making suitable arrangements designed to secure the orderly winding up of Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid. The issues involved under this head would be largely technical but nevertheless were of significance particularly in view of the comparatively large sums which might be involved.

(b) Secondly, there was the question of the financial situation of the U.K. in the transitional period before normal peacetime economic activities could be restored. On this the U.K. representatives hoped to have the opportunity of giving the U.S. representatives, at an early date, a full factual statement of the background.

(c) Finally, there was the task of completing the conversations which had already taken place on future commercial and monetary arrangements in the international field, in accordance with the program foreshadowed in Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. The U.K. representatives regarded the discussions under this head and those under (b) above as necessarily and properly interconnected.

Lord Halifax added that none of the U.K. representatives had any final authority to settle matters without prior reference to London. But Lord Keynes, Mr. Brand, and he had had the opportunity of full discussion with members of the new Administration and he felt confident that they were sufficiently well-informed of the Administration’s attitude to be able to make a substantial—and indeed perhaps definitive—approach to a settlement of the problems which would come up for discussion. It had always been the hope of the U.K. Government to hold such discussion in the autumn of 1945, but it had hitherto been assumed that such discussions would take place while the war against Japan was still in progress. Now that that war had ended it was clearly more urgent to achieve a settlement of the questions at issue. Therefore the U.K. representatives held themselves entirely at the disposal of the U.S. Group for concurrent discussions on all subjects on the agenda in the hope that rapid progress could be made.

Finally Lord Halifax said that he hoped that the outcome of the discussions would be such as to show a disordered world that there was still a rallying point of sanity and cooperation to which hard-pressed men could turn with confidence as they faced the difficulties of the post-war era. It was in that spirit that the U.K. representatives approached the deliberations.

2. Future Arrangements

Mr. Clayton said that, if convenient, the next meeting of the Top Committee would take place at 3.30 p.m. on the 13th September in the Board Room at the building of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. At that meeting Lord Keynes would begin his exposition of the U.K. financial position.

Lord Keynes said that the U.K. Group wished to raise one matter upon which an urgent decision was necessary. The U.S. Administration had given formal notice of the general termination of Lend-Lease from the 2nd September last. Although informal warnings had been given at an operating level there had been no such formal intimation as regards the termination of Reciprocal Aid. The delay in communicating such an intimation had been due to the fact that the U.K. representatives had waited the receipt of the President directive concerning the continuation of Lend-Lease in the field of military supplies.³⁷ That directive had now been received under cover of a letter from Mr. Patterson.³⁸ The assumption in it was that the assistance to be continued would be on a mutual basis, and that would be acceptable to the U.K. Government. But Lord Keynes felt that it would now be desirable formally to intimate that, apart from this, Reciprocal Aid should be regarded as having terminated on the 2nd September and he assumed that the U.S. Administration would see no objection to such a communication. He added that in a letter to the Chairman of the British Supply Council, Mr. Crowley had intimated that Lend-Lease would be continued for a period of 30 days from the 2nd September in respect of certain shipping services and freight charges.³⁹ There was, however, no suggestion in that letter that Reciprocal Aid should be extended after the 2nd September on a similar basis and the U.K. representatives assumed that they would be correct in thinking that there was no intention of making such a suggestion.

Lord Keynes went on to say that he thought it desirable that the proposed military sub-committee of the Lend-Lease Committee should be convened at an early date in order to discuss the interpretation to be attached to the President’s directive as set out in Mr. Patterson’s letter and in order to ensure that the necessary instructions to act in accordance with it were issued to the military commanders on both sides.

Mr. Crowley said that he thought that these Reciprocal Aid questions should be considered in the first instance by the Lend-Lease Committee which he would undertake to convene as quickly as possible. He thought that following upon that committee it should be possible to arrange for the military subcommittee to consider Mr. Patterson’s letter and the questions arising on it mentioned by Lord Keynes. The Sub-Committee would refer its recommendations to the Lend-Lease Committee, and that Committee would refer in turn to the Top Committee.

It was agreed that the procedure suggested by Mr. Crowley should be adopted. Accordingly a meeting of the Lend-Lease Sub-Committee⁴⁰ was arranged for 11 a.m. on the 13th September in Mr. Crowley’s conference room.

3. Organisation of Committees and Sub-Committees

A general interchange of views took place on the proposed organisation of committees and sub-committees. The arrangements tentatively proposed for that organisation met with general approval. It was agreed that efforts should be made to arrange for two main committee meetings each day—one in the morning and one in the afternoon—so as to avoid an overlap which would cause personnel difficulties. It was agreed that the organisation of meetings of the sub-committees would be primarily a matter for arrangement by the Chairman of the appropriate main committee.

4. Press Relations

Mr. Clayton said that he understood that a proposed press release had been agreed with the U.K. representatives and that something in the nature of a joint press service was contemplated.

Lord Halifax confirmed that a joint press release had been agreed. He expressed some doubt, however, as to the desirability of the proposed arrangement whereby U.S. and U.K. press officers should attend committee meetings, on the grounds that if they did so they would be the more likely to be under embarrassing pressure from the press to divulge information. He wondered whether it would not be better simply to arrange for the Joint Secretariat to prepare an agreed press release at appropriate intervals.

Mr. Clayton thought that complete reliance could be placed on the discretion of the press officers who could in any event work under dose direction as to the extent of the information which they were to release.

Mr. Vinson stressed the risk of leakages and the desirability of taking all possible steps to avoid them. He suggested that it would be well to defer a decision on the question of the presence of press officers at committee meetings. It was agreed to follow this advice and to arrange for discussion of this question outside the committee before the further meeting of the Top Committee on the 13th September.

5. Position of Dominions

Mr. Clayton asked whether the U.K. representatives desired any Dominion representatives to be associated with the discussions.

Lord Keynes said that the U.K. representatives would maintain touch with Dominion representatives on matters of common concern. But it would be embarrassing for the U.K. representatives if the impression were given that they were negotiating on behalf of Dominion Governments. If questions affecting the Dominions arose it would be better for them to be discussed separately with the U.S. Government, although the U.K. representatives would naturally be prepared to facilitate such discussions.

Mr. Clayton said that the position in this respect was fully understood by the U.S. Group.

6. Closing Statement

Mr. Clayton said that just as the U.K. representatives had no authority to take final decisions without reference to London, so the U.S. representatives were under the obligation to report to the Secretary of State and the President. But although neither side could take definitive decisions he was confident that they would be able to reach the state of agreeing upon recommendations which, when submitted to the Governments of both sides, would be found to be acceptable.

Washington , 12 September, 1945.

34. Thomas B. McCabe, Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner.
35. James S. Earley, Adviser on British Commonwealth Financial Affairs, Division of Financial Affairs.
36. R. B. Stevens, British Civil Secretariat.
37. Reference is to JCS 771/18, approved by President Truman on September 5.
38. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson.
39. In a letter of November 13, 1945, to the Chairman of the British Supply Council, Robert H. Brand, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton summarized the principles governing United States policy on the continuance of lend-lease assistance to the British Commonwealth in the field of shipping. Mr. Crowley, he said, in three letters to Mr. Brand, dated August 27, September 7, and September 20, “stated that certain specified shipping services would continue to be provided under lend-lease for a period of 60 days after 12:01 a.m., V–J Day, September 2, 1945”. With the expiration of this period, Mr. Clayton informed Brand, the United States was prepared to extend these services for another 30 days beginning at 12:01 a.m., November 1, 1945. In the 30-day extension, however, the services were to be provided under proposed offsetting arrangements, then under discussion in the lend-lease settlement talks, and not under straight lend-lease. (841.24/11–1345)
40. Reference is to the U.S.–U.K. Combined Lend-Lease Committee.