740.00119 Control(Japan)/11–445: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 4—3 p.m.]
3757. Molotov received me last night at my request to discuss contents of Dept’s 2272, November 2, 8 p.m. Most of the conversation lasting over an hour and a half related to the responsibilities of the Allied Military Council. Molotov showed his hand more clearly. He did not appear satisfied with Dept’s suggestion as to use of the word “control” in paragraph 1 and asked whether it could not be included before “implementation”, so that the last words would read “in regard to the control over the implementation of the terms of surrender, et cetera”. He asked whether it was not appropriate for the Council to have such control. I explained that it was the Supreme Commander who had this control in consultation and with the advice of the Allied Military Council.
[Page 821]Following some discussions in which he did not change his attitude we turned to paragraph III. After I had explained our position on this paragraph Molotov argued at length that on nonurgent questions of principle the consultation of the Supreme Commander with the Council should provide for agreement before action was taken by the Supreme Commander. He referred to what he termed the Potsdam Agreement regarding the Hungarian Control Commission.97 He said that Stalin had stated to me that he was ready to accept the Hungarian and Rumanian formula. Molotov pointed out that since Potsdam this provided for agreement on questions of principle. I replied that Stalin in his conversation with me had stated that he was prepared to accept the Hungarian-Rumanian procedure which according to Stalin provided that the Supreme Commander had the “last voice”. I explained that this was the principle which the Generalissimus had accepted and that his statement recognized that the Supreme Commander should have the final authority if agreement was not reached.
I pointed out that the parallel with Hungary was in no sense similar to our proposals for Japan, emphasizing the functions of the Far Eastern Commission.
Molotov argued that in matters such as the character of the Jap Govt, when not urgent, it was desirable that the four principal Allies should agree on such fundamental questions. I explained that the situation in Japan was highly complicated and dangerous, that the Supreme Commander’s hands should not be tied in taking action that might be necessary. In making this statement, however, I emphasized that we were making this proposal in good faith and that he could be assured that when there was time we wished to consult fully with our Allies and make every effort to come to agreement. We did not wish to take sole responsibility unless it was necessary. On the other hand it was a matter of judgment as to whether urgency existed and we wished the document to be quite clear that the Supreme Commander had the unquestioned authority to make decisions if he considered it necessary.
Molotov kept coming back to the Hungarian language and denied that the Soviet Govt had not accepted the provisions as proposed at Potsdam. I told him that the purpose of my visit was not to negotiate the wording of the proposal but to explain carefully the intent of my Govt therein so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future.
We then turned to the Far Eastern Commission. I explained to Molotov that the language of II (A) 1 was still subject to review and [Page 822] revision if clarification were necessary. Molotov did not appear to desire further discussion and I let the matter drop particularly as I am not myself fully clear on the meaning of the language. The British Chargé98 has told me that the British had in mind in making their suggestion that agreement should be reached between the participating govts on such questions as trade with Japan.
Molotov seemed satisfied when I told him that a full set of policies and directives already issued were being furnished the Soviet Embassy and appeared to prefer the revised language of II (C) as suggested in your message.
I told Molotov further that in general I had received confirmation of the other information I had given him in our last conversation and that I had a little more information about the voting procedure if he cared to discuss this question. He replied that he thought this was perhaps the place in which there should be four power agreement as was the case of the United Nations Organization. He immediately added, however, that he was not in a position to state his Govt’s position on this or any other matters in connection with our proposals. He told me he would consult his Govt and hoped to have an answer or proposals to make on Monday in which event he would get in touch with me.
I cannot give any indication of what Molotov’s reply will be. There is no doubt that he personally is searching for some method by which the Soviet Govt’s position can be strengthened in control of Japan particularly in relation to the future permanent Jap Govt. How far this is his own view or inspired by Stalin I cannot judge. I had previously emphasized the need for speed and Molotov’s immediate attention to this matter indicates that he is equally anxious to come to prompt agreement.
- See section XII of Protocol of Proceedings of Berlin Conference, August 1, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1478, 1494.↩
- Frank Kenyon Roberts, Acting Counselor, with rank of Minister, of the British Embassy in the Soviet Union.↩