740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–2245
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield)
| Participants: | Colonel Dziuban, OPD, War Department |
| Mr. Durbrow, EE56 | |
| Mr. Penfield, FE |
Colonel Dziuban called this morning to discuss occupation forces in Japan. He said that the War Department is in a very difficult position because, having no information regarding possible Chinese and Russian participation in the occupation, it is unable to make plans for the number of American troops which will be required in Japan. He explained that it is estimated that by July 1946 a total of about 140,000 men will be required for the occupation, which, under the JCS policy of maintaining a number of American forces at least equal to all other powers combined, would mean a total of 70,000 US troops. It appears that General Northcott (the Australian who is in command of the British Commonwealth forces) in his conversations with General MacArthur has indicated a desire to send slightly over 40,000 Commonwealth troops to Japan. Colonel Dziuban pointed out that if this proposal is accepted and the Russians and Chinese eventually participate on a similar basis there would be well over 100,000 troops in Japan other than American, which would necessitate a substantial increase in the planned American participation.
Colonel Dziuban handed me the attached memorandum57 and asked whether we could give him answers to the various questions listed. We [Page 890] replied orally along the following lines, emphasizing that our answers were tentative and informal:
- a.
- I promised to draft a telegram to Chungking immediately instructing the Embassy there to make an approach to the Chinese on a governmental level regarding Chinese military participation in the occupation.
- b.
- We said that any answer regarding Russian participation would have to await the return of the Secretary from Moscow.
- c.
- We recalled that last week a brief statement had been made to the press to the effect that we had invited Russian participation in the occupation and said that we saw no reason why we should not make public full information regarding our position on this matter.
- d. and e.
- We stated that we saw no objection to a US-British Empire occupation of Japan provided it was publicly made clear that our other Allies had been invited to participate on the same basis as the British Commonwealth.