740.00119 Council/10–1645: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 16—12:10 p.m.]
3559. Supplementing my message today No. 3558, October 16, noon, knowing how blunt and direct Stalin has always been in my conversations with him, I believe that he will contend that after inviting the Soviet Union to come into the war against Japan we are now excluding him from appropriate consideration in dealing with a defeated Japan. He will not consider that the Advisory Council for the Far East is sufficient participation for the Soviet Union. He will ask why Molotov’s letter of October 1 in which the Soviet request for a Control Council was set forth has been disregarded and why the Soviet Government has now been asked to participate in a meeting of the Far East Advisory Council after its position was made plain in this letter that the question of the control machinery for Japan should be settled first.
I, of course, fully concur with the decision that General MacArthur will continue to be Supreme Commander with final decision but I had assumed that we were prepared to consult fully with our Allies including the Soviet Union, keep them fully informed of developments on all matters, military and political, and attempt to reach agreement on policies and that we would take independent action only if agreement was found impossible.
While I was in London, Dunn told me the SWNC (State-War-Navy Coordinating) Committee had recommended establishment of [Page 756] a military committee of the commanders of the Allied occupational forces in Japan to advise with MacArthur on questions of the enforcement of the surrender terms and control of Japan.
It seems that the Soviet Govt’s present unwillingness to discuss the question of control machinery for Japan at the proposed meeting of all the Allies in the Advisory Council is based on the belief that this is such a fundamental subject that it can only be discussed frankly and fully in a more restricted group.
It would be useful if I could be informed of whether we intend to have any prior discussions formal or informal with the Soviet Govt on this subject or whether it is our intention to go ahead with the meeting of the Advisory Council October 23 without Soviet participation. I feel that if I am able to see Stalin it would be better for me to present frankly our position and attempt to get his general agreement and so avoid if possible the development of an impasse. In the latter event it can be assumed that the Soviets would pursue a unilateral policy in areas which they can dominate.
I believe that the most promising procedure is to inform Stalin frankly of our intentions and plans and thus allay the unreasonable suspicions which are evidently mounting in his mind. It will be recalled that he told Soong50 that China and Russia should realize the US might well be weak in her policies towards Japan and eventually lose interest in eliminating Japan as a future threat.
Until at least some preliminary understanding is reached with the Soviet Govt regarding Japan, I am fearful that we may be unable to reach a settlement on the procedures for the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers in considering European problems.
- T. V. Soong, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier), signed the treaty of August 14 and related agreements at Moscow; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 300.↩