Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 Control(Japan)/11–1345: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

Washington, November 17, 1945—5 p.m.

2361. After careful examination of Molotov’s statement transmitted in your 3828, November 12 and the helpful comments contained in your 3832, November 13, in consultation with the War Department, we believe it would be desirable for you to have another interview with Molotov for the purpose of setting forth exactly the degree to which it is possible for this Government to go in order to meet Soviet desires. You should, therefore, call upon Molotov in order to present him with the following expression of the position of the U.S. Government.

Begin Proposal I. Allied Council for Japan

The following are the amendments which would be acceptable to this Government:

1. The Council should be known as “Allied Council for Japan” which would avoid any impression that the Council would occupy itself only with military matters and not with the implementation of directives involving matters of political, economic, cultural etc. character.

2. After paragraph 2 of the original U.S. proposal there would be no objection to adding the statement that each representative would be entitled to have an appropriate staff the size of which would be fixed in agreement with the Chairman of the Council.

3. Provision could be made in the terms of reference for periodic meetings of the Council at stated intervals perhaps every 2 weeks.

4. The following paragraph could be added to the terms of reference:

“Action to modify the agreed regime of allied control for Japan or to approve revisions or modifications of the Japanese Constitution will be taken only in accordance with decisions of the Far Eastern Commission.” End proposal.

You should endeavor to explain again to Molotov that this Government feels that the proper body for the formulation and determination of basic policies towards Japan is the Far Eastern Commission and that the proposed Allied Council for Japan under the Chairmanship of General MacArthur would have no power to determine on its own initiative fundamental questions such as the change in the regime of control or changes in the Japanese constitutional structure. These are properly matters for consideration in the Far Eastern Commission. So far as changes in the personnel of a Japanese Government are concerned, to take this power from the Supreme Commander by requiring the unanimous agreement of the four powers would deprive him of the essential and fundamental authority necessary to enforce his orders. As is pointed out below, such matters would in normal course be discussed in advance by the Supreme Commander with the Council, and any government dissatisfied with action taken by him could raise the matter for action by the Far Eastern Commission, or directly with this Government, under the amendments to that instrument which we propose herein.

The U.S. proposal as amended provides a full measure of consultation by the Allied Council with regard to the administration of Japan, and for observation of the manner in which the administration is being carried out. In the event of disagreement between the Chairman and one or several members of the Council it goes without saying that any government could raise the issue involved either in the Far Eastern Commission or by direct approach to the U.S. Government. If after such consultation it was clear that the action of the Supreme Commander in question had been at variance with the reasonable interpretation of the policy directives on which such action was based, measures could then be taken to modify the action in dispute. It should be clear to the Soviet Government that in view of our primary responsibility toward the control and administration of Japan, the U.S. Government could not accept an arrangement whereby in the event of disagreement in the Council the Supreme Commander would be unable to take essential action pending an agreement between the interested governments. Any indication that the authority of the Supreme Commander is not final in relation to the Japanese authorities and in the execution of policies in Japan could only serve to weaken his authority and control over the Japanese Government and thus imperil the efficient administration of allied policy in Japan. You might point out that at no stage in the case of the ex-enemy European satellites has the Soviet Government agreed to any interpretation of the functions of the Allied Control Commissions which would tie the hands of the Chairman (the Soviet High Command) in the event of disagreement with the other two members nor require him to withhold action pending agreement between the Governments represented on the Control Councils. U.S. and British complaints in regard to the functioning of these Councils have not related to the final authority of the Chairman but primarily to the absence of proper consultation or even information prior to action. (For your information and such use as you think advisable the Department knows of no case in Rumania, Hungary, or Bulgaria, where the Soviet Government has interpreted the Potsdam Agreement to mean that the Chairman of the Control Commission can act only after prior agreement on the part of the other members. It has consistently held, as far as we are aware, the Russian word “Soglasovaniye” to mean consultation and discussion and not agreement. In this connection General Schuyler’s report on the meeting of Allied Control Commission on September 8,³⁰ which we believe the Military Mission has, is pertinent). You might point out in this connection that at the time of the Japanese surrender under the arrangements set up after agreement with the Soviet, British and Chinese Governments, no such limitation on the authority of the Supreme Commander was provided nor was there any reference made to varying periods in the control and administration of Japan.

Begin proposal II. Far Eastern Commission

1. To insure in accordance with Soviet desire that fundamental questions such as basic changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or the regime of control be decided through mutual consultation, the U.S. Government would be prepared to include in the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission a clause to the effect that any directives dealing with fundamental changes in Japanese constitutional structure, or in the regime of occupation, would only be issued following prior consultation and agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.

2. Provided Article 3, paragraph 2 of the terms of reference is retained enabling the U.S. Government to issue interim directives pending decision by the Far Eastern Commission or in the event of disagreement, the U.S. Government would not object to a voting procedure in the Commission which would embody the principle of unanimity among the four principal Allies before a decision became binding. The U.S. Government considers that the Far Eastern Commission is the proper place for the coordination of agreed policy concerning Japan and it is prepared, therefore, to consider sympathetically any Soviet suggestions which would facilitate the achievement of this end provided the right to issue interim directives which themselves would be subject to review by the Commission is maintained. These interim directives which in themselves would be subject to review by the Commission would be issued by the U.S. obviously only in cases where the situation in Japan would not permit delay.

To make clear what is obviously intended we would be willing to (1) add the following sub-paragraph between Article II, A, 1 and II, A, 2 “To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission” and (2) add the following paragraph between Article III, 1 and III, 2 “If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II, A, 2 should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.[”]

In both the Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission the U.S. wishes to afford the maximum opportunity for information, consultation, and the working out of agreed Allied policies in all spheres relating to the control and future of Japan. The fact that any matter could be or actually had been considered by the Allied Council or the Far Eastern Commission would not prevent the Soviet Union or any other government taking up directly with the United States Government any important policy matter before or after action is taken. In the interest, however, of the effective execution of any policy towards Japan, it could not accept arrangements under which any action could be indefinitely delayed because of disagreement or differences between the Allied nations involved. The essential safeguards upon which this Government must insist are in no sense in tended to permit unilateral policy on its part but merely to insure that the entire administration of Japan, for which this Government admittedly bears the primary responsibility, does not break down pending the settlement and adjustment of differences which might arise between the interested governments.

In the event that it is not possible for you to induce Molotov to accept what seems to us a most reasonable point of view and he insists upon the Soviet amendments which might in effect take away the final authority of the Supreme Commander and thereby imperil the successful execution of control and administration of Japan, in accordance with the responsibilities conferred upon him under the surrender, we contemplate sending you a formal note outlining the basic elements of our position for presentation to the Soviet Government.

Byrnes

30. Brig. Gen. Cortland T. Van R. Schuyler, chief of U.S. military representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. For documentation on Rumania, see vol. v, pp. 464 ff.