740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–1345: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 13—7:40 a.m.]
3832. Re Embassy’s 3828, November 12, midnight. Reviewing this morning Molotov’s statement, handed me yesterday, and my previous conversations with him and with Stalin, I feel that I should attempt to state more clearly what appears to be in the minds of the Soviet officials in their reluctance to accept our proposals. This, I believe, goes beyond questions of Molotov’s tactics in trading and is giving them serious concern.
1. The control machinery for Japan.
At Sochi, Stalin made it clear that he was ready to accept MacArthur as permanent chairman of a control commission in accordance with the Rumanian formula, with MacArthur having the last voice. Since the American forces were in occupation, he said this was logical. They interpreted our proposal, however, as establishing MacArthur permanently as the Allied Supreme Commander and that the representatives [Page 850] of the other three Allies will function as his advisers without any real status in the control machinery. When Molotov states that the Soviet representative should not appear to be only “decorative” he is repeating the same thought that Stalin presented to me when he used the words “piece of furniture”. I of course have no information on the treatment General Derevyanko received before he was recalled but Stalin contended that he was neither consulted nor supplied with information as to what was going on. Stalin told me that Derevyanko had seen MacArthur, but I gathered only when Derevyanko asked to see him on specific matters.
It now seems that the Soviets are fearful that in our proposals, since the body in Japan is not termed as a control commission but a military council, that the Soviet representative will not take any real position of responsibility on the many political, economic, cultural, administrative and financial matters which are involved in the development of a permanent structure of life in Japan. The fact that the body is set up as a military council rather than a control commission, appears to them to indicate that we have not the intention of giving our Allies any important position in the control of Japan. They look upon the policy decisions arrived at in the Far Eastern Commission as general in character, requiring all important interpretation in their implementation. They are fearful that the Soviet Govt will constantly be faced with faits accomplis and that if it objects little can be accomplished as it would have agreed in advance that the Supreme Commander shall be free to take action. Thus, the minimum I believe they feel they are entitled to is the inclusion of the word “control” in the title for the body in Tokyo and language in the terms of reference to the effect that the Supreme Commander will not only consult in advance with this body, but in the event of disagreement, when action is not urgent, the questions if they are fundamental in character, such as the change of government, et cetera, will be referred to the respective governments for consultation or to the FEC (Far Eastern Commission).
2. The Soviets are definitely suspicious that our policies may lead to the development of a Japan which would be antagonistic and a threat to the Soviet Union. Japan has for two generations been a constant menace to Russian security in the Far East and the Soviets wish now to be secure from this threat. Molotov’s continual emphasis on the one question of changes in government appears to indicate that this is the vital question in which they are interested to have their views given fullest consideration and over which they can exercise some control. It is clear to me that it is impossible for us to take responsibility for the occupation of Japan with any qualifications on the right of the United States to make final decisions. On the other [Page 851] hand the Soviets might agree to this principle if we were ready to include language such as I have mentioned above providing for reference to the Governments or FEC (Far Eastern Commission) of matters in disagreements, to change the title of the Council and to provide voting procedure in FEC (Far Eastern Commission) acceptable to them.
3. In the question of voting procedure in the FEC (Far Eastern Commission) the Soviets are now clinging to the principle which they have insisted upon in the World Security Organization and other bodies, namely that there should be unanimity between the four principal Allies. Their views on this subject are well known and therefore I do not believe that I need explain why they place such importance on this question. Of course, it is obvious the United States Govt must be free to issue interim directives pending agreement. In the light of the above considerations I believe that we should face the points I have enumerated and indicate to the Soviets how far we are ready to go with each of them. I cannot help feeling that the situation is serious. Unless the Soviets are reasonably satisfied they may well decline to participate and will attempt to build their security in the Far East through other means inimical to our policies and interests. All of this cannot avoid having an effect on the Soviet attitude towards the UNO (United Nations Organization) and European matters.