Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–2645: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
Washington, November 17, 1945—7 p.m.

2362. As indicated in the President’s message to Stalin of August 17 and stated in “U.S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” which was [Page 861] released to the press on Sep 22, “participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected”. National contingents will be integrated in the forces under the command of the Supreme Commander and will not occupy separate zones, but their respective Govts will be responsible for their supply and maintenance.

The British Commonwealth has offered a balanced force of the nature of 30,000 men, predominantly ground forces. Conversations regarding the details of the participation of this force in the occupation are proceeding.

In view of Stalin’s attitude regarding Allied troops in Japan (your 3664 Oct 2632) we wish, in order to avoid Soviet misunderstanding of our intentions, to inform the Soviet authorities of developments before final arrangements are made for transport to Japan of the Commonwealth force. You should therefore explain the situation to Molotov, informing him that in view of our publicly and privately expressed commitments to our Allies we feel obliged to proceed with arrangements for the reception of other national contingents in Japan, and indicating that we would be willing to have a USSR force similar to that of the British Commonwealth participate in the occupation. You should also reassure him that we do not link this matter with current conversations regarding control of Japan or that it is in any way prejudicial to these conversations.33

Byrnes
  1. Not printed; it reported in substance the memorandum of October 24, p. 782.↩
  2. In a note to Mr. Dunn, Mr. Matthews stated: “I hesitate to initial these. 1. The practical advantages of not having the Russians in occupation in Japan are obvious. 2. I don’t know how this rejection of Stalin’s proposal might affect the all important general far eastern negotiations. 3. I am not sure how far we are in fact committed to the British or what their attitude might be if both they and the Russians stay out. I think Chip [Bohlen] should be consulted on these.” The Under Secretary of State noted in reply: “I am told that Bohlen has seen & approved this. DA”. (740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–2645)↩