740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–2445
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this office’s telegram 37, October 10, 1945, in regard to the new Japanese cabinet and to submit further comment on the cabinet and its members, together with brief biographic sketches of the members.69
At this early date it is not to be expected that any new cabinet would represent a radical or fundamental change in Japanese political policies. The present cabinet, although on the surface of a somewhat more “liberal” appearance than any of its predecessors for a number of years, in fact far more represents conservative than liberal elements in Japan. It was picked by conservative advisers near the throne who based their choice more on negative than on positive considerations. Cabinet members were selected because they were not during the past few years in prominent position, because they had not gained unfavorable reputations abroad, and because they had not, in Japanese opinion, done anything which would be likely to make them suspected war criminals. (Selection of the War and Navy Ministries was, of course, an exception to the foregoing. These ministries were presumably kept in office for the purpose of liquidating Japanese armed forces.) It is reported in some Japanese circles that the present cabinet has financial backing of the Mitsubishi interests. The cabinet is a mediocre one, and can be expected to attempt to do little more than endeavor to cooperate with the occupation authorities in making such changes as are believed necessary to meet Allied demands in the hope that the period of occupation will not be prolonged. Predictions of the cabinet’s short duration are widespread.
Shortly after assuming office Prime Minister Baron Shidehara announced eight important policies of his cabinet: (1) establishment of democratic political policies and programs; (2) solution of food problem; (3) reconstruction and repair of war damaged areas; (4) relief measures for unemployed; (5) subsidy and assistance for war victims and demobilized personnel; (6) administrative reforms in the government; (7) reorganization of financial and industrial policies and programs; [Page 780] and (8) study and reorganization of education and public information. It may be of some significance that “democracy” is placed ahead of the solution of the food problem. In the minds of the vast majority of the Japanese, the food problem is paramount, almost to exclusion of other problems. The Japanese Government on the other hand apparently believes that in order to appease the Allies it is necessary to place the greatest emphasis on the establishment of “democracy.”
Since the formation of the cabinet certain steps to be taken by the government have been announced. For example, it is expected that a special session of the Diet will be held in December, and that the government’s plan for the revision of the election laws will be presented at that session. According to the press part of the revision of these laws will include alteration of election districts and the extension of suffrage of all adults, male and female, over twenty years of age. (This would give suffrage to Japanese at nineteen by our count and to some Japanese who had just passed their eighteenth birthday.) On October 16 it was announced that the government had decided to call a special session of the Diet to be opened about November 10 and to sit for approximately five days. This session would, it was reported, be designed primarily for the purpose of allowing the new cabinet to make public the details of its policies but would not consider the revision of the election laws which would be postponed until the December session. It has also been announced that Mr. Joji Matsumoto, Minister without Portfolio, has been appointed by the cabinet to consider constitutional problems and the question of revision of the constitution.
In compliance with directive issued by the Supreme Commander, the government has reportedly dismissed chiefs of various prefectural special police sections. At the same time steps have been taken to release political prisoners and to complete compliance with the general directive referred to in our despatch no. 2 of October 8, 1945.70
There is ample evidence that this cabinet represents conservative and cautious elements of Japanese society. While it must accept such basic changes as are forced upon it, it is unlikely that it will willingly introduce on its own initiative radical, new concepts into Japan’s social, economic and political way of life. For example, Prime Minister Shidehara, according to a reliable Japanese source, is said to be of the opinion that actual revision of the present constitution is unnecessary and that only a new interpretation is required. (It may be noted that Professor Tatsukichi Minobe, a leading constitutional authority of genuine liberal views, has published several articles expressing the same thought.) Also, the Minister for Foreign Affairs71 has publicly [Page 781] defended the zaibatsu. In a press interview on October 19 he emphasized the difference between the “old” and the “new” zaibatsu and stated that the “old” zaibatsu had made substantial contributions to the prosperity of Japan, that it was highly doubtful whether dissolution of the “old” zaibatsu would benefit the Japanese people, that the “old” zaibatsu had suffered heavy losses during the war, which losses were ignored by the government, while the “new” zaibatsu had worked with the militarists and made great profits and that the “old” zaibatsu were kept out of Manchuria while the “new” zaibatsu were encouraged and built up by the militarists. Finally, the Minister of Education72 on October 10 in a press interview stated inter alia that the Emperor must not be adversely criticized from the school lecture platform. These examples are typical of Japanese reluctance to accept that which to them represents radical change. It is worthy to note that there has been observed as yet no adverse criticism of the Emperor or the Imperial Institution except by the communists. A few political groups have come forward with positive assertions of loyalty to the Emperor, but the vast majority maintain in public their traditional silent position in regard to the Imperial Institution.
Respectfully yours,