740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–2345
Record of Trans-Pacific Teletype Conversation66
[Under Secretary of State Acheson:] I want to give you the background of the War Department’s cable of October 21, No. War [Page 769] 77672, to General MacArthur, so that you may discuss the matter further with him and with Mr. McCloy. Last night the Secretary sent through the War Department a message reading as follows: “The Secretary of State has seen CA 53682. He believes that there has been some misunderstanding of his proposal for an Allied Military Council arising in part from lack of clarity in the language used and in part because the proposal was not spelled out in more detail. He does not find himself in disagreement with any of the basic principles enunciated by SCAP. The Secretary wishes to explain his proposal further. First, the sentence ‘SCAP would be the Chairman and in cases of disagreement his decision would resolve the matter—’”
[Mr. Atcheson[?]:] There is no necessity to quote the message that you are now sending as copies are [in] front of the conferees here. Go ahead with further discussion.
[Mr. Acheson:] In August the Secretary made a proposal for a Far Eastern Advisory Commission to sit in Washington. China and the Soviet Union accepted by September 7. The British delayed acceptance. By the time the British accepted our proposal the Soviet Union on October 2 stated to the Secretary that the functioning of the Advisory Commission should be preceded by the establishment of a Control Commission in Tokyo. This discussion is still going on and the Soviet Union has not agreed to meet with the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on October 30. Molotov has now receded from his original position and appears to be willing to compromise by the establishment of a commission of the four major powers in Tokyo which would have what amounts to a purely advisory function leaving SCAP with full authority. The Secretary and the Department are most anxious to resolve this controversy with the Soviet Union by giving that Government a face-saving solution. The Secretary believes that time is of the essence and that our relations with U.S.S.R. may well depend upon some adjustment within the coming week. The plan which he has devised and has more fully explained to SCAP in the foregoing cable is for this purpose. He believes that there is nothing in it which in any way impinges upon SCAP’s powers. If there is, it can and should be removed. The plan merely formalizes the present liaison arrangements in such a manner that the U.S.S.R. can withdraw from its present position without loss of prestige. The Secretary hopes that you and McCloy can discuss this fully with General MacArthur explaining to him our problem, our pressing need [Page 770] for a solution and our desire not in any way to interfere with the substance of his authority.
Harriman is seeing Stalin tomorrow and while he is not authorized to put this proposition up to Stalin he is indicating that we are seeking a solution and it will be most helpful to be able to work this matter out with the greatest expedition.
Is this clear? Have you any questions?
[Mr. McCloy:] This is McCloy talking.
I now have had a chance to talk with MacArthur and Atcheson about an arrangement that would be satisfactory to General MacArthur. MacArthur objects to setting up any form of council in Tokyo which would have any executive authority independent of or coextensive with his. On the other hand, he is willing to have introduced Allied political advisers limited to major powers. Is that what you wish (or for that matter military advisers as well) who would have full access to him and who could communicate freely with their own governments but who would have no authority to deal with the Japanese Government and no authority except in an advisory capacity. He would be prepared to have them meet as a body if they wished to do so and he could refer matters to them for their advice or they could originate it if they wished. How frequently they would meet would depend on needs and convenience but anyone could obtain access to General MacArthur individually. If at any time he so desired, MacArthur would want our political adviser to meet with them. Does not this conform to Secretary’s wishes and with the Advisory Commission would it not serve the full purpose you have in mind?
You should realize that already General MacArthur has afforded the existing liaison officers full access to information and full freedom of movement throughout Japan to see and talk with anyone they desire to. He is permitting their scientific observers to move freely throughout the country and any other observers to do the same.
[Mr. Atcheson:] This is Atcheson speaking.
We believe our proposal, as outlined by Mr. McCloy, has advantages over the suggested Military Council. If [It] could take care of the British and Chinese desires to have political representatives in Tokyo as well as constitute a concrete gesture toward the Soviets. It would, we believe, strengthen the American Government’s position with the American Press as furnishing indication on our willingness to have Allied participation on the ground here as suitable counterpart, under the Potsdam Declaration, to our wishes for Allied participation on a broad basis in current European questions.
[Mr. Acheson:] This is Acheson.
In matters of substance General MacArthur’s proposal may go further than necessary. In matters of form it presents some difficulty. [Page 771] In substance we do not desire the proposed council to raise matters which as SCAP pointed out should be dealt with through Far Eastern Adv. Com. on governmental level and which might result in confusion in discussion. This can probably be cared for. However Soviet attach importance to a “Council” even though as in Rumania which they cite as example it is merely meeting place of advisors. How could your proposal take care of this feature?
[Mr. McCloy:] This is McCloy speaking.
Suppose you call it Council of Political Advisors. Would this cover your point? I have not checked name with MacArthur but this may be satisfactory if you feel that it does cover what you have in mind.
[Mr. Acheson:] This is Acheson.
The Far Eastern Adv. Com. is in effect a Council of Political Advisers.
Bohlen stresses that important part of Soviet position is the prestige they attach to membership on a Council on which Gen. MacArthur sits although they do not question in any way his complete & final authority.
[Mr. McCloy:] McCloy talking.
I think that, as Bohlen puts it, it carries with it just the implication that MacArthur wishes to avoid. The substance of what they want is contained in MacArthur’s proposal. Is it not sufficient to try out the idea of political advisers without constituting them formally as a Council? MacArthur could not appropriately be a member if the group was merely advisory to him.
[Mr. Acheson:] Acheson talking.
Our problem in dealing with Soviet request arises from difficulty of denying them the meager position which they have accorded us in the Balkans. This amounts merely to the right to be informed & to express views. Soviet has in practice in Balkans established practice of acting first & informing Council later where they found this desirable.
We hope solution can be found along line of precedent with which Soviet is familiar rather than in a new concept which although in substance carrying perhaps greater participation will cause suspicion.
In further reference to your last sentence, Soviet commanders in Balkans sit on councils which are no more than advisory to them.
Another problem, which I think you overlook, is that of providing a rationale, which will permit the inclusion of the four major powers and the exclusion of the remainder, who are on the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The conception of a group of political advisers would make this more difficult. The idea of the major military powers was to make it easier.
[Page 772][Mr. McCloy:] McCloy talking.
MacArthur willing to inform them and permit expression of views. As I see it the difficulty revolves around the use of the word Council more than anything else. The Balkan situation is not an analogy, for here we have a SCAP set up by agreement by all participating nations. Could we call the group “the Allied Councilors to the SCAP” their status to be as defined in our proposal? I see great difficulty in excluding, from any group operating here, the Australians, who are on, the verge of contributing a substantial force for the occupation for [of?] the country, and who have made a definite contribution to the successful prosecution of the war in the Pacific.
[Mr. Acheson:] Acheson talking.
The Australian problem which is real will have to be met separately perhaps by having them provide the Commonwealth representative or even be added.
The principal point has perhaps now been discussed enough for the present until we each study the matter further. Some such name as Allied Council of SCAP might do. I am not sure just what the issues are between us. Is it whether General MacArthur would preside over Council and/or whether members should be soldiers or civilians?
We have checked the Rumanian arrangements and find that on paper that commission functions as “Allied (Soviet) High Command acting in the name of the Allied Powers”. We cite this merely to point out the difficulties of debating new concepts and models and the desirability where possible of modifying existing ones to assure preservation of SCAP’s full powers and functions.
[Col. Vittrup:] This is Vittrup.
During period of technical difficulties, Mr. Acheson and Bohlen had to leave. Please send whatever else you desire and let us know how long Mr. McCloy will be in Japan. Following that, conference closed unless you have other points you want me to pass on to Mr. Acheson.
. . . . . . .
[Mr. McCloy:] McCloy talking.
There is no issue as to whether the members be civilian or military. They could be either. I think MacArthur would prefer not to sit with them leaving it to them to meet or perhaps have his deputy or Chief of Staff present but I do not know whether [this] is a real issue without consulting MacArthur further[—]the only issue I see is the implication contained in the formal constitution and naming of this group as a quadripartite Council even though it actually has no power except to advise. Precisely because unlike any other theater SCAP has been set up by Allied authority a new nomenclature and [Page 773] procedure seems necessary and advisable in order to avoid any suggestion of a modification of his authority. We will talk with MacArthur further and continue to study problem. In the meantime assume you have enough for Harriman to start on. It is three a.m. here [October 23] and we are quitting for the night. McCloy will spend at least two more days here and possibly three.
. . . . . . .
- Present in Washington were Under Secretary of State Acheson, Charles E. Bohlen of the Office of the Secretary of State, and Cols. R. L. Vittrup and James McCormack, Jr., of the War Department. Among those present in Tokyo were Gen. Richard J. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff to General MacArthur, the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson), the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy), and members of SCAP. The subject of the conference was Allied participation in control and occupation of Japan, with reference to telegrams CA 53682 from Tokyo and War 77672 to Tokyo (neither found in Department files). The time in Japan was early on October 23.↩