740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–3045: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 30—8:12 a.m.]
3701. Dissatisfaction of Soviet Government with American dispensation in Japan has by now been made evident through medium [Page 809] of Soviet press. Accusation in sum is that widespread roots of Jap imperialism and aggression are not being eradicated. As in case of Soviet recriminations re Anglo-American administration in Germany, accusations require interpretation.
It is difficult to believe that Soviet General Staff and Politburo are lying awake nights worrying about recrudescence of Jap imperialism and aggression. What may cause them uneasy moments, however, is thought that Japan like Germany might some day be utilized by Western Powers as springboard for attack on USSR. Japan as much as Eastern Europe is in Soviet zone of vital strategic interest. Long range strategic implications of American occupation and control of Japan are therefore one reason for Soviet dissatisfaction with situation in Japan.
With USA dominant in Japan, only possible program for introducing and expanding Soviet influence, aside from establishment of Allied Control mechanism with its limited utility to USSR, is exploitation through Jap Communists and Leftists of post-war disorder and economic unrest. We appear, however, to be housecleaning and encouraging liberal tendencies in Japan. This has effect of stealing Communist thunder and thus irritates USSR because fundamentally USSR prefers crusading against reaction to competing with liberalis[m]. Our apparently intelligent internal policy in Japan is therefore a second cause for Soviet dissatisfaction with American dispensation in Japan.
Possible third cause of Soviet dissatisfaction—of which no evidence has yet been seen in press but which appears inferentially in stray conversations with Russians—would be feeling that USSR as one of the two greatest powers and as Pacific power has not been accorded due “face” in disposition of Japan. Being new rich with a lingering inferiority complex and feeling of gauche uncertainty in international society, USSR is inordinately sensitive re appearance as well as substance of prestige.
This third cause of Soviet disgruntlement could probably be eliminated to considerable degree by concessions to Soviet dignity. But it should not be assumed that such concessions would compensate in Soviet eyes for continuing American single control of Japan and a constructively liberal internal policy there. So long as these fundamental conditions exist Soviet press and Government may be expected to take jaundiced view of Jap affairs.
To Department 3701, repeated Chungking 196; Paris 400; London 547. Department please repeat Tokyo.