740.00119 PW/10–1945
Report by the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff35
Draft Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
National policy, as set forth in SWNCC 70/5* and approved by the President, states that Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union have a responsibility to participate with the United States in the occupation and military control of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof; that the United States should exercise the controlling voice in the occupation authority in Japan proper and should designate the commander of all occupation forces and principal subordinate commanders; and that the occupation authority should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately.
General MacArthur considers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur, that if the United States is to maintain the controlling voice in the occupation of Japan, U.S. participation in the occupation forces must be at least equal to that of all other nations combined. Further, in order to permit a reduction in the number of U.S. troops, forces of other nations must be equal in all important respects to American troops. The provision of suitably qualified forces by the other powers will thus make it possible to release up to half of the U.S. troops required for occupational purposes in Japan. Based on present estimates which indicate a requirement on the order of 200,000 troops to occupy Japan, the provision of Allied contingents might thus reduce the requirement for U.S. troops to some 100,000 men. However, if arrangements are made at this time to provide 90,000 to 100,000 men in Allied contingents, and if it should subsequently become evident that the present estimate of about 200,000 men required for the occupational force is excessive, it will not be possible to reduce further U.S. participation unless the dominant voice in the occupational authority is relinquished by the United States, or unless it is practicable to arrange for proportional and simultaneous withdrawal of Allied forces. Participation by the Allies should therefore be limited to that minimum size necessary to obtain the political objectives of the [Page 745] United States. For planning purposes it is considered that the British Empire, China and Russia might each furnish between 20,000 and 30,000 troops, thus reducing the U.S. requirement to perhaps 100,000 men.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the Secretary of State needs to enter, at his earliest convenience, into negotiations with the major Allies to provide occupational forces for Japan proper in order to attain the political objectives of the United States set forth in SWNCC 70/5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the invitation extended to China, Great Britain and Russia should envisage provision by each of a force of about 30,000 men. The invitation should specify that the forces so provided will be integrated operationally into the U.S. forces under General MacArthur, that they should be balanced and self-supporting, that the maintenance of these forces will be the responsibility of the government providing the forces and that General MacArthur will utilize these forces in any area or manner which, in his opinion, the military situation may require. In view of practical difficulties of integrating highly technical elements such as air forces and naval vessels, it is recommended that the Secretary of State discourage offers of token air and naval forces as components of each nation’s contribution. If they must be included, these components should be integrated into the U.S. air and naval forces in a manner similar to the U.S. ground forces. [Foregoing sentence deleted.]
The following major units and total strengths which allow for supporting units are suggested as a basis for initiating negotiations: China, three infantry divisions (equivalent in numbers to one U.S. division with supporting troops), total about 30,000 men; U.S.S.R., one reinforced infantry division, total about 30,000 men; and Great Britain, one composite Empire infantry division, total about 30,000 men. If air and naval units are included, the totals should be within these totals.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the inclusion of forces of the Philippine Commonwealth in addition to those of the major Allies, if an invitation to the Philippine Government is politically desirable.
A draft indicating points which need to be covered in an agreement with a foreign nation is attached hereto.
- Submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with recommendation it be forwarded to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. For action, see last paragraph of memorandum by the War Department, p. 762. On October 23, by informal action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation subject to amendment (indicated in brackets).↩
- On file in J.C.S. Secretariat. (SWNCC 70/5 is a revision of SWNCC 70/2 (J.C.S. 1398) incorporating amendments requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 1398/1.) [Footnote in the original; documents under reference not printed.]↩
- With reference to bracketed insertions in this appendix, see last sentence of footnote 35, p. 744.↩